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Preface
Are fishing rights good, bad, necessary? Ichiro Nomura, Assistant Director General
of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) asserts in
SAMUDRA Report No 44, the triannual publication of the International Collective in
Support of Fishworkers  (ICSF) (see pg. 82): “The FAO Secretariat has moved, beyond
a doubt, on the matter of whether fishing rights are good or not. They are absolutely
necessary and fundamental to the sustainability of the world’s fisheries resources”.
This begs questions such as: Are fishery resources better conserved under a rights-
based regime? What are the pros and cons of fishing rights in different parts of the
world? What are the elements to look for in a fishing-rights regime, particularly in
the context of developing countries? Do small-scale fishing communities benefit from
different forms of fishing rights?
This dossier, a compilation of articles from various issues of SAMUDRA Report since
1996, seeks answers to these questions. It examines some of the approaches and types
of fishing rights in the geographic contexts of Africa, Asia, North America (Canada),
Europe and Latin America. Ranging from topics like artisanal fishing zones in India
and Peru to individual transferable quota (ITQ) regimes in Iceland, New Zealand and
Canada, most of these articles are written primarily from the perspective of small-
scale fisheries, and coastal and inland fishing communities.
Some of the articles reflect the genuine apprehensions of small-scale fishing
communities about ‘distributional inequities’, about exclusion and marginalization
from the introduction of property rights that valorize capital over labour and
community interests. Acquisitions of ITQs by corporations, argues Parzival Copes in
his article (see pg. 5), would “destroy the viability of many smaller communities that
do not have the financial resources to compete for the purchase of quotas and licenses.”
Einar Eythorssson, in an article on Iceland (see pg. 1), while not denying that there
are economic benefits from ITQs, raises the question of “who is enjoying these benefits,
at what cost to whom?” Considering incidents of ‘high grading’, ‘quota busting’,
‘price dumping’ and ‘data fouling’ in countries that have adopted an ITQ-based
fisheries management system, some of the articles in this dossier question whether
or not a rights-based regime is the best bet for better conservation of fisheries resources.
There are also articles that show how some disadvantaged coastal communities have,
in fact, benefited from the introduction of property rights in fishing. Matthew Hooper,
in an article on ITQs in New Zealand (see pg. 18), for example, claims, drawing upon
the experience of the Maori peoples, “how a system based on well-defined property
rights allows the rights of indigenous communities to be recognized and provided
for…”
There is broad agreement, on the one hand, about a rights-based approach to fishing,
including the introduction of artisanal and trawl-free zones in coastal fishing, aquarian
reforms in inland fishing, fishing rights in reservoir fishing, transferable quotas in
large-scale fishing, reallocation of rights in commercial fishing, or assertion of
traditional rights in marine fishing. There is some support to adopting fishing-rights
regimes in consultation with fishing communities and in implementing these regimes
in a participatory manner. In this context, the role of fishers’ movements has been
highlighted.
On the other hand, from a perspective of labour, gender and human rights, there are
fears about some forms of fishing-rights regimes being inequitable, and about the
socially insensitive manner in which some of these regimes are defined, adopted and
v
vi
practised. The underlying narrow economic worldview of these regimes has been
critically examined.
What emerges very clear from the debate is that the last word is yet to be spoken on
fishing-rights regimes and their scope, especially in the small-scale fisheries of the
world.
At the end of the day, questions still remain, and more unresolved questions are only
round the corner. How can fishing-rights regimes be an improvement over
conventional fisheries management? How practical would it be to integrate the
principle of irreversible ‘exclusion’, at tremendous social costs, into decisions
regarding who can fish? In small-scale fisheries, are property rights necessarily the
best way to determine how access amongst small-scale fishers will be allocated? How
could they protect the autonomy of small-scale fishing communities and prevent
alienation of access to fisheries resources to large corporations? How could they not
end up marginalizing fishworkers? How could they protect and improve upon
traditional rights? It appears that greater adaptive space and flexibility of fishing-
rights regimes would perhaps significantly help fishery stakeholders, particularly in
the developing world, adopt such regimes.
Or should we, as Menakhem Ben-Yami argues in his characteristically blunt style
(see pg. 34), treat all ponderings over fishing rights as hyperbole and continue with
conventional input-control measures in conjunction with small-scale fisheries that
employ “less capital-intensive and technologically and operationally sophisticated
fishing methods”?
These are questions that will especially trouble policymakers and fishworker
organizations from developing countries—and it is for them that this dossier is
primarily meant. Although most of the articles in it are drawn from the experience of
marine fisheries in industrialized countries, they are relevant to developing countries
and will help them make “an informed judgement about the social costs and benefits”,
as well as the “moral and legal foundation” of the debate. After all, the pressure on
developing countries to adopt fishing-rights regimes is based on the experience of
rich countries.
We hope this dossier helps readers understand the vicissitudes of some of the fishing-
rights regimes in the world.  It draws attention to the importance of designing such
regimes—if deemed necessary—to deliver conservation and management benefits
to small-scale fisheries by demonstrating sufficient sensitivity toward the economic
and social needs of coastal and inland fishing communities.
Sebastian Mathew
Programme Adviser, ICSF
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During the past decade, fish resourcemanagement by a system ofindividual transferable quotas or ITQs
has been strongly promoted as a solution to
the problems of ineffective management and
economic inefficiency in the fisheries. The
ITQ model is attractive to resource managers
for a number of reasons. First, it leaves the
difficult problem of distributing fishing quotas
fairly and equitably among fishermen and
fishing communities to the market
mechanism, making life easier for the
managers. Second, it leaves the problem of
getting rid of excess fleet capacity to the
market and thus removes the strain of buy-
back programmes and compensations from
government budgets. Third, it promises a
more efficient fisheries industry in the future,
which, in turn, will create a flow of tax
revenues and even resource rentals into the
governments’ coffers.
To fishermen, or owners of fishing vessels,
to be more specific, the system may also look
quite attractive. Unsuccessful fishermen can
sell their quotas to their more expansionist
colleagues, thus receiving a fair compensation
for leaving the industry. Those who want to
expand, or need additional quota to fully
utilize the capacity of their vessels, can buy
it at a market price.
The aggregate result should be an
economically sound fisheries industry, with
improved job security and solid foundations
for community development. This is, in short,
the story told by the promoters of the ITQ
system.  The Republic of Iceland was one
of the first States to introduce ITQs as an
overall management system in its marine
fisheries. Those who are considering ITQs
as a management option should, for that
reason, be interested in studying the Icelandic
case. Are there lessons to be learnt from the
Icelandic experience?
From 1984 to 1990, fishing quotas for cod
and other demersal species were allocated
to fishing vessels according to catch records
for 1980-83. Quotas could not be divided or
removed permanently from vessels, except
if a vessel was wrecked or sold abroad. Quota
transfers that meant a reduction of total quota
holdings within a municipality had to be
authorized by municipal councils and local
trade unions. Market transfers of quota shares
were relatively rare during this period. Quota
leasing, which means that a part of an annual
quota held by one boat is caught by another,
was allowed from the start, and developed
slowly and without much controversy until
1993.
By January 1991, the system was liberalized.
Quota shares were allocated permanently,
without any time limits. Quotas became
divisible. They could be separated from
vessels and transferred freely, as independent
commodities, but only to other vessel owners.
While the 1990 fisheries law, in practice,
allowed for a semi-privatization of the fishing
rights in Icelandic waters, it also defined fish
resources as public property. According to
the law, the fishing rights defined and
distributed under the law are not private
property rights.
Confusing status
This somewhat confusing legal status of the
quota shares evoked complicated debates
over the issues of taxation, depreciation and
Feudalism at sea
Einar Eythorsson
Iceland’s experience with individual transferable quotas is an
eye-opener to the problems and prospects of fisheries management by quotas
This article is by
Einar Eythorsson, an
Icelandic social
scientist, then with
Finnmark College,
Abo, Norway. This
article first appeared
in SAMUDRA Report
No. 22, April 1999
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the use of quota shares as collateral. How is
it possible for a private person to buy or sell
something which is public property? Would
such a thing be liable to taxation? Should
banks accept public property as collateral for
private loans?
Initially, investment in quota shares was
considered as expenditure, and quota holdings
were not treated as capital, which meant that
they could not be used as bank collateral. In
1993, the Icelandic Supreme Court, however,
found that quota holdings should be treated
as private capital, and that they could be
depreciated by the same rate as for
copyrights—20 per cent annually. At first, the
collateral problem was solved by mutual
agreements between banks and indebted boat
owners to ensure that quota shares and
vessels could not be separated without
consulting the bank. In the long run, this
situation became very unpractical (fishing
vessels representing minor market value
without quota shares) and quota shares were
eventually allowed as collateral.
The generous depreciation rate for quota
shares is also being removed, as it has led to
a reduction in tax payments from the fishing
industry. The official status of quota shares
as public property, while they are treated as
private property for all practical purposes, can
not be upheld in the long run. This was
illustrated by a Supreme Court decision in
December 1998, which is detailed later on in
this article.
As the ITQ system, in theory at least, should
strengthen the foundations of the fishing
industry, it should mean more secure and
even better paid jobs at sea. On the basis of
such future prospects, the Icelandic Union
of Deckhands (SS) was basically positive to
the introduction of ITQs. The Union of
Skippers and Mates (FFS) was more
sceptical, and soon became explicitly
negative. Since the liberalization of the ITQ
system in 1991, there has been a series of
bitter conflicts between vessel owners and
crewmen, resulting in repeated strikes and
lockouts in the industry. The reason is found
mainly in the changing dynamics in the
fisheries industry under ITQs, especially the
implications of a growing leasing market for
annual quotas.
The term ‘quota leasing’ covers different
types of transactions to transfer rights to catch
a certain amount of a certain fish species in
the current year from one vessel to another.
One form of transaction is an equal exchange
of species—the rights to catch one species
are paid for by the rights to catch another,
based on an exchange rate between different
species. A second form is leasing quota
directly, which means that the right to catch
a certain amount of fish is paid for in money,
at a market price derived from supply and
demand.
A third variety, which became increasingly
common during 1992-93, is contract fishing,
or what is often referred to among fishermen
as ‘fishing for others’. Fishing contracts are,
in many cases, signed between vessel
owners with small quota holdings and
vertically integrated fishing/processing
companies with large quota holdings. The
vessels are then obliged to deliver their
catches to the company. They receive a fixed
price for the catch.
In 1993, this price was about half the market
price in the case of cod fishing, the remaining
50 per cent being indirect payment for the
leasing of quota from the company. The
income of crew members is a fixed
percentage of the price received for the
catch, as defined by the share system. The
practice of contract fishing outlined above
means that the income of a crew on a vessel
fishing under such a contract is bound to be
substantially lower than the income of a similar
crew on a similar vessel with sufficient quota
holdings belonging to the vessel.
As contract fishing became more
widespread, more crewmen experienced a
drop in their income. According to their
unions, there were several incidents of leasing
contracts being arranged for the sole purpose
of reducing the labour costs in the fisheries,
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a practice often referred to as ‘quota-
profiteering’ (kvotabrask).
Feudal system
The system of contract fishing is often
referred to as a feudal system of ‘sea lords’
and ‘tenants’. Under the ITQ system, quota
holdings are being concentrated in fewer and
bigger companies, while there is a substantial
fleet of fishing vessels with insufficient quota
holdings for a year-round operation. In some
cases, vessels have been stripped of their
quota, and sold cheaply to fishermen who
intend to make a living by leased quotas.
These boats, the so-called ‘eunuchs’,
contribute to the high demand for leased
quota and a high leasing price. In this
situation, vertically integrated processor
companies can, in fact, ask for bids from idle
vessels, in order to have ‘their fish’ brought
home at the lowest possible cost.
This, in short, was the background of the
fishermen’s strike in January 1994 and
repeated strikes in the following years. The
unions wanted to abolish the system of quota
leasing, or even remove the entire ITQ
system. The result has been a partial return
to a system of negotiated minimum prices,
and a special committee to resolve conflicts
regarding prices and shares. There is a
growing opinion that the share system should
be reformed or even abolished to avoid the
effects of ITQs upon the income of
crewmen. The fact that the holders of quota
shares also hold the strongest negotiating
power in the industry has now been realized
by the unions—despite the strikes, they have
not achieved any fundamental change of the
ITQ system.
After eight years of experience with the ITQ
system, the controversies within the industry
and in Icelandic politics are as strong as ever.
Repeated polls among the Icelandic
population show that most of the public is
opposed to the system. It is, however,
uncertain how, or if, the implementation of
ITQs can be reversed without a massive
economic loss. Quota shares are considered
as private property for all practical purposes,
and they represent a major capital value,
relative to the national economy of Iceland.
Companies with big quota holdings have
strengthened their position, and quite a few
of them have made investments in fisheries
enterprises abroad. It is thus hard to imagine
how the quota-capital could be returned to
the public. In any case, the present owners
of quota shares would claim full economic
compensation from the government if their
quota assets were to be confiscated.
However, it seems that we have not yet seen
the end of the ITQ story in Iceland. In
December 1998 the Icelandic Supreme Court
reached a verdict in a case raised by a
fisherman who had been denied a fishing
licence and a catch quota. The denial was
based on the fact that the fisherman in
question had not been an owner of an active
fishing vessel in the early 1980s, the period in
which ‘fishing experience’ was converted into
fishing rights.
Equal rights
Considering the Icelandic constitution, which
claims equal employment rights for every
citizen and the Fisheries Law of 1990, which
defines the fish resources as public property,
the Supreme Court found the denial unlawful
and unconstitutional. In short, the Court found
that by implementing the ITQ system, the
government had given away exclusive rights
to the publicly owned Icelandic fish resources
to a group of people who happened to be the
owners of active fishing vessels at a certain
point of time. Such an act could not be justified
by the need to preserve the resources or by
the best public interest.
So far, the Icelandic government has
responded by making a minor change in the
fisheries legislation. Any owner of a fishing
vessel is now free to apply for a licence, which
provides the opportunity to catch some quite
rare fish species that are not managed under
the ITQ system. However, catch quota for
any of the major commercial species must
still be bought or leased from the present
owners. Provided that there are limited
employment alternatives for fishermen, this
...by implementing
the ITQ system,
the government
had given away
exclusive rights to
the publicly owned
Icelandic fish
resources to a
group of people
who happened to
be the owners of
active fishing
vessels at a certain
point of time
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change will probably only increase the
demand for annual quota on leasing contracts,
as more vessels with little or no quota can
enter the market. This, in turn, may cause a
further increase in leasing prices and,
consequently, a downwards pressure upon
the income of crewmen. Meanwhile, the
capital value of quota shares will climb further
upwards.
I have chosen to dwell upon some of the
problematic issues involved in fisheries
management by ITQs. I will not argue that
there are no economic benefits from ITQs. I
will rather ask who is enjoying these benefits,
and at what cost to whom. Judging from the
Icelandic experience, there seems to be little
doubt that ITQ systems have major
implications for the distribution of income,
wealth and power. By learning from the
experience of Iceland and other States that
have implemented ITQs, it should be possible
to make an informed judgement about the
social costs and benefits of the system, as
well as its moral and legal foundation. 
Judging from the
Icelandic
experience, there
seems to be little
doubt that ITQ
systems have
major implications
for the distribution
of income, wealth
and power
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Since the beginning of civilization,fisherfolk of coastal communities havelaid claim to adjacent coastal
resources. Their perceived rights to local fish
stocks derive from the sustained use they
have made of them. The importance of these
rights has been intensified by the evolved
economic dependence of coastal people on
their fishery resources. However, it is
becoming increasingly clear that coastal
communities will be able to maintain their
prerogatives of priority access to adjacent
fish resources only by a vigorous collective
defence of these resources as their common
property.
Typically, most inshore fish resources have
lent themselves well to harvesting by locally
based small-scale fishermen. Their traditional
rights to adjacent fish stocks are now
threatened by two significant developments.
One is the growth in power and ambition of
industrial corporations in the fisheries sector.
Such corporations have naturally dominated
offshore and distant-water fishing operations,
because of their ready ability to access the
large-scale technology and financing needed
for such operations. Now, in their drive for
greater market share and enhanced security
of raw material supplies, they are also
seeking to increase their direct access to
resource-rich coastal fisheries.
The second threatening development is the
current drive for formalization of access
rights to fish resources in a manner
compatible with contemporary Western
notions of corporate and individual private
property. This is increasingly taking the form
of attempts to ‘privatize’ the fisheries by
commercializing ownership rights through
transferable shares in the fish harvest. Such
rights are referred to as ‘individual
transferable quotas’ (ITQs). An underlying
objective of most promoters of ITQs is to
ensure the dominance of market forces in
arranging access to the fisheries, by allowing
unfettered transferability and accumulation of
quotas at unrestrained market prices. This
has the effect of monetizing access rights at
high capital values, thereby favouring
corporations and wealthy investors. Using
their financial power, they are able to bid up
the price of quotas and buy up access rights
to large shares of the harvest, either by
outright quota ownership or by control through
tied loans to individual operators.
The complexity and high cost of managing
ITQ systems have made their application in
the coastal fisheries of most developing
countries impractical at this time. Here the
corporate fisheries sector is more likely to
impact the small-boat inshore fisheries
through the incursions of larger company
vessels into inshore waters or through their
depletion of stocks that migrate between the
inshore and the offshore.
The usual procedure in introducing an ITQ
regime is to give a free allocation of perpetual
quotas to the owners of currently operating
fishing vessels, with the proviso that they (and
future owners) have the right to sell these at
any price obtainable in the market. The value
of a set of quota holdings, even of a small-
boat operator, in many fisheries may now run
to tens of thousands of US dollars and, in some
fisheries, may amount to well in excess of a
million dollars.
Coastal resources for whom?
Parzival Copes
As powerful forces seek to industrialize and privatize the world’s fish
resources, it is time to counter the moves to dispossess coastal fisherfolk
This article is a
summary of an
extended paper by
Parzival Copes,
which formed the
keynote address at
the founding meeting
of the World Forum
of Fish Harvesters
and Fishworkers in
New Delhi, on 18
November 1997.
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 23, September
1999
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Such prices constitute a strong incentive for
established fishermen to sell out if they are
in an ITQ fishery, particularly if they are close
to retirement. If they are in a fishery without
transferable rights, they may be persuaded
to have their fishery converted to an ITQ
system, so that they may also make a windfall
gain when they retire.
ITQ systems are very difficult to dismantle,
both for fiscal and political reasons. Once
the rights have been traded, the new owners
would claim full compensation for the rights
they had bought if the government decided
that the ITQ or transferable licence regime
was not working well and should be
abandoned. The fiscal burden might be
insupportably high and the political
embarrassment would be great. Transferable
rights programmes are, therefore, almost
irreversible.
With ITQ systems, it is difficult for crew
members on small boats to become, in time,
vessel owner-operators, as has been part of
the life-cycle pattern in so many fishing
communities. The inequitable give-away of
transferable rights to particular individuals
who happen to be boatowners at the right
time will tend to confine access to the fishery
to a more select group and their heirs, and
thereby create or sharpen class divisions in
fishing communities. A further important
social and economic concern is that of the
geographical concentration of fishery access
privileges. This may be achieved through the
acquisition or control of ITQs by corporations,
which then locate the fishing vessels they
own or control at their base of operations in
particular larger centres. This is liable, in time,
to destroy the viability of many smaller
communities that do not have the financial
resources to compete for the purchase of
quotas and licences, but that would have
remained economically viable if they had
continued to have access to their accustomed
resource base. This represents a loss of
social capital invested in infrastructure and
of private capital invested by the inhabitants,
who may also find their lives disrupted and
their circumstances much reduced.
It is important to recognize clearly the intrinsic
nature of a government’s move to install an
ITQ regime, starting with a free gift of
marketable access rights to selected
individuals. It is basically the expropriation
without compensation of a community’s
resource base. This may end up with
alienation of the resource from the
community, and its actual or prospective
transfer into the hands of outside corporate
or entrepreneurial interests, which may
decide to exploit the resource from a distant
base. The direct financial value of this
confiscation may be measured by the
capitalized value of the quota holdings
representing the alienated resource.
Privatization of rights
In summary, what does the move to
‘privatization’ of fishing rights in the form of
ITQs and transferable licences really mean
for coastal communities that have been
historically dependent on their local fishery
base?
It may mean the ‘enclosure’ of their fishery
commons by the authority of a distant
government; the confiscation of a fishery
resource to which they have had a long-
established traditional right; the rupture of a
community’s social fabric and the sharpening
of class and wealth distinctions, with the
assignment of windfall gains to some and the
loss of access to a master-fisherman’s career
for others; the prospect of alienation of a vital
community resource base to wealthier outside
interests; and, finally, the possible decline and
eventual abandonment of the community
itself.
ITQs are frequently promoted as a device to
‘privatize’ the fishery. It is asserted that they
would abolish the common-property nature
of fish stocks, and bring about private
ownership of the fishery, with the efficiency
advantages that attach to such ownership.
This vision is wrong. The notion that ITQs
will remove the common-property nature of
fish stocks and make the fishery ‘just like’
other industries is utterly unrealistic. It needs
to be realized that fish in the ocean are
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fugitive and can not be segregated, identified
and assigned to different owners. The
ecology that nurtures them is the seamless
multi-use ocean environment that is common
for fishing, recreation, transportation and
many other purposes. Fish stocks and the
ocean environment that produces them, by
their very nature, are common-use and
common-property resources. They can not
be divided into self-contained and separately
managed units to which comprehensively
specified private property rights may be
attached.
For privatization of the fishery to be
substantially complete and to meet the test
of economic efficiency, it would be required
to give every fishing enterprise exclusive
property rights to, and exclusive control over,
a particular identified set of fish, along with
a particular ecology that produces those fish,
in the same way that a farmer owns and
controls specific animals and all the
productive facilities of the farm necessary
to raise and bring those animals to market. It
is patently impossible to operate in such a
fashion in the marine fisheries, because of
the physically determined common-use
nature of the resource.
ITQs do not give property rights to the fish
stocks, but only privileged access rights to a
pool of fish that quota holders continue to
exploit in common. It has been demonstrated
that ITQs will often help to rationalize fishing
capacity. On the other hand, as shown above,
they will also frequently result in distributional
inequities. Of further concern is the fact that,
in many cases, they are demonstrated to be
damaging to fisheries conservation.
In ITQ fisheries, the total allowable catch
(TAC) needs to be set firmly at the beginning
of a season or fishing period, as participants
need to know in advance what their quota
(share of the TAC) is. The credibility of the
system depends on honouring the set quotas,
but sound management requires constant
monitoring of stocks, with in-season changes
in TACs and fishery closures, according to
observed stock conditions. The inflexible
TACs of ITQ systems lead to harmful
overfishing if they are set too high, or wasteful
underfishing if they are set too low.
ITQ systems are notorious for cheating
(‘quota busting’), with participants taking, but
failing to report, catches in excess of quota.
Enforcement of quotas is difficult, expensive
and, in many fisheries, impossible to achieve.
Where enforcement of quotas is reasonably
successful, a different problem arises, that
of `high-grading’. In order to maximize
income from their (quantitative) quotas,
fishers are induced to throw away fish that
have a lower value per pound, which often
means a significant part of their otherwise
saleable catch will be discarded and go to
waste. Even worse is the practice of ‘price-
dumping’ in some ITQ fisheries, where the
entire catch of a trip is discarded if, on the
way back to port, it is found that the day’s
market price is low.
Forbidden practices
All three of the foregoing practices are usually
forbidden in ITQ fisheries, and so perpetrators
do not report their transgressions. This leads
to ‘data fouling’, with catch mortality being
under-reported and managers not knowing the
full impact of fishing on stocks. The result is
inferior stock estimation and greater hazards
in setting unreliable quotas at the beginning
of the fishing season.
Adding to the problems are mixed-stock
fisheries, where it is impossible for vessel
operators to catch different species in the
same proportions as the quotas given for those
species. This also may result in discarding to
match catches with quotas, or to quota busting
to hide overages.
There is ample evidence to indicate that ITQ
systems often can not be reconciled with
sound fisheries management and are basically
incompatible with the precautionary approach
that is now the international standard for
responsible fisheries management. While
small-scale fishing communities may feel
particularly threatened by the damaging social
impacts of ITQs, they may find that some of
ITQs do not give
property rights to
the fish stocks, but
only privileged
access rights to a
pool of fish that
quota holders
continue to exploit
in common
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their most effective arguments refer to the
adverse conservation impacts of ITQs. This
also provides a strong basis for alliance with
socially sensitive environmental groups.
In the industrialized countries, small-scale,
owner-operated vessels fishing in coastal
waters have some important natural
advantages over the corporate fisheries
sector. Smaller vessels are generally
effective in targeting inshore stocks, and
economical in operation close to their local
base. With short times at sea and a good
holding facility, they can deliver a high-quality,
fresh product. The owner-operator of a small
boat is greatly motivated to run his vessel
efficiently and maintain it carefully.
Provided the small-scale fishery is
rationalized to yield attractive revenues per
boat and to operate subsidy-free, it is in a
position to impress sensitive governments
with the social advantages of its relatively
high labour intensity, its favourable lifestyle,
and its economic and social underpinning of
smaller coastal communities.
The populations of many fishing communities
have grown, while advancing technology has
reduced employment opportunities in the
fishery, even if partially offset by the greater
range of fisheries now pursued. To remain
economically healthy, the small-boat sector
must accept the need to keep fishing capacity
in balance with available harvests. This will
probably require occasional reductions in fleet
size by buy-back, in order to offset likely
advances in fleet productivity.
Developing countries
The plight of small-scale fishing communities
in developing countries is often a daunting
one. Where population densities are high,
open access to the fishery has frequently
attracted large numbers of impoverished,
landless workers.
Fishing communities have often become the
abode of ‘the poorest of the poor’. Intense
population pressure, in combination with a
lack of government capacity to manage the
fisheries and a lack of effective local authority
to impose a conservationist discipline, easily
leads to overfishing.
In several countries, the desperate need for
immediate daily income has caused fishers
to engage in ‘Malthusian overfishing’,
employing destructive techniques using
dynamite, poison and ultra-small-mesh nets.
In developing countries, the immediate threat
to small-scale fisheries often comes from the
encroachment on inshore fish stocks by
industrial fishing operations. These have often
been encouraged by governments anxious to
promote industrialization and to develop
export industries for high-value species, such
as shrimp.
In addition, industrial fisheries and
aquaculture operations have been allowed to
encroach upon the grounds of small-scale
fishers. Lack of fishery management
restrictions on these operations often leads
to depletion of wild stocks and disease
outbreaks in aquaculture.
On the other hand, in some countries,
governments have recognized the needs of
vulnerable coastal communities, and have
moved to protect coastal fisheries by
prohibiting larger vessels from fishing near
to shore, though enforcement has frequently
been ineffective.
The immediate priority of threatened small-
scale coastal fishing populations in developing
countries has to be the vigorous assertion and
defence of traditional rights to adjacent
resources, culminating in legal recognition of
those rights. No less important, however, is
the long-term need to achieve a reform of
coastal fisheries that will help to banish
damaging fishing practices and produce larger
sustainable yields. Experience suggests that
community-based co-management
approaches may have the best prospects for
success. A full solution to the coastal fisheries
problem in developing countries will require
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the provision of job opportunities outside the
fishery to draw off surplus labour from the
fishery.
Political fashion
Small-scale fishing communities in developed
countries have become the victims of the
current political fashion for ‘privatization’. It
is being applied to the fishing industry
incorrectly, in the mistaken belief that the
common-use and common-property
characteristics of marine resources can be
suppressed.
The device of the ITQ is being used to this
end, on the erroneous assumption that
fugitive marine resources can be divided,
packaged and assigned to private owners in
effectively the same fashion as immobile and
captive terrestrial resources.
In some places, much damage has already
been done in alienating fishery resources
from small-scale fish harvesters and in
diverting fish catches from smaller, fishery-
dependent communities to larger, industrial
centres. Meanwhile, in developing countries,
small-scale fish harvesters in many places
are losing resources to encroaching industrial
fishing and aquaculture operations. The
already precarious livelihood of large
numbers of fishery-dependent workers and
their families is at stake.
Behind the current campaign for
‘privatization’ of fisheries lies the reality of
an assault on the traditional common-
property resource rights of vulnerable
fishery-dependent populations. Given the
clearly adverse impacts of privatization
devices such as ITQs, both on social equity
and on resource conservation, a strong basis
exists for joint action in defence of common-
property marine fish resources by groups
representing small-scale fish harvesters and
environmentalists, both in developing and in
industrialized countries. Considering the
extensive and near-irreversible damage that
is being inflicted by so-called fisheries
privatization, there is no time to lose in
mounting the defence. 
The immediate
priority of
threatened small-
scale coastal
fishing populations
in developing
countries has to be
the vigorous
assertion and
defence of
traditional rights
to adjacent
resources,
culminating in
legal recognition
of those rights
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The native peoples of Canadarepresent approximately five per centof the country’s population. They live
along the three ocean coasts of  the country
as well as inland, and have  been on the
continent for thousands of  years. During the
17th and 18th centuries, the then British
colonial power entered  into various treaties
with them, sometimes for purposes of peace
and friendship, and sometimes to guarantee
territory and trade.
One such treaty was agreed to in 1760
between the British Governor Lawrence  and
the M’ikmaq peoples who fished and  hunted
in the regions of eastern Canada bordering
the Atlantic. The treaty itself generally  fell
into disuse but was used in defence of a
M’ikmaq fisherman, Donald Marshall Jr.,
who was charged with fishing in a closed
area, using unregulated gear.
The case found its way through Canada’s
judicial system right up to the Supreme Court.
On 17 September 1999, Supreme Court
acquitted Marshall on the  basis that the treaty
gave him a right to fish  and trade such fish
in order to earn a  moderate livelihood for
himself and his family. The court decision
made it explicit that the treaty right could be
regulated and subject to catch limits that
provided  for a moderate livelihood. However,
some M’ikmaq people believed they now had
a recognized right to fish when and where
they so chose, and began  placing lobster traps
into areas where the lobster season was
closed.
As the M’ikmaq built up their fishing
presence in closed lobster areas,  commercial
fishermen who rely on the  same lobster area
for their livelihood grew  increasingly angry
as the Government  Department of Fisheries
made no  attempts to restrain the out-of-
season  fishing.
The situation exploded on 3 October when
fishermen in the Miramichi Bay off the  coast
of New Brunswick sent out 100 boats  that
proceeded to haul up native lobster  traps,
removed the meshing, returned the  lobsters
to the water and sank the disabled  traps.
Native persons responded by taking over  the
government wharf at Burnt Church on the
Miramichi, burning two fishermen’s  trucks
and bringing in what they refer to as their
‘warrior society’. Native and non-native
people were driven into direct and violent
conflict with one another, and similar situations
threatened to break out in other coastal areas.
The Marshall Case was now preoccupying
the media and the political leaders of the
country. The decision of the Supreme Court
judges was questioned widely, and two of the
seven judges also dissented. The Premier of
Newfoundland, Brian Tobin, blasted the
judges for not  understanding the nature of
the fishery and for not providing a period of
time for the implications of the decision to be
properly managed and implemented. The
entire commercial fishing sector in Eastern
Canada was protesting, calling for a
moratorium and political intervention. They
felt the fishery as they knew it was being
undermined.
Restrictive regime
The reader not familiar with Canada must
remember that there are 50,000 fishermen
in Atlantic Canada fishing under a very
Flipped on its head?
Michael Belliveau
A Canadian Supreme Court ruling on the traditional fishing
rights of the M’ikmaq threatens relations with commercial fishermen
This article is by the
late Michael
Belliveau, an
erstwhile Member of
ICSF and formerly
Executive Secretary,
MFU. This article
first appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 24, December
1999
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restrictive fisheries management regime. The
lobster fishery is particularly sensitive
because the species is widely dispersed in
inshore waters along a very large coastline.
It is a fishery broken down by zones (lobster
is a sedentary species seldom moving beyond
25 km of its habitat), and each of 44 zones
has a specified season that is rigidly enforced.
Licences are limited, and their total number
frozen. This limited entry has led, over time,
to licences acquiring a value and being
considered as quasi-property. If you had
invested $100,000 in a lobster licence, you
might get a little anxious if you saw a few
native fishermen fishing out of season,
apparently authorized by the Supreme Court
to do so, and catching with each trap ten
times as many lobsters as the commercial
fishermen catch in season.
The M’ikmaq people, for their part, have
historically been marginalized into a  reserve
system (although they also have  full rights
as Canadian citizens), where rates of
unemployment are astronomical, levels of
education low, and standards of  living below
the poverty line. They believe their fishing
rights have been denied them under the
modern fisheries management regime.
In total numbers, the M’ikmaq pose no
serious threat to commercial fishermen,
except in localized areas where there are
significant numbers of natives adjacent to  the
lobster grounds that are fully subscribed to.
However, if their treaty right is a ‘blank
cheque’ to fish whenever, wherever and
however, then the commercial fishery, as  we
know it, has been flipped on its head. But
the Supreme Court has made it clear  that it
is not a ‘blank cheque’, but a limited  right to
a moderate livelihood and, indeed, it is a
‘communal’ right and not an  individual right
as such.
The obligation is on the M’ikmaq as a people
to exercise the right in accordance with
regulations. The Government of Canada has
appointed a Chief Negotiator who has until
15 April 2000 to arrive at interim fishing plans
that accommodate the new treaty rights. Until
such fishing plans are tied down, inshore
fishermen  remain extremely anxious, and the
social climate in fishing areas where natives
and non-natives live in the same broader
communities remains tense.
The Maritime Fishermen’s Union (MFU) has
been  at the centre of the controversy since
our  inshore fishermen are based in all of the
areas where there are significant numbers
of coastal M’ikmaq.
The MFU recognizes the Supreme Court
decision has been a breakthrough for the
M’ikmaq. We believe their new rights can
be accommodated within the present
fisheries management system. The
accommodation can be done by means of  a
voluntary licence retirement programme.
We believe strongly that the  accommodation
should not be on the  backs of fishermen but
should be shouldered by the society as a whole
through their government.
As we write, it seems the Federal Cabinet
will recognize this principle and allocate  the
appropriate monies to make the adjustments.
In the meantime, we want to find ways of
making the peace between  commercial
fishermen and First-Nation peoples.  
Licences are
limited, and their
total number
frozen. This limited
entry has led, over
time, to licences
acquiring a value
and being
considered as
quasi-property
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After the New Order government ofSuharto came into power in 1966, anew phase in Indonesia’s
development was initiated. This was
articulated in the Trilogy Pembangunan (the
Three Basic Principles of Development) that
aimed to achieve a certain level of
development. At the same time, the New
Order also took some steps to maintain
national stability, based on the assumption that
development targets could only be achieved
if national stability was guaranteed.
One of the strategies adopted for this was to
maintain the community’s focus on
development efforts. Another was to keep
the community away from political activities,
including the activities of political parties. At
the same time, political parties were not
allowed to make contact with communities,
especially in rural areas.
The New Order also established people’s
organizations, such as Himpunan
Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI)/
Indonesian Farmer Brotherhood
Organization) and Himpunan Nelayan
Seluruh Indonesia (HNSI)/Indonesia
Fishermen’s Organization). These were
actually linked to the ruling political party.
Fishworkers were allowed to join only HNSI
and farmers, only HKTI. Members of these
organizations were obliged to vote for the
ruling party.
Any attempt to establish a new independent
organization would be branded as a
communist initiative by the government. In
practice, this system blocked the aspirations
of local people and made it difficult for them
to engage in any political activity, except
during the public elections, once every five
years.
To accelerate the country’s development, the
government emphasized the modernization of
every sector. In fisheries, the emphasis was
on substituting traditional fishing equipment
with modern craft and gear, in order to
improve the income of fishers.
As part of this drive, traditional fishers were
encouraged to replace traditional gear with
trawls, known in Indonesia as pukat
harimau. Credit incentives were provided for
this. Trawls were seen as having several
advantages, particularly greater efficiency,
which made possible higher levels of fish
production with minimal human resources.
Due to these various benefits, the trawl soon
became the gear of choice in the
modernization drive.
However, this policy did not take into account
the fact that traditional fishermen lacked the
knowledge and training needed to operate
trawls. Moreover, they could not afford to
purchase the highly priced trawls, despite
credit incentives. As a result, the policy
actually benefited the professionals within the
sector, and did little to improve the situation
of traditional fishermen. More often than not,
trawls were owned by investors, who used
skilled labour to operate the gear.
For the traditional sector, several negative
impacts resulted. With the use of trawls, large
catches became possible. But their use also
destroyed the coastal environment and
important spawning and breeding grounds.
Most of the trawlers operated in the same
coastal waters used by traditional fishermen,
Up against trawling
Tries Zamansyah
The traditional fishermen of North Sumatra have
united to battle the threats posed by trawling
This piece is by Tries
Zamansyah,
Secretary General of
the Sarekat Nelayan
Sumatera Utara
(SNSU), North
Sumatra, Indonesia.
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 25, April 2000
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their ‘customary sea’, and competed directly
with them.
Public property
This affected both the catches and the income
of the traditional fishermen. Significantly, the
concept of the ‘customary sea’ vanished
when the Government of Indonesia declared
the sea as ‘public property’, as stated in
Ministry of Agriculture Decree No.607/KPTS/
UM/9/1976.
Forced to respond to the protests of traditional
fishers, the Government implemented a trawl
ban in 1980, through Presidential Decree
No.39/1980. The use of trawls was banned
in all Indonesian territory, except in Irian Jaya
and Maluku, by Presidential Decree No.12/
1982).
This ban was also supported by a Decree of
the Indonesian Supreme Court (No. 8/1988).
Despite this, in practice, the ban has not been
operational. Vessels using trawls continue to
operate in Indonesian territory, especially in
the North Sumatra region. This situation has
forced the traditional fishers of North
Sumatra to undertake various actions.
It is also significant that, until now, the HNSI
has failed to solve the problems resulting from
continued trawling activities and has not been
able to work towards the implementation of
the ban. On the contrary, there is a tendency
for the HNSI to favour the trawler owners
and to even protect and provide cover to their
operations.
There are several reasons that make it
difficult to implement the trawl ban. The ban
on trawling, under the Presidential Decree
No. 39/1980, was not supported by effective
monitoring and enforcement at the regional
level.
Other government policies have supported
the continuation of trawling activities. For
instance, a fisheries regulation of 4 July 1996
supports the purchase of foreign boats by
investors. This, in effect, means the
procurement of trawlers. This has occurred
in Belawan, where there are at present 144
modern fishing boats using trawl-like gear,
named otherwise to get past the law.
There is no policy that specifically protects
traditional fishers, their gear and their
customary area of operation, from the
operation of modern fishing gear such as
trawls. Although there is a Fishery Law that
acknowledges the rights of these traditional
fishers to their customary sea, this regulation
is not operational.
The Regional Government Offices that issue
permits to fish often do not take into account
their impacts on the traditional sector or, for
that matter, on the coastal environment. In
fact, they tend to favour the interests of the
investors.
The institutions that are meant to implement
the trawl ban, such as the marine force, the
police and the fisheries department, often
have overlapping responsibilities. Collusion
tends to occur between trawl owners and
government officials. For example, trawls that
have been confiscated by traditional fishers
and handed over to the authorities, are
released the very next day.
This situation has angered traditional
fishermen. And, not surprisingly, they have
taken several actions, such as burning of
trawlers. They feel that they cannot depend
on the official system to take care of their
interests.
The resentment of traditional fishermen
towards trawler owners is further aggravated
by the fact that they have established a three-
tier marketing network of intermediary
middlemen that controls fish prices. The price
at which the consumer finally purchases the
fish is very high. Since traditional fishermen
can only sell their fish to the first middleman,
they get a very low price.
They have no other option but to go along
with this system; if not, they run the risk of
not being able to sell their catch at all. Any
effort to establish an alternative marketing
structure is soon destroyed by the marketing
network controlled by owners and investors.
There is no policy
that specifically
protects
traditional fishers,
their gear and
their customary
area of operation,
from the operation
of modern fishing
gear such as
trawls
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The Fish Auction House that was supposed
to have functioned as the place for fishermen
to auction their catches has become part of
the owner-controlled marketing system. The
situation is similar in fishermen’s co-
operatives.
Several meetings were held by fishworkers
between 1993 and 1998 to discuss this
situation. Fishermen and a number of public
figures in North Sumatra participated in these
meetings. It became evident that to deal with
these problems, traditional fishermen in North
Sumatra must establish an independent
organization managed by the fishers
themselves.
Independent organization
Finally, on 14 July 1998, in Medan, an
independent fishermen’s organization was
formed, called the Sarekat Nelayan
Sumatera Utara (SNSU) or North Sumatran
Fishers’ Union.
About 900 traditional fishermen from three
regions in North Sumatra (Langkat, Asahan
and Deli Serdang) participated in this event.
SNSU aims primarily to draw the attention of
the government to the long-neglected
problems of traditional fishermen—for
instance, the problems caused by trawling
and other similar operations, and their impacts
on traditional fishermen and on the coastal
environment.
The SNSU declaration was presented to the
Governor of North Sumatra and to the Head
of the Provincial Fishery Department in
North Sumatra. This led to a dialogue
between fishermen and the Governor. The
Governor promised that the problem of
trawling would be resolved within a year.
But this promise was never fulfilled. In fact,
the number of trawlers operating in the area
has increased, even as conflicts between the
trawlers and traditional boats have risen.
Along the Sialang Buah coast, in the district
of Mengkudu in the Deli Serdang region alone,
51 fishermen were injured between 1993 and
1998. Of these, 31 fishermen lost their lives
as a result of injuries from clashes between
the traditional boats and trawlers at sea.
There have been several other such incidents
in regions such as Langkat, Asahan and
Belawan. However, there are no official
records of these incidents.
As an organization founded by fishermen,
SNSU actively promotes the interests of
traditional fishermen by putting pressure on
the Provincial Governor of North Sumatra,
the President of Indonesia, and agencies such
as the Office of the Attorney General, the
District Military Office of Bukit Barisan,
Lantamal I Belawan, Provincial Fishery
Department in North Sumatra, and District
Officers (Muspika) in coastal areas, etc.
A number of activities have been undertaken
to draw attention to the problems of
traditional fishermen, such as delegations,
demonstrations, presentations, and even the
direct arrests of trawlers.
The SNSU aims to create unity among fishers
in North Sumatra and to support them in their
struggle for social, cultural, economic and
legal justice, as citizens of Indonesia. More
specifically, it aims to:
z develop economic activities for all
members through the formation of
fishermen’s co-operatives;
z improve the social welfare of all members;
z train members through educational
activities;
z defend the interests of members through
advocacy; and
z establish fishermen’s groups in every
district along the coast of North Sumatra.
In order to achieve these objectives, SNSU
has developed various programmes. These
can be broadly classified as Advocacy,
Community Economic Development, Human
Resource Development, and Networking.
The SNSU aims to
create unity among
fishers in North
Sumatra and to
support them in
their struggle for
social, cultural,
economic and legal
justice, as citizens
of Indonesia
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The present era of reform in Indonesia, where
freedom to organize and express one’s views
is part of the democratization process, has
provided a good opportunity for traditional
fishermen to articulate their concerns. It is
hoped that the establishment of the Ocean
Exploration and Fishery Department will
promote the welfare of traditional fishermen
in Indonesia and particularly in North
Sumatra. Hopefully, the mistakes of the past,
when the traditional fishery sector was
ignored, will not be repeated. 
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Redistributing wealth
Francis Christy
The use of individual transferable quotas as a resource
management measure must not be summarily dismissed
Parzival Copes’ arguments against theuse of individual transferable quotas(ITQs) for the management of fisheries
(“Coastal resources for whom?”, SAMUDRA
Report No. 23, September 1999) are not
particularly helpful to those responsible for
making decisions on the formulation of
management measures. Although ITQs will
not work in many situations, they,
nevertheless, provide an important tool which
should not be rejected for the wrong reasons.
It is abundantly evident that overfishing is
becoming more severe and more pervasive
throughout the world and that it affects small-
scale fisheries as much as it does large-scale
fisheries. The basic problem is that the supply
of fish stocks is limited and yet the demand
for fish products is growing. This leads to
rising prices and, in the absence of effective
controls, increased fishing effort. The result
is the depletion of stocks as well as the
excessive use of capital and labour.
Better management of fisheries is essential.
Management measures can deal either solely
with the biological aspects or with both
biological and economic aspects. In the past,
many of the measures dealt only with the
biological yield, ignoring the economic
consequences. These kinds of measures
included total catch limits, closed seasons,
closed areas, mesh size controls and others
designed to restore stocks to their maximum
sustainable yields (MSY). These were
frequently adopted because they presumably
affected all fishermen equally and did not
change the distribution of wealth (a
presumption that was often wrong).
Although such measures may be desirable
in conjunction with other measures, they do
not always achieve their objective of restoring
the stocks. Moreover, they do nothing to
prevent excessive fishing effort or conflict
among competing users. The difficulty is that
measures that prevent excessive fishing effort
or that deal with conflict, require decisions
on the distribution of wealth.
This can not be avoided. As Copes has
pointed out, an ITQ system provides individual
quotas to some fishermen but not to others.
What he did not point out, however, is that a
system limiting fishing effort directly, by
granting licences to some of the fishermen,
also distributes wealth.
He states that “to remain economically
healthy, the small-boat sector must accept
the need to keep fishing capacity in balance
with available harvests. This will probably
require occasional reductions in fleet size by
buy-back, in order to offset likely advances
in fleet productivity.”
Copes has failed to note that the provision of
territorial rights to a community of fishermen
(which he advocates and which I agree may
generally be desirable) provides wealth to
that community and excludes fishermen who
are not members of the community.  Copes
states that “typically, most inshore fish
resources have lent themselves well to
harvesting by locally based small-scale
fishermen.” While this may currently be true
in certain situations, it is becoming less and
less valid, and is unlikely to continue into the
future.
This response has
been sent in by
Francis Christy,
Senior Research
Officer, IMARIBA,
Washington DC, US.
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 25, April 2000
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It is clear that eventually, as population grows
and demand increases, decisions on the
distribution of wealth will have to be made.
Even the exclusion of large-scale fishing
vessels from the waters used by small-scale
fishermen will not preclude the eventual
necessity for determining how access within
the group of small-scale users will be
allocated. Since this is at present necessary
in many situations and will be increasingly
necessary in the future, it is desirable to
examine all the various techniques for
controlling access, including the use of
ITQs.
Management
measures can deal
either solely with
the biological
aspects or with
both biological
and economic
aspects
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The management of fisheries throughthe use of property rights is oftenperceived as being anathema to the
recognition of indigenous fishing rights.
Experience in New Zealand suggests that the
opposite may, in fact, be the case. Not only
are indigenous fishing rights compatible with
a property rights approach to fisheries
management, such an approach can be used
to settle claims involving indigenous fishing
rights, to preserve those rights for future
generations, and to integrate such rights
within a wider fisheries management
framework.
Throughout the world, State management of
fisheries using regulatory instruments has left
indigenous communities subject to the values
and aspirations of the dominant culture as
represented by the government of the day.
No matter how liberal, democratic and
egalitarian the State may be, the final result
is likely to further erode the ability of
indigenous communities to manage, harvest,
and use natural resources in ways that are
consistent with their cultural needs. A
property rights-based system can provide a
robust mechanism for ensuring the
sustainable utilization of fisheries, while
providing for indigenous rights holders to
realize their often divergent social and
economic aspirations.
Indigenous communities traditionally have
their own internal regulatory mechanisms for
management of their fishing activity. Such
regulatory mechanisms are integral to the
nature of their fishing rights.
Recognizing and providing for indigenous and
coastal community fishing rights requires
empowering the communities concerned to
use those mechanisms, and integrating them
within the wider fisheries management
framework. In fully exploited, multiple-user
fisheries, a system based on well-defined
property rights allows the rights of indigenous
communities to be recognized and provided
for, relative to the rights of other groups.
In New Zealand, the introduction of a
property rights system for fisheries not only
gave rise to the largest indigenous rights claim
in the country’s history, it also provided the
means for that claim to be settled and for
indigenous rights to be recognized and
provided for within the wider legislative
framework. Maori fishing rights have been
recognized by a combination of property
rights instruments, vested in tribal or sub-tribal
communities rather than individuals. It is up
to those communities to decide how they
manage those rights.
As the indigenous people of New Zealand,
Maori held customary fishing rights under
British common law. These rights were
guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi, signed
between the British monarchy and Maori
chiefs in 1840. Customary fishing was
exempted from the rules and regulations in
fisheries legislation made after the signing of
the Treaty. However, the exact nature of
these rights was never defined.
Slow negation
As a result, Maori fishing rights were slowly
negated by the egalitarian principles of the
dominant European settler society—one law
for all. The statutory provisions protecting
Maori customary fishing rights were
worthless, unable to define the nature of
Maori power
Matthew Hooper
The Maori fisheries settlement is a world leader
in terms of resource transfer to indigenous people
This article by
Matthew Hooper, a
Senior Policy Analyst
at the Ministry of
Fisheries in New
Zealand, is based on
a paper co-authored
with Terry Lynch,
presented at the
FishRights99
Conference in Perth,
Australia. This
article first appeared
in SAMUDRA Report
No. 26, August 2000
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those rights, and then protect them from
encroachment by the activities of other
fishers. The Treaty of Waitangi was regarded
as a legal nullity by the courts until the 1980s.
In the mid-1980s, the government in New
Zealand moved to introduce a quota
management system based on individual
transferable quota (ITQ) for major
commercial fish stocks. It was this move to
create an artificial property right to take fish,
and then allocate that right to existing
commercial fishers, that drove Maori to seek
an injunction against the government, saying
that their customary fishing rights had not
been taken into account.
The task of defining the nature of Maori
customary fishing rights then fell to the
courts. In an important test case in 1986, a
Maori individual was found not guilty of
taking undersized shellfish on the grounds
that he was exercising a customary fishing
right. He had fished in accordance with
customary practices by obtaining permission
from the kaitiaki, or guardian, of the tangata
whenua from the area where the fishing
occurred, and acted in accordance with the
instructions of the kaitiaki.
The concept of tangata whenua, or ‘people
of the land’, is crucial to the definition of
Maori customary fishing rights. Tangata
whenua are the iwi (tribe) or hapu (sub-
tribe) that hold customary authority over a
particular area. Rather than being general
Maori rights, customary rights belong to
tangata whenua and can only be exercised
within their area. The full nature and extent
of customary fishing rights was elucidated
by the Waitangi Tribunal as a result of
extensive research into tribal claims to
fisheries.
The Waitangi Tribunal is a permanent
commission of inquiry, set up in 1975 to
investigate claims regarding breaches of the
Treaty of Waitangi. Maori customary fishing
rights were found to have both a commercial
and a non-commercial component (based on
evidence that Maori were trading seafood
widely, prior to the signing of the Treaty of
Waitangi). The fisheries they exploited were
extensive, and the methods to catch fish were
highly advanced, compared to those of their
European counterparts.
The Tribunal also ascribed a developmental
component to the customary right, giving
Maori a right to a share of the deep-sea
fisheries off the coast of New Zealand, even
if they were not being fished at the time the
Treaty was signed.
Customary rights
Most importantly, Maori customary fishing
rights pertained not only to the use of fisheries,
but also to the management of the resource.
While fishing practices differed among the
different tribes, customary fisheries had
always been actively managed by kaitiaki.
Traditionally, fishing outside the rules set by
the kaitiaki could subject the fisher to severe
penalties. In 1986, the High Court placed an
injunction on the Crown, preventing it from
proceeding with the introduction of the quota
management system.
The Court advised the Ministry of Fisheries
that the aims of the Crown in introducing the
quota system were commendable. At the
time, the Waitangi Tribunal observed that the
ITQ right had much in common with the rights
guaranteed to Maori under the Treaty of
Waitangi—it guaranteed access, it was
perpetual, and it provided opportunities for
autonomous management. The problem was
that indigenous rights had not been recognized
or provided for in the allocation of commercial
fishing quota.
An interim settlement of Maori fisheries
claims was negotiated in 1989, and full and
final settlement signed and legislated for in
1992. The principal effect of the settlement
on the customary fishing rights of Maori was
to split the commercial and non-commercial
components of those rights.
This distinction was necessary to
accommodate the settlement within the
broader fisheries management framework,
which was by then based on the use of ITQ
for commercial fisheries, while non-
It was this move to
create an artificial
property right to
take fish, and then
allocate that right
to existing
commercial
fishers, that drove
Maori to seek an
injunction against
the government,
saying that their
customary fishing
rights had not
been taken into
account
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commercial fishing continued to be managed
by regulation.
The commercial rights of Maori were
recognized through the provision of assets
comprising quota, shares and cash. The 1989
interim settlement provided for 10 per cent
of all existing ITQ to be bought back from
fishers and provided to Maori. The 1992
Settlement centred on the Crown’s provision
to Maori of NZ$150 mn to purchase a half-
share of Sealord Products Ltd. Sealord is the
largest commercial fishing company in New
Zealand, owning over 20 per cent of all
commercial fish quota. In addition, the Crown
has an ongoing obligation to allocate 20 per
cent of quota for fish species newly
introduced to the quota management system
to Maori.
The Settlement legislation established the
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission,
previously the Maori Fisheries Commission,
to manage the commercial settlement assets
on behalf of Maori. The quota held by the
Commission is no different from other ITQ
generated under the quota management
system. The Commission currently leases
quota to tribes on an annual basis. In time,
the quota will be allocated to the beneficiaries
of the settlement, giving them all the benefits
and obligations associated with quota
ownership.
The settlement is a world leader in terms of
resource transfer to indigenous people. While
other settlements have addressed claims to
individual fisheries, no other country has
transferred close to 30 per cent of its total
commercial fishing industry to its indigenous
people. Maori are the single largest player in
the rock lobster and paua fishery, and one
of the top two players in the snapper fishery.
In conjunction with managing these assets,
the Commission has become one of the best
informed and articulate participants in the
New Zealand fishing industry, providing
valuable advice both to government and to
industry bodies.
The Commission also invests in the future of
the Maori fishing industry, spending around
NZ$1 mn annually on its scholarship
programme, training up to 300 young Maori
a year. The programme focuses on three
areas: business management, studies directly
related to fisheries, and a highly successful
seafood processing course. The Commission
offers up to nine NZ$15,000-per-year
scholarships to study at the Australian
Maritime College and the University of
Tasmania.
The non-commercial component of the
customary right was provided for through
regulations that devolve the management of
non-commercial customary fishing to
kaitiaki appointed by the tangata whenua.
The regulatory framework provides an
effective way of recognizing and providing
for the traditional fisheries management
practices of Maori. The framework is highly
flexible about the way tangata whenua
manage their fishing activity, but prescriptive
in terms of mandate issues, recording of
catch, and accountability mechanisms.
Mandated representatives
Tangata whenua must establish mandated
representatives for their area before they can
actively manage their non-commercial fishing
activity. The regulations provide for tangata
whenua to appoint kaitiaki who are
responsible for managing customary fishing
in their area. Disputes over who should be
kaitiaki or over tribal boundaries must be
resolved by tangata whenua.
Kaitiaki manage customary fishing through
an authorization system which requires them
to specify the exact nature of the fishing
activity that is being authorized, including
species, quantities, areas, size limits, methods,
purpose for which the fish will be used, and
instructions for the disposal of any bycatch.
Each of these factors is at the discretion of
the kaitiaki, who must act within the bounds
of sustainability and with due regard for the
environment.
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Regulations also provide for the
establishment of areas known as mataitai
reserves over traditional fishing grounds.
Mataitai reserves are a form of territorial
use right.
There is no commercial fishing permitted
within these reserves and all non-commercial
fishers, including recreational fishers, must
act in accordance with bylaws made by the
kaitiaki when fishing within the reserve area.
Fishers must report back their actual catches
to the kaitiaki, who record the information
for fisheries management and compliance
purposes. Kaitiaki must report quarterly to
the Ministry of Fisheries on how many of
each species were taken out of each
management area within their traditional
boundaries. The information generated by
the regulations is then used to set sustainability
measures, and provides a powerful tool for
tangata whenua to participate in wider
fisheries management processes.
After setting the total allowable catch (TAC)
for a fishery, the Ministry of Fisheries must
share the TAC amongst the three extractive
fishing sectors—customary non-commercial,
recreational, and commercial. The customary
non-commercial needs of Maori have a de
facto priority in this process—the needs of
Maori are provided for first, to the extent
that they are not commercial. In the small
toheroa shellfish fishery, this has resulted in
the entire TAC being set aside for customary
non-commercial needs.
Individual customary fishers are accountable
to the kaitiaki who authorize their activity.
Kaitiaki are primarily accountable to the
tangata whenua who appoint them, and to
the Ministry of Fisheries, for the sustainable
management of fisheries and for the
maintenance of effective records for both
management and compliance purposes. The
State is still ultimately responsible for the
overall sustainability of fisheries and for the
provision of assistance to kaitiaki to enable
the effective operation of the customary
fishing regulations.
As a result of the 1992 Treaty settlement,
Maori now own around 40 per cent of New
Zealand’s commercial fish quota. Taking joint
ventures into account, Maori have a controlling
interest in more than 60 per cent of New
Zealand’s commercial fishing industry.
However, the commercial assets of Maori
continue to be managed by the Treaty of
Waitangi Fisheries Commission on behalf of
all Maori, and have yet to be allocated to tribes
and/or any other beneficiaries identified under
the terms of the settlement.
While many tribes are benefiting from the
annual leasing of quota by the Commission
at discounted rates, they will not have
autonomous control over the management of
their commercial fishing activity until
allocation has occurred. The commercial
interests and objectives of Maori may differ
from tribe to tribe. They may also be different
from the interests of other commercial fishers
in their area. ITQ allocation will allow the
different priorities and interests of tribal
groups to be realized within the same
framework, while minimizing the opportunity
or need for the State to interfere with those
interests.
Distribution inequities
Property-rights instruments such as ITQ are
often given a number of negative associations.
These include the privatization of what are
seen to be collective rights, inequities in the
distribution of rights, alienation of traditional
fishers from their livelihoods, and even the
demise of coastal communities. However, as
far as the indigenous fishing rights in New
Zealand are concerned, all of these occurred
to some degree before the introduction of
ITQ. Ironically, it has been the introduction of
ITQ and other property-rights instruments that
have provided a means of addressing these
issues.
The introduction of the quota management
system meant that the Crown was able to
buy back rights from existing commercial
fishers and re-allocate them to Maori. This
was meant to compensate them for the
attenuation of their rights over the previous
The customary
non-commercial
needs of Maori
have a de facto
priority in this
process—the needs
of Maori are
provided for first,
to the extent that
they are not
commercial
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140 years. (Obviously, if the initial allocation
of ITQ had taken Maori rights into account,
no buy-back would have been necessary.)
The Settlement legislation ensures that the
ITQ provided to Maori remains under
collective ownership until such time as
allocation occurs.
The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission
has been working on criteria for tribes to be
eligible to receive settlement assets. One such
criteria is that tribal bodies must have
constitutional arrangements in place to ensure
that the collective commercial fishing rights
of a tribe, as represented by its share of quota
and cash, are not alienated from the tribe
without the necessary level of accountability
being present. Once allocation has occurred,
then the tribes can manage their commercial
fishing activity the way that suits them,
incorporating whatever combination of
economic and social objectives they desire.
Tangata whenua are now regaining control
of their customary non-commercial fishing
activity. Customary fishing regulations are
now in place and are being implemented by
tribes and sub-tribes around the country. The
primary hurdle facing tribes seeking to utilize
the new management framework is the
determination of mandate over areas, and the
resolution of disputes with neighbouring
groups over boundaries and kaitiaki
appointments.
Customary non-commercial fishing rights,
while not represented by ITQ, are still
considered property rights within New
Zealand’s fisheries management framework.
Fishers must fish within the rules and limits
specified by the kaitiaki for the area, and
must report back on what they actually
caught. The Ministry of Fisheries must then
make an allowance for the extent of
customary needs when allocating the total
allowable catch (TAC) for any fishery. The
proportion of the TAC set aside for customary
non-commercial take is effectively the
property right associated with customary non-
commercial fishing.
Management control
The aim of all tribal groups must be to regain
control over the management of all their
fishing activity, both commercial and non-
commercial. Once quota has been allocated,
and kaitiaki have been appointed, tangata
whenua will be in a position to manage their
fisheries in a more holistic manner.
Importantly, the well-defined rights of
tangata whenua will ensure that there is
always fish available for everything from
commercial purposes on marae (meeting
ground) to personal consumption.
The current direction of fisheries
management in New Zealand foresees the
devolution of management responsibilities to
stakeholder groups, and stakeholder
participation in the development of
management plans for key fisheries and/or
areas. As a result of the indigenous fisheries
settlement, Maori are well placed to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by
such an environment. With well-defined rights
firmly secured, Maori are destined to be at
the centre of co-operative management
initiatives in the future. 
The aim of all
tribal groups must
be to regain control
over the
management of all
their fishing
activity, both
commercial and
non-commercial
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One of the suggestions made toprotect the livelihoods of small-scalefishermen throughout the world is
the installation of special artisanal fishing
zones. Such zones would make inshore
fishing areas off-limit to industrial fishermen
and, correspondingly, reserve them for small-
scale operators. The experiences of zoning,
in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu from the
1970s onward point out potential hazards as
well as conditions necessary for the success
of such arrangements.
At the onset of the so-called ‘Blue
Revolution’ in the early 1960s, Tamil Nadu
had thousands of marine fishermen, operating
from small hamlets along its 1000-km long
coastline. These fishermen generally
confined their operations to an innermost sea
area, which roughly coincided with the
contours of the continental shelf. Seasonal
migration took them up and down the coast,
but rarely farther than 10 km from shore.
The government’s promotion of trawling
technology drastically changed the seaside
panorama. By the late 1960s, harbour centres
berthing small trawlers had developed all
along the coast, and conflicts between trawler
and artisanal fishermen were rampant. The
main problem was that trawlers ventured
inshore to catch high-value shrimp. Not only
did they intrude on grounds that artisanal
fishermen considered theirs, but the trawlers
also caused extensive damage to artisanal
fishing gear.
These confrontations resulted in major
unrest. The State government, anxious to
keep the peace, constituted committees to
investigate and settle whatever incidents
came to its attention. At the same time, it
started to explore available policy choices.
One of its core options was the physical
separation of the antagonists through the
installation of distinct fishing zones.
As the government of Tamil Nadu exerted
strong control over access to trawling
technology in the first phase of
modernization—most trawler fishermen
depended on the government loans and
construction schemes for their vessels—it
first tried out this lever. Around 1968, the
Fisheries Department included a clause in its
contract, stating that recipients of trawling
gear could only fish outside a limit of three
nautical miles. This clause is important as it
constituted the first, albeit indirect, mention
of an official artisanal fishing zone in Tamil
Nadu. However noble its intent, the measure
failed to stem the flow of the ‘pink gold rush’.
As trawlers did not bear registration marks,
violators of the clause could not easily be
identified. Moreover, the clause’s foundations
were shaky, such as in the case of a transfer
of ownership. Could the new trawler owner
be held to the original terms of agreement?
The Fisheries Department had its doubts and
rarely seems to have pursued the matter.
In 1978, after serious riots between artisanal
and trawler fishermen rocked Tamil Nadu’s
capital, Madras (now Chennai), the State
government decided to formulate legislation
based on the distinction of fishing zones.
Long-drawn process
Realizing, however, that law-making is a long-
drawn process and that immediate action was
being expected, the government immediately
issued an executive Government Order (GO
The twilight zone
Maarten Bavinck
The experiences of zoning for small-scale fishermen
in Tamil Nadu, India, reveal both potential and hazards
This article is by
Maarten Bavinck of
the Centre for
Maritime Research
(MARE), University
of Amsterdam, The
Netherlands. This
article first appeared
in SAMUDRA Report
No. 27, December
2000
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881 of 1978). Alongside other measures such
as time zoning, GO 881 prohibited trawling
activities within a 3-mile inshore zone. For
the first time, the government also made
attempts to mark this zone by means of a
series of ‘country buoys’. As the name
suggests, however, these markers were so
elementary that the first storm washed them
away.
Trawler fishermen straightaway challenged
GO 881 in court. It was not the 3-mile rule
which incurred most of their wrath, however;
it was time-zoning. According to the order,
time-zoning implied that trawler fishermen
remain in port during the night, only to be
released at 6 a.m. Not only would this deny
them the best fishing moments (night-fishing
purportedly being more productive than
fishing in daytime), it also closed off fishing
grounds that could not be reached in a day’s
voyage. Most seriously, time-zoning stood a
great chance of being enforced, as it
involved no more than installing a chain
across the harbour mouth.
In response to the appeals, the High Court
of Chennai imposed a stay order suspending
GO 881’s main clauses for several years. The
order was finally superseded by the Tamil
Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983.
This Act continued along earlier lines,
decreeing the introduction of geographical
fishing zones as well as time-zoning
arrangements for trawler fishermen. It too
was greeted by a flurry of court cases from
disquieted trawler owners.
Interestingly, one of the plaintants argued that
if trawler fishermen were to be relegated
outside the 3-mile zone, artisanal fishermen
should be obliged to stay within. Although this
was contrary to the import of the Act, which
did not make any mention of a mandatory
zone for artisanal fishermen, the district court
judge who was handling the case felt
otherwise. According to his decree, artisanal
fishermen not only enjoyed a preferential
right to a separate inshore zone, it was also
their duty to confine their operations to this
area. This, of course, artisanal fishermen
protested against.
As in the case of GO 881, courts pronounced
stay orders on the Act of 1983, and it was
only toward the end of the decade that the
various legal objections were definitely
refuted by the Supreme Court of India.
During all this time, the State government
was unable to enact any of its fishing
regulations.
By 1995, the situation had fundamentally
changed. Although time-zoning was still in
cold storage, the Fisheries Department was
now free to implement other sections of the
1983 Act. The 3-mile rule was its showpiece
regulation. Any beachside visitor, however,
could tell that it was poorly observed. In fact,
trawler fishermen regularly encroached on
inshore waters, and conflicts with artisanal
fishermen persisted. It is instructive to
consider why the 3-mile rule was, and is, so
badly implemented by the State government.
One of the basic factors is a lack of political
will. This is related to the fact that trawler
fishermen wield considerable clout in Tamil
Nadu, whereas the movement of artisanal
fishermen has lost force since the 1970s.
Fisheries Department officers charged with
enforcement thus receive insufficient backing
to undertake sensitive missions, such as the
apprehension of trawlers. Another reason is
found in the Act’s motivation, which is
primarily of a social nature. Like similar
legislation in other parts of the world, its main
goal was the resolution of social conflict, not
the management of depleting marine
resources. Once overt conflicts died down,
government attention was once again
diverted.
The character of coastal fisheries and the
set-up of fisheries management also posed
formidable barriers to the enforcement of an
artisanal fishing zone. Where does one find
the resources to install an infrastructure
capable of guarding a 1000-km long
coastline? And how does one establish
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encroachments, if the artisanal fishing zone
is unmarked and participants lack advanced
positioning technology?
In 1995, the Fisheries Department in northern
Tamil Nadu owned only one small speedboat
and a small crew to patrol 400 km of shore.
This boat was slow and frequently out of
order. In addition, officers generally lack sea
legs and are reluctant to set out to sea, fearing
molestation and other unpleasantness. The
prevailing reality, therefore, is that patrolling
seldom occurs, and fishermen are left to
settle any problems that arise amongst
themselves.
This directs attention to the management set-
up. In spite of the fact that fishermen along
the Coromandel Coast of India have a long
and rich tradition of resource management,
their institutions do not enjoy any official
recognition. As it is, the State government is
the sole authority for fisheries regulation and
enforcement with regard to inshore waters.
There is, however, a mismatch between
governmental capacities and the sweep of
fisheries legislation. Under present
circumstances, the 3-mile rule in Tamil Nadu
mainly has a token value.
The idea of artisanal fishing zones derives
its charm from its comprehensiveness as well
as its simplicity. It ventures a simple and
apparently effective solution to the problems
of artisanal fisherfolk. Developments in
Tamil Nadu, however, indicate potential
obstacles and potholes.
Unenforceable rule
An important question is whether it is worth
striving for an artisanal fishing zone if the
rule can not be enforced. Many inshore
fishing zones are heavily contested, and
industrial fishing interests do not give up their
stakes without a fight. Political support is
imperative to achieve any success.
It also helps if a proposal stands a real chance
of being implemented. Declaring an artisanal
zone many kilometres in length and badly
marked does not contribute to its realization,
particularly if staffing and resources are
meagre. Co-management arrangements of
government, together with fishermen, might
form a solution, provided fishermen are also
given official enforcement authority. To my
knowledge, however, this has not been tried
out seriously at a more than local level in
Africa, Asia or Latin America. Many
governments are wary of decentralization and
the loss of power it implies, and will not readily
concede far-reaching co-management
arrangements.
This does not deny the potential value of
artisanal fishing zones as an instrument of
fisheries management. It does suggest,
however, that the scheme should be well
designed and tested.
The Tamil Nadu experience finally makes
clear that the successful enactment of any
measure to defend the interests of artisanal
fishermen requires concerted and enduring
effort. The proclamation of GO 881 and the
Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act
of 1983 was directly related to the activities
of the artisanal fishermen’s movement in
India. This movement, starting in Tamil Nadu
and in Goa, soon developed into a potent
nationwide force. The decline of the same
movement in Tamil Nadu after the 1970s,
likewise, constitutes one of the main reasons
for the non-implementation of available
legislation. To achieve success, political
momentum must clearly be maintained over
a long time period. For many fishermen’s
movements, this is a huge challenge. 
An important
question is
whether it is worth
striving for an
artisanal fishing
zone if the rule can
not be enforced
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In the Kesla block of HoshangabadDistrict in Madhya Pradesh, India, theadivasis (indigenous forest and tribal
people) have constantly faced displacement
and consequent deprivation of their resource
base. The last 15-20 years have seen tribal
struggles seeking resettlement and resolution
of other issues relating to land, water and
forest rights. Around five years ago, they got
their first taste of success in the form of
fishing and marketing rights in the reservoir
dam at Tawa, which is a tributary of the
Narmada river. An ordnance testing range
had displaced people earlier, and the Tawa
dam also contributes to continuing
displacements of the same people. Hence,
the permission for fishing and marketing rights
for the displaced persons of Tawa in 1996
was indeed a welcome step by the
government of Madhya Pradesh.
Earlier, in 1994, the oustees of Bargi dam
(another dam on the Narmada) in Jabalpur
succeeded in the entrepreneurial venture
entrusted to them by the government. In
1996, the government had accepted in
principle the rights of the adivasis to natural
resources. Encouraged by this, the
government granted fishing and marketing
rights to the Tawa Vistapit Adivasi Matsya
Utpadan Evam Vipnan Sahkari Sangh
(briefly known as Tawa Matsya Sangh) for
a period of five years.
The adivasis were initially apprehensive
about the prospects of fishing in such a large
reservoir and of marketing their catch. But,
with the strong support of Kisan Adivasi
Sangathan, the last five years have been quite
a fruitful experience of collective action.
Today, 36 fish co-operative societies are
active in various villages. Three affiliated
societies and about 12,000 to 13,000 fisherfolk
have joined hands to form a federation that
runs the whole show. Uninitiated in the ways
of business co-operatives and official
correspondence, these people did have a hard
time in the beginning. But the success of their
forerunner, the Bargi fish co-operative,
encouraged the Tawa fisherfolk to persist
with their efforts. Today, they are adept at
handling all affairs concerned with their
business, be it techniques of fish culture, fish
catching, identifying fish species, business
accounting or negotiating with traders in cities
like Calcutta or Nagpur. The revenue
collected by the government in the form of
royalty through the Sangh has shown a
steady increase.
Prior to the Sangh’s involvement, the
government had laid down a target of 45
tonnes of fish production for three months in
1996-97. But the Sangh more than doubled
the target to reach 93. 33 tonnes. Production
has been increasing and 327.18 tonnes of fish
were produced in 2000-2001. Earlier, the Fish
Development Corporation (FDC) had
produced only 131, 146, 89 and 84 tonnes of
fish, respectively, for the four years 1990-
94. During this period, each year the FDC
and the contractors had hired 140 fisherfolk,
most of whom were outsiders. On the other
hand, the Matsya Sangh engages as many
as 477 fisherfolk and all are local, tribal,
displaced people.
Regular income
One great achievement is that the people have
been able to acquire a regular job and
Naturally ours
Yogesh Diwan and Yemuna Sunny
The displaced indigenous people of the Tawa dam area in India
are fighting to retain their rights over water, forest and land
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reasonable income. Today, each person earns
around Rs. 90-100 (around US$2) daily.
Besides, 20 per cent of the catch goes to the
fisherfolk who can either consume or sell
them at their own prices. They are also
entitled to bonus and other facilities. Apart
from a fulltime employment for 10 months a
year, the fisherfolk also get dole of Rs1 per
kg during the closed season (15 June to 15
August).
This arrangement ensures a token salary
during the period of joblessness and also
safeguards against clandestine fishing. The
Sangh paid nearly Rs2,450,000 during 1997-
98 towards dole alone, apart from
Rs3,044,000 as a whole year’s remuneration.
Earlier, the FDC and the contractors jointly
used to disburse an average of Rs6,820,000
towards remuneration. The maximum
amount paid by them towards wages was
Rs1,120,000 during 1994-95, whereas the
Sangh made a record payment of
Rs1,109,000 in just the first three months,
reaching Rs 4,746,000 in 2000-2001.
Similarly, the fisherfolk worked for 267 days
in a year, as against 221 for the contractors
hired by FDC. Apart from fishing, other
assignments like transport, packing, sales,
collection of fish seeds, boatbuilding and
maintenance of office accounts are also
managed by the local people, including plenty
of women as well.
It is evident that the fish produced on such a
large scale can not be consumed by the local
market alone. So the Sangh began marketing
in the bigger cities like Calcutta, Nagpur,
Lucknow and Bhopal, where it had mixed
experiences. It faced ups and downs on sale
prices. Also, at times, the consignments got
spoilt before they could be sold and
occasionally, the Sangh had to pay higher
cartage too. Although the Sangh tried to
transport the consignments in insulated vans,
its main thrust continued to be the local and
nearby markets.
The Sangh also tried to help the fisherfolk to
buy boats and fishing nets by arranging for
loans on easy terms. Many societies benefited
from this arrangement. The preference for
locally built boats and wholesale purchase of
fishing nets from Mumbai proved to be cost-
effective.
But the inaction of the government machinery
is proving to be a hindrance for the Sangh.
Constant vigilance had resulted in the
apprehension of many poachers. But due to
the laxity of the police and the administration,
the criminals got away unpunished.
Subsequently, the Sangh announced prizes for
nabbing fish poachers. This brought down the
incidents of poaching and nowadays theft is
greatly under control.
Seedlings collected
Despite a lack of experience, the Sangh took
upon itself the task of collecting fish seedlings,
as the government and FDC had abdicated
their responsibility in this regard. During 1997-
98, nearly 2,613,000 seedlings were collected
and released in the Tawa reservoir, which
increased to 3,219,000 in 2000-2001.
This was, however, lower than the target of
3,600,000. The seedlings had to be collected
from various places. The Sangh was also
handicapped by a paucity of funds and
absence of hatchery and nursery facilities.
Hence, it had decided to earmark about
Rs50,000-Rs100,000 from fish sale every
month towards the purchase of costly
seedlings. It also promoted fish culture and
encouraged local people to breed fish
seedlings in small natural ponds. This ensures
a substantial reduction in both expenditure on
transportation and the death rate of fish
The Sangh made a net profit of Rs29,400,000
in 2000-2001. In contrast, under the
contractors and the FDC, there were
recurrent losses year after year. Between
1991 and 1994, the losses were to the tune of
Rs25,500,000, Rs47,100,000 and
Rs34,200,000 a year, respectively. Thus, the
Tawa experiment had not only benefited the
displaced people but also made a substantial
contribution of Rs1,570,000 to the public
exchequer in 2000-2001 by way of royalty at
The Tawa
experiment had
not only benefited
the displaced
people but also
made a substantial
contribution to the
public exchequer
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the rate of Rs6 per kg. of fish. Within a period
of five years, Rs6,737,000 of royalty had
been paid (see Table 1).
Table 1: Royalty Paid
by Tawa Matsya Sangh
Ye a r Roya lty (Rs m n)
1996-97 0.45
1997-98 1.18
1998-99 1.65
1999-00 1.89
2000-01 1.57
Total 6.74
Source: Annual Report, 2000-2001,
Tawa Matsya Sangh
But ironically, despite having contributed so
much in royalty, the government has not seen
it fit to provide the area with facilities like
roads, water, lighting, education, etc. The
Sangh also questions the wisdom of having
to pay royalty, especially as the contributors
are displaced people for whom the
government had denied even survival
necessities in the name of development (read
the dam). Even otherwise, the attitude of the
administration has not been one of goodwill
or support. On the issue of the need to
construct an ice factory, the government
withheld the funds that were sanctioned by
the Central government for the purpose.
Further, the Sangh is not being allowed to
use the government reservoir at Powarkheda
(a nearby village), which is currently lying
idle, for the breeding of fish seedlings.
23 December 2001 marks the completion of
the five-year period of Tawa Matsya Sangh’s
right to fishing and marketing granted by the
government. As yet, the Madhya Pradesh
government has not taken any decision on
its renewal. The irony of this hesitation is
particularly striking, since the State is in the
thick of a campaign on decentralization, tribal
self-rule and people’s participation. The
Tawa experiment is a very sincere
demonstration of all these three parameters.
Yet, there seems to be a nexus amongst the
bureaucracy, Matsya Maha Sangh (which
takes the place of the earlier Nigam or
Corporation, now a State-level co-operative
of the government) and local politicians and
contractors to override the collective efforts
of the people. Their attempt is to take away
marketing rights from the hands of the Tawa
Matsya Sangh.
Hence, the primary societies may get
confined to fishing rights only. The marketing
rights are being sought by the Matsya Maha
Sangh of the Madhya Pradesh government.
An official committee set up to look into the
functioning of the Tawa Sangh and to
recommend to the government a future
course of action has not done its job. It has
not consulted the federation officially; on the
contrary, it has been giving it the cold
shoulder.
Comparative performance
On 19 November 2001, in response to a
question raised on this issue in the Madhya
Pradesh State Assembly, a comparative
picture of the performance of the Tawa
Matsya Sangh and the earlier one of the
Nigam (through contractors) was presented
(see Table 2). The Matsya Sangh is way
ahead in all indices of performance. This very
clearly establishes the efficiency and
sustainability of the Tawa experiment.
It is worthwhile here to recall the experiences
of the Bargi co-operative (the forerunners
of Tawa Matsya Sangh) at a similar juncture
of functioning. The Chief Minister had
assured the co-operative of renewal of its
contract. But the instruction finally issued
mentioned only fishing rights for primary
societies. The marketing rights remained with
the government (Matsya Maha Sangh). This
implies that the status of the fisherfolk in
Bargi would henceforth be that of wage
earners only.
When the Chief Minister was again
approached, he expressed surprise over such
an outcome and the order was changed. But
the Maha Sangh had already started
functioning with the earlier order and had
signed an agreement with a contractor. The
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matter was taken to court and a stay order
obtained. Ironically, the government has not
made any clear stand on the issue.
Tawa Matsya Sangh and Kisan Adivasi
Sangathan envisage a distinct possibility of a
repetition of the Bargi-type treatment in Tawa
too. Hence, they are engaged in trying to
pressure the government to take a sensible
decision. Efforts are on to push the matter
through a campaign by people’s organizations
(of the region and outside), the media,
intellectuals and experts. The Sangh and the
Sangathan firmly stand by the view that their
hard-earned rights over the natural resources,
along with the creative and collective efforts
of the past few years, can not be simply taken
away. With the slogan of “people’s rights over
water, forest and land”, they have geared up
to continue their struggle. 
Table 2: Comparative Performance of FDC and Tawa Matsya Sangh
The Sangh and the
Sangathan firmly
stand by the view
that their hard-
earned rights over
the natural
resources, along
with the creative
and collective
efforts of the past
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In the South 24-Parganas District of theState of West Bengal in India is the 20-sq km island of Jambudwip. Located
about 10 km offshore in the southwest corner
of the Sundarbans at the mouth of river
Hooghly in the Bay of Bengal, the island can
be reached in 45 minutes from the Frasergunj
fishing harbour by bhut bhuti, a small
powered country craft.
Jambudwip has been used as a site for
fisheries camps at least since 1955, according
to Bikash Raychoudhury’s Moon and Net
(published by the Anthropological Survey of
India in 1980). Behundi jal or stake-net
fishery is a traditional activity in different
parts of the Sundarbans delta, on both the
Indian and Bangladesh sides.
The largest stake-net fishing operation in the
Sundarbans is based in Jambudwip. It is the
Jalia Kaibartha community from the
Chittagong hills that mainly practices behundi
jal fishery in the marine waters of the
Sundarbans. After India attained
independence in 1947, the members of this
highly enterprising fishing community settled
down in places like Kakdwip, Namkhana,
Sagar and Pathar Pratima in West Bengal,
and Champaran in Bihar.
However, this traditional source of livelihood
and sustenance is now under serious threat.
The Central Empowered Committee (CEC),
has said that the seasonal “occupation” of
the Jambudwip island by fishermen and the
fish-drying activity was a non-forest activity
that cannot be permitted under the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980, without prior
approval of the central government. (The CEC
was constituted by the Supreme Court of
India by a Notification on 20 June 2002 to
provide relief against any action taken by the
Central/State Governments or any other
authority regarding, inter alia, deforestation
and encroachments, and the implementation
of legal instruments for forest conservation.)
It has directed the West Bengal government
to remove all traces of encroachment on
Jambudwip island by 31 March 2003.
While the Fisheries Department of West
Bengal under Minister Kiranmoy Nanda
strongly defends the fishermen’s claim to the
seasonal use of the island, the Forest
Department is bitterly opposed. The
fishermen are now living in the shadow of
uncertainty. Will their two-generations old
fishery be treated as an activity eligible for
regularization or will they be summarily
evicted?
It was on 29 May 1943 that, under a
Notification of the Government of West
Bengal, Jambudwip became reserved forest
as part of the protected forests in the
Namkhana Division. As a result, no activity
was allowed on the island, except those
permitted by the Forest Department. From
at least 1968 onwards, fishermen have been
issued permits to use the island to collect
firewood and to launch boats into the main
creek.
Since 1989, Jambudwip has been part of the
Buffer Zone of the Sundarbans Biosphere
Reserve, where ecologically sound practices,
including fisheries, are permitted (unlike the
Core Area of a Biosphere Reserve, which is
securely protected for conserving biological
diversity). Jambudwip is, however, located
outside the Sundarbans Tiger Reserve.
Jammed in Jambudwip
Sebastian Mathew
The traditional stake-net fishers of the ecologically sensitive Jambudwip
island in West Bengal, India, face a likely ban of their seasonal fisheries
This article is by
Sebastian Mathew,
Programme Adviser
of ICSF. This article
first appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 34, March 2003
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The CEC visited Jambudwip on December
2002, in response to an application from the
Executive Director, Wildlife Protection
Society of India, seeking suitable relief
against alleged encroachment and
destruction of mangroves by fishermen.
The CEC’s report of 24 December 2002
directed the West Bengal government to
remove all traces of encroachment on
Jambudwip by 31 March 2003. However, the
CEC observed that the proposal for fish drying
on the island could still be considered, but
only after obtaining clearance from the
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry
of External Affairs for the fishermen
involved, since some Bangladeshis were
alleged to be involved illegally in the island’s
fisheries.
The CEC denouement followed a series of
events consequent to the Supreme Court
order of 12 December 1996 on the issue of
forest encroachment. Further to its Order of
23 November 2001 restraining the Central
Government from regularizing all
encroachments, the Ministry of Environment
and Forests (MoEF) wrote to all States and
Union Territories on 3 May 2002 to regularize
only eligible encroachments before 1980 and
to evict all other encroachments by 30
September 2002. The Forest Department,
soon after receiving this letter from the MoEF,
ordered the Jambudwip fishermen not to use
the island and to remove their fishing
implements from their makeshift sheds.
Subsequently, the Department set fire to the
sheds and fishing implements in July-August
2002. The torching of bamboo-and-reed
sheds and fishing implements is particularly
intriguing since there was a Ministerial
meeting held between the Fisheries and the
Forest Departments on 9 August 2002. At
this meeting, a decision was made, as
reported in the press, to regularize the
seasonal use of a demarcated area of
Jambudwip for fish drying by fishermen
holding identity cards issued by the Fisheries
Department.
A subsequent letter dated 30 October 2002
from the MoEF even made provision for setting
up district-level committees or commissions
to settle disputed claims of eligible
encroachments. But no such initiative was
taken in the case of Jambudwip. The letter
also revealed a softening of the MoEF’s
position; the earlier rigid stand on “summary
eviction” by 30 September gave way to
“showing progress on the eviction of ineligible
encroachments”.
Entry blocked
The West Bengal forest authorities, however,
hardened their stand on Jambudwip. They
erected concrete pillars at the mouth of the
creek—the lifeblood of the fishermen and
their fisheries— allegedly to block the entry
of fishing vessels into the creek. On 12
November 2002, for the first time in the history
of Jambudwip, ten fishermen drowned at sea
during a cyclone, as they were unable to seek
shelter in the creek.
Soon after the drowning incident, the National
Fishworkers’ Forum (NFF), India, launched
an agitation on 18 November 2002 against
preventing seasonal fisheries camps and
blocking entry of fishing vessels into the creek
in Jambudwip. Subsequently, the Principal
Secretary of Fisheries, West Bengal, informed
the CEC that the West Bengal State
Government had decided to permit fishing
activity in Jambudwip on the ground that it
has been continuing for almost 50 years.
The fishermen resumed fishing but they were
still prevented from landing their catch in
Jambudwip. On 25 November 2002, after
removing a few of the concrete pillars erected
by the West Bengal Forest Department, the
fishermen entered the creek and sat in their
fishing vessels in peaceful protest against
being denied access to the island.
On 26 November 2002, the Chief Secretary
of West Bengal wrote to the CEC requesting
it to agree to the State Government proposal
to allow the fishermen to resume fish-drying
activities up to February 2003 as an interim
The West Bengal
forest authorities,
however, hardened
their stand on
Jambudwip. They
erected concrete
pillars at the
mouth of the
creek—the
lifeblood of the
fishermen and
their fisheries—
allegedly to block
the entry of fishing
vessels into the
creek
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measure and to await a formal proposal on
the issue from the State Government. The
letter also contained viable proposals for long-
term solutions to the vexing issue, such as
allowing the seasonal fishery in a fenced area
along the seaboard of Jambudwip, with full
protection to mangroves beyond the fenced
area.
Although it indirectly makes provisions for
resuming fish-drying activities for the 2002-
03 season, the report of the CEC hangs like a
Damocles sword on the future of the
Jambudwip fishery. As we go to press, there
is still uncertainty if the fishermen could
resume their fishery from the year 2003-04.
About 3,000 fishworkers live on the island
during the season, staying in makeshift sheds
of bamboo and reed, repairing fishing nets,
sorting, drying and storing fish, while about
3,500 fishermen engage in behundi jal
fishing in the adjacent sea. What makes
behundi jal fisheries possible is the unique
delta ecosystem and the community’s in-
depth understanding of the inter-relationships
between the lunar cycle, oceanic currents
and the migratory behaviour of fish, in
conjunction with the dynamics of bottom
topography of the sea, including the pattern
of sedimentation and soil quality. The fishery
is marked by simultaneous capture, transport
and processing activities, with different sets
of people involved round-the-clock as one
unit under one bahardar, or fleet operator.
In actual practice, it is like setting up two
camps: one on land and the other at sea, since
the fishermen who fish do not return to the
island until the end of the season, unless there
is a cyclone or some accident. The fishing
ground is connected to the fish-drying yards
by fish transport vessels that operate daily,
sometimes twice a day.
The island—especially the creek during high
tide—is not only useful for unloading fish and
loading victuals for the fishermen staying on
the fishing ground, it is also beneficial as a
refuge from cyclones. Drinking water and
firewood are also available on the island.
Easy access to sufficient quantities of
firewood was a long-term requirement not
only for cooking, but, more importantly, for
boiling hemp fishing nets in natural dyes to
make them invisible to fish in the thick mud
These days though, firewood is used only for
cooking since everyone has switched to nylon
nets, which do not require any dyeing.
In the behundi jal fishery, a series of bag
nets are fixed in the black, sticky mud in the
seabed undulations called khari at a distance
of about 25 nautical miles from Jambudwip.
The khari has a combination of disintegrated
mangrove wood and mud, and is an important
source of food for bottom-feeder fish.
Aggregation of benthic fish attracts other fish
that predate on them. Both prey and predator
fish become quarry for the fishermen.
Bag net design
Each fishing unit has about 20 bag nets. The
bag net has an average length of 75 ft and
has a 60-ft mouth. Ropes, corresponding to
the water column depth, bind wings of bag
net on either side of its mouth to metal stakes
driven into the mud. The knots are ingeniously
tied so that the mouth of the net always faces
the water current, in both high and low tide.
The net is designed in such a manner that a
strong current would take it to the bottom of
the channel, while a weaker current would
keep it at the midwater level. In the absence
of a current, the net would float on the
surface. Two hardy bamboo poles are tied
vertically to the mouth of the net, 20 ft apart,
to keep it open. The nets are fixed at depths
of 12 to 15 fathoms. The high opening of the
bag net, in synchrony with the currents, allows
both demersal and midwater species to be
caught.
In each of the khari, five nets are fixed in a
row, as a cluster. Often, different khari are
chosen to deploy the nets. Unlike the trawl
net, which furrows the seabed, the stationary
bag nets do not cause any damage to the
seabed. The fish are emptied every six hours,
at the time of the equilibrium between the
high and low tides, when there are no
currents, and when the mouth of the net floats
○○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
33Sizing Up: Property Rights and Fisheries Management
SAMUDRA Dossier
on the surface of the sea. Fish are emptied
from the cod-end of the net; doa—the
Bengali word for emptying the cod-end—
can be translated as ‘milking’ the net. Each
unit catches about 400 tonnes of fish in a
single season. Two-thirds of the catch
comprise species like Bombay duck,
ribbonfish, anchovies, silver belly and wolf
herring that are dried for human consumption
and poultry feed. The remainder one-third
comprises high-value species like shrimp,
jewfish, catfish, Indian salmon, eels and rays,
which are sold fresh. It is estimated that each
unit catches fish worth Rs4 mn (approx.
US$80,000) in a good season. Putting all the
units together, Jambudwip produces about
16,000 tonnes of fish worth Rs168 mn
(approx. US$3.4 mn) in a five-month-long
fishing season.
According to Dr L K Banerjee, Retired Joint
Director, Botanical Survey of India, who has
worked on the mangroves of Sundarbans for
the past 30 years, Jambudwip has successive
stages of vegetation, comprising mainly
Avicennia species of mangroves, and species
of grass like Porteraesia coarctata and
Phoenix paludosa. The species diversity on
the island is not that significant. However,
the satellite imageries of Jambudwip for the
period 1981 to 2001 from the National
Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA) furnished
to the CEC by the Forest Department as
“irrefutable proof” of mangrove destruction
show dense mangrove vegetation coverage
except in areas that are allegedly cleared by
the fishermen. Moreover, since higher-
resolution satellite images clearly showing
deforestation to the detail that the NRSA
images are claiming to portray have been
produced in India only from 1998, the
authenticity of the images as irrefutable proof
for the period prior to 1998 needs to be
independently verified scientifically.
Even if there is felling of mangroves on the
Jambudwip island for firewood by the
fishworkers, it is not an impossible situation
to salvage since the Avicennia species of
mangroves found on the island can be
successfully regenerated. There are several
examples from India as well as other parts
of the world. Moreover, the fishworkers are
ready to move from firewood to liquefied
petroleum gas for cooking purposes.
There are about 10,000 people dependent on
the stake-net fishery today, as against a couple
of hundreds 35 years ago. Instead of
extinguishing the fishery, what is required is
to recognize its salient aspects and mitigate
negative impacts through better coastal area
management, treating the island and the
fishing ground within one framework. The
Fisheries and Forest Departments have to
develop mechanisms to collaborate with the
fishermen to achieve this goal.
“I gave commands; Then all smiles stopped
together”, the poet Robert Browning made
the Count say in My Last Duchess. In the
case of Jambudwip, it is high time to retract
the command and bring back the smiles of
the fishermen of the island. 
What makes
behundi jal fisheries
possible is the
unique delta
ecosystem and the
community’s in-
depth
understanding of
the inter-
relationships
between the lunar
cycle, oceanic
currents and the
migratory
behaviour of fish,
in conjunction
with the dynamics
of bottom
topography of the
sea, including the
pattern of
sedimentation and
soil quality
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In the beginning, fish were aplenty andthere were no rules upon the face of thedeep, and the spirit of free access moved
upon the waters. And the fishermen saw that
it was good and fished as many fishes as
they needed to feed their families and their
neighbours. But people were multiplying and
replenishing the earth, and more and more
fishermen had to catch more and more fish
to meet the demand of the ever-growing
humanity. And governments said: let there
be management, so that there would always
be enough fish left in the seas to procreate.
And they limited the gear, the vessels, the
seasons, and the fishing areas, and they called
it ‘input regulation’. But, the fishermen kept
fishing and their fleets kept growing, and the
governments saw that it was bad. So they
made licences, and their scientist thought up
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and the
total allowable catches (TACs). But the
fishermen kept competing, and over-
capitalizing, and the fish became scarce. And
the economists said unto the governments:
let there be property rights. And they spawned
individual transferable quotas (ITQs). And
they believed that it is good and said unto the
fishermen: Behold, rights’ privatization is your
salvation. And the governments sent the ITQs
upon waters to replenish the seas and subdue
all fisheries.
And it was good! This is more or less the
gospel, which prevails throughout fisheries
administrations in many countries. It makes
some people richer and they become its
devoted believers and supporters, while the
many made poorer—or afraid to become
so—its adamant opponents. And the
consequences in almost every single case are
more or less gradual concentration of fishing
rights in fewer and fewer hands, often enough
in the hands of major corporate interests, at
the expense of small-scale, family- and
skipper-owned fishing enterprises that operate
one or two small or even medium-sized
fishing vessels, each.
Fisheries management is supposed to look
after the health of the fish resources exploited
by fishermen. This requires knowledge of
fishery biology and ecology, population
dynamics, and historical data of the fishery
and of environmental and associated stock
fluctuations in its area. As fisheries
management can only manage people, it
entails negotiations, legislation, technology
and enforcement. There is a whole catalogue
of management systems and technical and
administrative methods that managers can
use to try to achieve their targets. The political
attitude of the powers in charge determines
the choice of the system and the manner in
which it is applied through licensing, quotas
allocation, or limits set on effort. The system
chosen influences, through allocating benefits
to the different stakeholders, the distribution
of the benefits derived from the resource.
For example, allocating fishing rights to a large
number of small-scale fishermen would call
for different management methods than
allocating them to a large company.
Traditional knowledge
Old-type management by tribal and
community leaders and local fisherfolk’s
organizations based on traditional knowledge
of the resource and traditional justice, is now
almost totally extinct. It has been replaced
throughout most of the world by bureaucratic
and technocratic mechanisms heavily
influenced by political and economic
Hijacked by neoliberal economics
Menakhem Ben-Yami
A fashionable neoclassical political-economic ideology
has taken over the management of many fisheries
This article is by
Menakhem Ben-
Yami, Fisheries
Management and
Development
Adviser, Israel, This
article first appeared
in SAMUDRA Report
No. 35, July 2003
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considerations that, while interested in fish
as marketable merchandise and a source of
profits to the operators, have only little to do
with safeguarding the resource as a source
of income to fishing people. Fisheries
management has thus become a power play
over benefits from the resource.
Stakeholders are many, starting with fishing
people and local interests in fishing
communities, through recreational fishermen,
environmental lobbies and coastal
development interests, and ending with
powerful corporations and market forces,
whether local, national or multinational.
Neoclassical economics invaded the
management of various commons and
national resources as an extension of a
paradigm dominant—though very much at
issue—in the industrialized world. Its gospel
is being spread over the world and its political,
financial and academic institutions by troops
of disciplined economists, rewarded for
devotion, and punished for dissent. So, what
is this neoliberal or neoclassical teaching in
economics that has also impinged on
fisheries? And on what basis are its devoted
adherents preaching that theirs is the only
way society can take to utilize its fish
resources in a feasible and efficient manner?
The old ‘classical’ economic teaching
introduced the belief in the ‘invisible hand’
driven by self-interest guiding rational
individual decisions eventually into an
optimum economy, in which free-market
forces take care of all aspects of peoples’
lives. An implied outcome of such ‘free play’
is that any financial profit derived from a
common, fully, partly or quasi-privatized
resource would somehow trickle down and
redistribute itself all over the society.
But this is a myth and a fallacious contention,
if not an outright lie. It is common knowledge
that, in most of the world’s countries, a big
share of such benefits indeed trickles down,
but to various investments abroad, and to
imported luxury products and services. The
‘trickle-down’ theory can approach the real
situation only in a few rich countries, where
profits feel secure and investments promise
further accumulation of capital.
Recently, more and more economists and
other social scientists have started casting
doubts on the neoclassical gospel, nicknamed
by some as ‘autistic economics’. Awarding
the 2002 Nobel Price in economics to two
professors, one of them a psychologist, who
refuted the theory that, as a rule, individuals
make rational economic decisions, reflected
this growing criticism. Economic determinism
inherent in the neoliberal theory does not work;
the markets’ reaction to prices, the prices’
reaction to the dynamics of supply and
demand, and peoples’ reactions and economic
activities do not fit that theory’s assumptions.
Hence, its weakness in economic analysis and
forecasting.
Some economists and other social scientists
argue that, contrary to its pretense to a
scientific, objective approach, neoclassical
economics is, in fact, a social-political
narrative and a methodology used by global
economic and political interests to
concentrate power in the hands of corporate
national and multinational institutions. Thus,
individual businessmen and small and
medium-scale private enterprises, not to
speak of wage earners, are losing their
influence on socioeconomic decision making
to powerful commercial-industrial centres and
their collaborators in governments. This
transfer of power is promoted, legislated, and
executed through democratic processes
occurring within the existing legal framework
with the help of well-financed journalistic and
media campaigns and more or less biased
scientific publications, with the neoclassical
economic narrative serving as a tool for
achieving the explicit goals and hidden
agendas of its promoters. Thus, the ‘invisible
hand’ has been transformed from the sum of
the multitude of individual decisions into the
sum of the political and economic decisions
of powerful interests.
Profit maximization
Neoclassical economics is supposed to aim
at and produce maximization of social and
Fisheries
management has
thus become a
power play over
benefits from the
resource.
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national benefits, which, in fact, are dollar-
equivalent measures of how economists
value goods and services (including non-
market goods and services). It preaches
maximization of profits or rents often attained
at the expense of heavy social costs. The
big question is how these costs and benefits
are defined and calculated; since social costs
are very difficult to estimate, any portrayal
of economics as an absolute, scientific
methodology is simply fallacious, and honest
economists admit that they cannot adequately
calculate all social benefits and all social
costs.
It is obvious that losses incurred through
forfeiture of alternative actions, and due to
various social and other external costs, many
of which cannot be evaluated in terms of
dollars and cents, are a part and parcel of
any economy. As long as we do not take into
account all the costs and benefits from
production and market fluctuations, various
management steps, social, economic and
cultural dislocations of people and their
ramifications affecting coastal communities,
as well as other ‘externalities’ difficult to
express in monetary terms, we are unable to
calculate the true net social costs and
benefits.
Also, many people associate the term ‘social
benefits’ with how national resources are
distributed across society. They ask, for
example, how many people make a living
from a certain resource. A ‘less efficient’
small-scale fishery that employs many more
people than an ‘efficient’ big-owner fleet,
may feed less monies to the ‘national purse’,
but, as a rule, is directly and effectively more
beneficial to people and their communities.
Only an in depth analysis can establish which
option would produce truer benefits and
values. Thus, it is quite consequential who
defines national and social benefits, and how.
For example, calculation of net national
benefits for an industrial shrimp fishery in a
non-industrial country must include a
deduction of the costs of all imports, such as
expatriate manpower, fuel and lubricants,
vessels, deck and propulsion machinery,
processing and refrigeration equipment, and
fishing gear, as well as insurance and
maintenance costs incurred in foreign-
currency. In some cases, the only net benefits
from an industrial shrimp fishery in such
countries are the revenues from licence fees
and the employment of nationals, while the
major share of the revenues as well as the
product itself goes abroad.
Policy costs
Therefore, responsible economic theory must
take into account also values that are non-
financial/commercial, and the diverse
peripheral socioeconomic, political and
cultural costs, as well as the taxpayer’s money
spent on dealing with human problems
resulting from management decisions. Only
then would the society and its governments
be informed of the true costs of any policy
proposition, before their natural resources get
transferred into the hands of a few.
Nowadays, however, such transfer is
facilitated by governments’ obsession with
privatization as a panacea for all maladies of
the economy.
The neoliberal gospel preaches that
practically nothing can work efficiently, if it
is not somebody’s private or corporate
property. The massive ideological privatization
practised in some countries has embraced
also such natural resources as water, forests
and various energy sources as well as public
transport. Even economically viable, and
efficiently run national resources often fall
victim to the privatization Moloch. How
wrong this ideology can be has been recently
well illustrated by a whole series of flops of
some mammoth privatized and corporate
companies, due to both, mismanagement and
corruption, as well as by the rather
disappointing results of the privatization of
the British railway system. Swissair, PanAm,
Enron and other recent bankrupt giants were
not run by governments.
One consequence of the domination of
neoclassical economics is the rather obscure
struggle between free enterprise and
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corporate interests. In the past, the
conception of capitalism and free markets
used to emphasize private initiative.
Nowadays, however, it isn’t necessarily so.
Neoclassical economics is leading to a regime
in which major businesses and corporations
are gradually displacing smaller-scale
enterprises and businessmen, while being
indifferent towards the social conditions of
working people, whose role it reduces to
selling their work power on the market. It is
‘happy’ when supply of labour exceeds
demand, because unemployment depresses
wages and improves profits.
Some time ago, after the demise of the Soviet
system, one would think that free enterprise
had won. One is not so sure nowadays. Like
the Soviet monopolistic concerns, some of
the giant companies of the ‘capitalist’ world
are run by financial bureaucracies supported
by ideological economists, who seem to
consider small and family-owned enterprises
a noise and a nuisance in their concept of
‘economically efficient’ world.
The invasion of fisheries by neoclassical
economics has been a logical consequence
to its domination of the global, and many
national, economies. Like many historical
invasions, it was partly invited from inside
the fisheries by large-scale interests and their
proxies in the management mechanisms,
who gave it a friendly reception. Once in, it
seems to be here to stay, especially in all those
countries where, for various reasons, it is not
met with strong opposition.
What brought this ideology into the fisheries
is its claim that privatization is the most
efficient, if not the only, mode of exploiting a
resource. This, even if the resource belongs
to the whole nation, as is the case with water,
forests and, for that matter, fish in the sea.
When, following the Second World War, the
spiralling growth of fisheries brought about
the need for management, it was initially
based on so-called ‘input control’. This implies
regulation of fishing effort through such
means as limited access, fishing time and
areas, as well as other regulations that try to
follow the biological characteristics of the
species involved. In some countries this
management system still works well enough;
in others it has been deemed, rightly or
wrongly, inadequate. Fish population dynamics
models have been used to estimate the
biomass of fish populations and, consequently,
the fixing of TACs. In some fisheries this led
to highly competitive ‘gold rush’ fishing
operations and investment in excessively
strong and fast vessels. The next step was
dividing the TAC into quotas that were
allocated to vessels, usually, according to their
fishing history. And this was the moment
when the neoliberal economists stepped in
with a new pattern: marketable fishing quotas
(ITQs).
Property rights
They introduced the rather axiomatic theory
that property rights are a must in fisheries
for maximum benefit and efficiency, spelled
out in financial terms and rational exploitation
of the resource. Since property rights are
characterized by (i) security, or quality of title;
(ii) exclusivity; (iii) permanence; and (iv)
transferability, their application in fisheries
boils down to ITQs. Thus, mere ‘fishing rights’
have become ‘private property rights’. Trade
in fishing rights eventually must hit the weaker
stakeholder by allocating individual quotas too
small to pay a vessel owner’s way out of the
red, on the one hand, and by pricing licences
and quota entitlements above the value of his/
her fishing boat and gear, on the other.
A licence gone from a fishing community is
gone forever, together with all the associated
jobs, services and income. If it were not for
social opposition, a worldwide adoption of
ITQs would have proceeded faster.
Since marketable quota systems favour the
financially stronger, they invariably lead to a
gradual displacement of small-scale individual
or family-owned fishing enterprises, and,
sooner or later, to the concentration of fishing
rights in the hands of a few, either specialized
fishing companies, or large holding
corporations for whom fishing may be only
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one branch of a multifarious business. Such
concentration would eventually occur even
where there are legislative attempts at
stipulating acquisition of quota by some
maximum values. Hence, there is a growing
concern of ‘privatization by stealth’.
It is incredible that managers introducing this
system into small-scale or mixed fisheries
would be unaware that its social, economic
and political ramifications favour large-scale
business at the expense of local fisheries and
processing industries, and small-scale
operators, and threaten the survival of the
small-scale fishing sector. ITQs tend to
depress artisanal fishers and effectively
exclude part-time participants in local
fisheries, and favour the owners, while
disregarding crew members. Hence, the
selection of ITQ for such fisheries must
reflect the political and social attitudes of the
respective governments.
Green non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have willy-nilly contributed to the
privatization trend. Although some of them,
for example, Greenpeace, have joined
protests against ITQs, there have been NGOs
with often exaggerated and sometimes even
fallacious alarmist publications on the state
of fishery resources, painting the fishermen
as the main culprits, which fueled the
neoclassical economists’ fires. ITQ advocates
have claimed that privatization based on
marketable fishing quotas would maintain fish
stocks at sustainable levels.
Gold rush
Their main argument was: “If fishing interests
are allowed to invest in a permanent share
of the TAC, so that they’d be sure of their
relative share in the landings of the respective
species from a given area, they wouldn’t
need to apply the ‘gold-rush’ mode of
operation, and would be interested in
maintaining the resource in an everlastingly
sustainable condition.” On the other hand,
ITQs are a rather peculiar sort of property
rights: one pays, sometimes quite heavily, for
the right to catch a certain amount of fish;
one never knows whether one will be able to
get it and at what operational cost, and one
doesn’t really control the resource and
doesn’t know whether by observing the rules
and sticking to the quota, one is not made a
sucker by others.
Hence, the potential well-intended
stewardship over the resources by quota-
owners is, in fact, more than often frustrated
by high grading, fish dumping and quota
busting. While ITQs indeed mitigated the
‘gold-rush’ fishing, and their contribution to
stock conservation might have happened in
a few fisheries, it has been proved so only in
a couple of them. At the same time, failures
have been reported and documented.
The ITQ system would be socially and
nationally justifiable where the resource is
technically not accessible to small- and
medium-scale operators based in coastal
fishing communities, and where exploitation
of the resource requires large-scale industrial
fishing vessels and fleet logistics.
But where large numbers of small-scale
operators traditionally exploit inshore and
coastal resources, most of them consider
marketable quotas socially and also
economically wrong. Harvesting methods
that are most efficient in financial terms are
often the ones with the worst collateral
(including environmental) impact, while less
capital-intensive and technologically and
operationally sophisticated fishing methods
normally allow wider and much more
equitable access to benefits from the fishery,
with less negative environmental and social
impacts.
In Third World countries, for example, coastal
fisheries operate under many stresses, the
main one being invasion of larger-scale
fisheries into waters and stocks accessible
to, and fishable by, small-scale fishermen,
often with official government support or
high-circles’ well-paid ‘closing of the eye’.
But, in such areas, large-scale operations are
less efficient than small-scale fishing. They
consume several times more fuel per tonne
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of marketable fish than the small-boat fishery;
capital investment in gear and vessels is
higher; and they produce fewer true
national benefits.
The same fish stock that can be fully and
profitably exploited by 10 trawlers manned
by 100 people, if allocated exclusively to
coastal fisherfolk using nets, pots and hooks-
and-lines, may provide a living to many
hundreds, or maybe thousands of them, never
mind how low their calculated profits are
going to be.
In many areas, both recreational and small-
scale commercial fisheries form the
backbone of coastal communities whose
economies revolve around fishing. It causes
money to flow to equipment and bait, food
and fuel suppliers, boatyards, and a variety
of commercial and technical services in
docks, harbours and marinas, as well as those
sectors of the tourist industry that are centred
on fishing communities.
Hidden agendas
No doubt, management decisions depend
first of all on the prevailing policy objectives.
Different governments and the powers that
influence them may have different, above-
board and hidden agendas. Hence,
worldwide, there is no consensus on the
objectives of fisheries management. Some
governments may believe that safeguarding
the well-being of communities where fishery
is an important contributor to the local and,
thus, national economy is an important goal.
‘Safeguarding the well-being’ means creating
and maintaining conditions that would enable
the fishing industry to get an adequate return
on investment, and fishing people, sufficient
take-home incomes.
It also may mean that in certain special
circumstances, the State may have to
intervene to help a community over a
temporary hardship, as it would do for
farmers hit by a drought year, or an industrial
community hit by an earthquake. Isn’t that
what governments are for: collecting taxes,
providing services, and helping in trouble?
But some governments, as well as most
global, transnational and intergovernmental
financial institutions are driven by the
neoclassical ideology, especially when it
comes to economic relations with developing
nations. Undeniably, some of the conditions
of economic co-operation and assistance
imposed by those institutions stem from their
wish to protect their investments from
misconduct, corruption and mismanagement.
But, only too often, under the hypocritical
pretext of securing free markets and
economic liberalization, their conditions are
simply a tool of protectionism. And here we
come to fisheries subsidies. The United
States, the European Union (EU) and some
other developed countries, in view of the
heavy overcapitalization of their fishing fleets,
came to the quite appropriate decision to stop
subsidizing the construction of fishing vessels.
They want, however, to have their new
policies ‘globalized’ to cover also the
developing world.
A number of developing countries too have
had, for many years, large national fleets, and
they should not subsidize overcapacity as well.
Any international agreement involving fishery
subsidies should take into account small-scale
fishermen, who have to compete for the local
fish resources with large-scale fishing fleets
allowed to fish or poach on their native,
traditional fishing grounds. Such fleets are
subsidized, almost as a rule, whether directly
or in a roundabout manner, as are the EU
payments for access to fishing grounds of
Third World nations. Small-scale fisherfolk
operating under such conditions deserve
support both on the part of their own
respective governments, as well as the
international community. Would it be too much
to ask the EU, and individual governments of
countries whose fleets are out to exploit
coastal fish stocks of their own or other
countries, as well as the governments who
allow such fleets into their coastal waters, to
give them a fighting chance?
Fisherfolk in the small-and medium-scale
sectors both, owners and hired hands, who
do not want to be dislocated from their
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subsidies should
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traditional fisheries by management systems
based on marketable fishing rights, should
recognize that their main adversaries are the
standard bearers of neoclassical economics
in national and transnational financial
institutions and corporations, and their proxies
in fisheries management. It is very difficult
to resist such powerful interests in democratic
societies without joining forces. For this
purpose, provincial, national and regional
fishermen’s associations should organize
under common umbrellas. Also, international
associations of fishing people should create
a joint worldwide umbrella that would not
affect their individual structure and character,
but would enable them to board the
globalization train in weight and force. 
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The struggle by artisanal fishers in Peruhas been in the news of late. Theyare demanding that the integrity of the
five-mile artisanal fishing zone be maintained,
in the face of recent moves to open up
‘windows of penetration’  to allow large-scale
industrial fishing in the southern part of the
country (see The Holy Grail, pg. 42).
Starting in the 1970s, several countries
around the world have established artisanal
fishing zones. In many cases, the declaration
of such zones was a response by States to
the growing conflicts between the large-scale
and the artisanal sectors, as in India and
Indonesia. Faced with increasing and unequal
competition from the technologically efficient
large-scale sector, artisanal fishworkers in
many countries expressly demanded the
establishment of these zones.
That such zones can play an important role
from a social perspective is undeniable.
Millions of people in the developing world
depend on fisheries for a livelihood, and a
majority of them fish in coastal and nearshore
waters. Their livelihoods, as well as the
fisheries resource base, are known to be
directly and indirectly jeopardized by the
activities of industrial and large-scale fleets
using destructive gear, such as bottom trawls,
in coastal waters.
From a fisheries management perspective
too, the logic for the establishment of artisanal
zones, where only selective fishing gear and
techniques are permitted, is incontestable.
Coastal and inter-tidal areas are known to
be highly fragile, productive and important
as spawning and breeding grounds. As such,
a regulation that allows only selective and
responsible fishing in such zones, in
combination with other management
measures, could be very effective.
These issues are to be discussed at a
workshop that the International Collective in
Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) is organizing
early next year, titled Sustaining Fisheries
and Livelihoods in Latin America: The
Imperative of Secure Access Rights for
Artisanal Fishworkers.
In deciding on measures that could support
the small-scale and artisanal sector, the
changing context and the dynamism within
this sector must also be kept in mind. It would
be inappropriate to see the artisanal zone as
a ‘box’ within which the small-scale sector is
confined. The small-scale sector, in many
parts of the world, as in the Philippines,
Senegal, India, Sri Lanka, Peru and Chile, has
convincingly demonstrated its ability to
harvest highly migratory resources, such as
tuna and shark, in a sustainable manner, in
deeper waters within the exclusive economic
zones (EEZs). To the extent that small-scale
fisheries for such species is technologically
and environmentally efficient, and leads to
socially desirable outcomes such as greater
employment and equitable distribution of
income, it must be supported through specific
policy measures.
Recognizing the artisanal zone is an important
first step towards recognizing and supporting
the artisanal and small-scale sector. The
struggles of artisanal and small-scale
fishworkers for maintaining the integrity of
the artisanal zone, as in Peru, can not but be
backed. By demonstrating enough political
will, States can design and implement
fisheries management measures that meet the
goals of both equity and sustainability. 
Towards artisanal fishing zones
Recognizing the artisanal zone is an important first step towards
recognizing and supporting the artisanal and small-scale sector
Millions of people
in the developing
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In several Latin American countries, thecomplementary objectives of securingartisanal fishing rights and conserving
marine resources are enshrined in law. Thus
‘artisanal fishing zones’ have come to be
recognized as special kinds of marine
reserves, where small-scale fishing is allowed
to take place without interference from
larger-scale activities. Intensive, non-
selective and destructive fishing activities
(often referred to as ‘industrial fishing’, and
geared to the production of fishmeal) are
banned from these close-to-shore zones. The
recognition of reserved artisanal fishing zones
has, in many cases, come after long and hard-
won (and ongoing) struggles, particularly in
the two neighbouring Southern Cone
countries of Chile and Peru. Here ‘exclusive
artisanal zones’ have been established within
a boundary of five nautical miles from the
shoreline.
Despite these advances, artisanal fishing
zones are subject to continuing incursions,
both legal and illegal, by industrial and large-
scale fishing operations. Clashes are also
increasingly prevalent between artisanal
fishing communities and aquaculture
enterprises. Again, aquaculture enterprises
may operate both legally (through being
granted concessions) or illegally. In some
Latin American countries, aquaculture
enterprises have been set up illegally following
violent (often armed) seizure of land and the
intimidation of local communities through
killings and torture.
In addition, it is an unfortunate fact of life
that some government functionaries are not
impartial actors in the decision- and law-
making processes. In many countries, the
investment sector (for intensive aquaculture
and industrial fisheries) often carries more
political clout than small-scale fisheries.
Worse still, high-ranking government officials
may also be the captains of those very
industries seeking to gain access to
conservation areas reserved for artisanal
fishing.
In Chile, Ecoceanos News of 15 October
2004 reports that allegations of ‘illegal
enrichment’ have resulted in a Special
Parliamentary Commission being set up to
investigate the ‘black market’ in aquaculture
concessions. Aquaculture concessions are
allocated free of charge, and with no time
limit set. The only requirement is the payment
of a nominal annual charge of between
60,000 and 120,000 pesos (approximately
US$100-200). The owner is then free to lease
or sell these freely acquired concessions.
Ecoceanos reports that in some regions such
concessions may sell for as much as US$1
mn.
In August 2001, the Chilean Fisheries
Subsecretary, Daniel Albaran, resigned amid
allegations of corruption and professional
misconduct. Albarran was, at the same time,
the chairman of several aquaculture
enterprises and Fisheries Subsecretary. In his
public function, he was responsible for
approving large numbers of aquaculture
concessions. In business, he had an interest
in how concessions were allocated. He may
well come under the scrutiny of the
Parliamentary Commission.
Aquaculture concessions
Likewise, in Peru, the handing out of
aquaculture concessions in traditional fishing
The Holy Grail
Brian O’Riordan
This article examines the background  to the changes now being
proposed for the status of the artisanal fishing zone in Peru
This article has been
compiled by Brian
O’Riordan, based on
correspondence with
various organizations,
and news items and
official documents
available on the
Internet. This article
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areas, in both the coastal areas and inland
waters, has been strongly criticized. There
have been fierce conflicts between artisanal
fishermen and aquaculture enterprises over
issues of access rights in several fishing
communities along the coast—Chimbote,
Samanco, Casma, Callao, Pisco and Ilo.
Given a situation of increasing insecurity, and
faced with growing threats to their livelihood
rights from competing interests, artisanal
fishworkers from Chile and Peru have
recently committed themselves to establishing
an International Commission in Defence of
the Five-Mile Zone. The commission was
established earlier this year during the Second
Bi-national Peru-Chile Artisanal Fishermen’s
Meeting that took place in the northern
Chilean city of Arica, from 1-2 July 2004.
Then, in September 2004, in the Port of Ilo,
Peru, the commission organized an
International Forum on Artisanal Fishing to
widen the network and to articulate more
clearly the demands of artisanal fishworkers.
In parallel, non-governmental organizations
in the Southern Cone region, from Chile,
Argentina and Uruguay, met in July 2004 to
set up a Southern Cone Coalition to promote
sustainable fisheries and social equity in the
region.
In 1992, an area was legally reserved for
artisanal fishing in the nearshore waters of
Peru through Supreme Decree D.S. 017-92.
This established the zone adjacent to the
coast: “comprising the area between zero and
five nautical miles, as a conservation zone
for the flora and fauna that exist there”.
“Carrying out fishing activities for direct or
indirect human consumption with purse-
seines, and with other methods, gear and
fishing devices that modify the biological
conditions of the marine environment” is
banned. The decree was passed due to “the
serious interference of industrial fishing fleets
and fleets fishing for direct human
consumption in zones declared as the
exclusive reserve for the operation of
artisanal fishing vessels.” It recognizes the
importance of this zone for “upwelling and
the breeding of the principal fishery
resources that sustain the fishery for direct
human consumption”, and the need to
“establish measures conducive for its
protection”.
In 1995, another Supreme Decree modified
some of these conditions, and clarified that
the ban on purse-seining refers only to
industrial fishing, and not to artisanal fishing.
It also clarified that the 0-5 nautical mile zone
is reserved for artisanal fishing and, as such,
that artisanal purse-seines may be used in the
zone, so long as they comply with the criteria
set by the Ministry of Fisheries.
Fierce conflicts
But the permission granted to artisanal purse-
seining activities in the five-mile zone has led
to fierce conflicts in the northern region of
Tumbes. Thus, in August 2004, the Peruvian
Ministry of Production was forced to call in
the navy to establish control measures on the
activities of the so-called vikingos chicos
(little vikings) and bolichitos (mini-purse-
seines) in the sea around Tumbes.
The 1995 modification also makes the ban
conditional on the technical opinion of Peru’s
Marine Institute (IMARPE). And here lies the
bone of contention for artisanal fishermen in
the south of the country, notably those from
the port town of Ilo. In February 2001, IMARPE
published a technical report, titled The
Problematic of the Five-mile in the South
of Peru and Technical Alternatives for Its
Management. The report observes that, in
the south of the country, the distribution and
concentration of the main fishery resources
are localized in the zone 10 miles from the
coast. This is due to climatic and
oceanographic factors, and the presence of
a very narrow continental shelf. In this
southern region, the shelf width averages five
nautical miles, but ranges from a maximum
of 13 nautical miles to less than two
(compared to 70 nautical miles in the northern
region around Chimbote).
IMARPE notes that the concentration of
fishery resources becomes more pronounced
in summer (between December and March),
especially in the five-mile zone. Its report
provides an overview of oceanographic
There have been
fierce conflicts
between artisanal
fishermen and
aquaculture
enterprises over
issues of access
rights in several
fishing
communities along
the coast
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conditions in the southern region, and
describes the spawning behaviour of the
Peruvian anchovy. Known locally as
anchoveta (Engraulis ringens), it is the
main species targeted by industrial fishing
activities supplying the fishmeal processors.
The report then goes on to describe the
activities of both the industrial and artisanal
fishery in the south of the country.
In Peru, some 700 marine species are legally
classified according to whether they are
destined for direct human consumption (some
150 species) or for industrial purposes (two
or three main species, including anchovy/
anchoveta—Engraulis ringens and Anchoa
nasus—and sardine). In fact, it has recently
become national government policy to
mobilize supplies of fish (scad, locally called
jurel, and mackerel, caballa) to address the
problems of widespread malnutrition amongst
the low-income segments of the Peruvian
population.
This has been enshrined in law through
Supreme Decree D.S. 021-2004, which
establishes special conditions for the catch
of industrial fishmeal vessels to be used for
human consumption. But FIUPAP is highly
critical of this, pointing out that the industrial
sector targeting these resources is already
showing overcapacity. Rather, priority should
be given to developing the artisanal sector
and providing market support to ensure that
fishermen obtain a fair price, and low-income
consumers an affordable food.
IMARPE’s 2001 report documents the
significant increase in fishmeal processing
capacity since 1997 in the south of the
country, and the resulting increase in fishing
effort for anchovy, particularly in the summer.
In the period 1990-95, the industrial fleet
operating out of the port of Ilo remained more
or less constant, reaching a maximum of 85
vessels in 1992. By 2000, vessel numbers had
increased to 165, with a peak of activity in
the summer months.
In the period 1991-92, more than 60 per cent
of the southern industrial fish catch (for
fishmeal) was taken within five miles of the
coast. During the summer months between
1993 and 1997, this rose to 80 per cent. The
report also notes that, in most years, anchovy
represents more than 80 per cent of the
industrial catch. It refers to an additional 10
species caught by the industrial fleet
classified as species for human consumption,
but claims that industrial fishing activities have
had little impact on the mainstay species of
the artisanal sector.
In a subsequent report on artisanal fishing in
the zone 16°S - 18°20’S, IMARPE states that
over the period 1996-2002, 65 per cent of
the artisanal fishing fleet’s activities were
carried out in the 0-1.5 mile zone, and 99.5
per cent within the 2-5 mile zone. These
observations have been hotly contested by
the artisanal sector. They claim that part of
the sector has been forced to retreat inshore
to avoid interference from the industrial
sector.
New sector
Also, in the last few years, a new deep-sea
sector has developed, and artisanal fishing
boats range as far out as 150 miles to catch
perico (Coryphaena spp) and sharks
(Tiburon diamante and Tiburon azul).
The IMARPE study only looked at activities
in the five-mile zone, and not outside it. As
such, it provides an incomplete picture. Also,
it only looks at interference between sectors,
and not into sustainability issues. The Ilo
fishermen, therefore, contest the validity of
the report and its use for policy
decisionmaking.
The IMARPE report states that “due to the
greater concentration of fishery resources in
the coastal zone in the summer months, the
application of a seasonal exception is justified
in this period, that would allow for less
interference with artisanal fishing. As there
is a much smaller artisanal fleet South of 18°s
(that is, up to the Chilean border), free fishing
should be allowed in this area during this
period.” The report goes on: “One measure
that could be applied is that when industrial
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fishing vessels fish inside the five-mile zone
and catch fish classified as being for human
consumption, these could be given to the
artisanal fishermen,” with the caveat that “so
long as catch controls are improved for the
bycatch of fish for direct human
consumption. This would also require
improving the port infrastructure (the artisanal
fishing quays) and establishing marketing
channels.”
For the artisanal fishermen, the conclusions
and recommendations provide stark
prospects. According to IMARPE, the
applicability of the five-mile zone law in the
south of the country is not in line with the
seasonal oceanographic variations and
changes in species abundance.
They, therefore, recommend that “during the
summer, there should be a seasonal exception
to the five-mile law”. This would involve
allowing the industrial fleet to fish within three
miles of the coast in a belt of about 120 miles
(16°S to 17°59’S). From 18°S to the Chilean
border, industrial vessels would be allowed
to fish freely right up to the coast. “In all
cases, bycatch of species for human
consumption should be handed over to the
artisanal fishing community.”
In December 2003, these recommendations
found their way into Peruvian fisheries law.
Supreme Decree No 037-2003 calls for a
special fisheries regime to be established for
anchovy in the southern region, from 16°s to
Peru’s border with Chile. It proposes that
larger-scale purse-seiners be allowed access
to specified areas (so-called ‘penetration
windows’) within the artisanal five-mile zone.
The law also establishes that a special, non-
Statal, financing mechanism
(FONDEMPASUR) be set up for the
development and modernization of the
artisanal fishing sector in the southern region.
This is to be financed by a levy placed on
each metric tonne of fish landed by licensed
industrial fishing operations.
The law also specifies that all fish caught
other than anchovy should be handed over to
the authorities at the nearest artisanal fish
landing quay, or to the most representative
organization of artisanal fishermen.
Permission is also given to the owners of
artisanal fishing vessels to catch anchovy, and,
under exceptional circumstances, sell it for
human consumption.
In effect, the industrial sector is required to
set up a compensation fund in exchange for
being given these ‘windows of penetration’,
and is being ordered to do the artisanal
fishermen’s work of catching fish for human
consumption.
This decree is more or less exactly what the
industrial fishing sector had been lobbying for.
It is strongly backed by the southern fishmeal
producers organization, APROSUR, which
claims that in 2003, due to the lack of
nationwide access to the five-mile zone, some
US$ 95 mn worth of foreign exchange from
potential fishmeal exports was lost to the
nation, and further, that in the southern region,
a potential US$17.33 mn and 4,000 jobs were
lost due to fishmeal plant closures. They say
that the IMARPE report completely vindicates
their claims.
Coastal fishing
“The (artisanal zone) decree applies to the
whole coast without taking into account the
difference in the nature of the coastline in
the south and the north. While in Chimbote,
the shelf extends to 70 miles, in Ilo, it hardly
reaches 3.5 miles. This means that the
(southern) industrial fishing has to be
predominantly coastal,” they say.
They claim that reserving the five-mile zone
for artisanal fishing makes their industry less
competitive than Chile’s. “The anchovy that
is not caught by the Peruvian fleet is caught
by the Chilean industrial vessels,” they say.
APROSUR and the National Society of Fishing
Vessel Owners (SONAPE) have been actively
organizing demonstrations and other lobbying
Applicability of the
five-mile zone law
in the south of the
country is not in
line with the
seasonal
oceanographic
variations and
changes in species
abundance
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efforts to raise public awareness and
influence the political processes in their
favour. The artisanal fishermen of Ilo have
strongly challenged both the IMARPE findings
and the claims of the industrial fishing sector.
They accuse the Minister of Production,
Javier Reátegui Roselló, of being both judge
and jury, given his personal interests in the
fishmeal industry. In their view, allowing
‘windows of penetration’ for the industrial
fishery in the south is tantamount to ruining
the fishery.
According to them, the anchovy and other
fishery resources of the south represent a
natural resource bank. It is of major
importance as a feeding and spawning area,
which is disrupted and harmfully transformed
by industrial fishing activities.
They claim that “measures like making
exceptions to closed seasons in the south or
making penetration windows in the border
area for the industrial fishery are irrational,
and undermine the sustainability of the fishery
by not guaranteeing any resource or income
for tomorrow.”
They report that there are around 1,500
organized artisanal fishermen based around
the port of Ilo. The main organization is the
Sindicato nico de Pescadores Civiles del
Puerto de Ilo Artesanales-Buzos (SUPABCPI),
which is a member of the national artisanal
fishermen’s federation, FIUPAP. They claim
that there are a similar number of unorganized
fishermen in the region as well.
Artisanal fishing activities around Ilo, which
are all aimed at producing food for human
consumption, are diverse: mini-purse-seines
(bolichito), gill-nets, high-seas fishing, launch
(pintero) fishing, line fishing, shellfish
gathering, and diving using both compressors
and aqualung.
Over the last 10 years, these activities have
undergone considerable change. For
example, there are very few launches
(pintero) and gill-nets (cortineros) today.
The artisanal fishers claim that the root cause
of these changes is the impact of industrial
fishing.
On the one hand, the inshore sector has been
increasingly pushed toward the shore to find
areas inaccessible to industrial fishing vessels.
This has resulted in localized overfishing and
a particular demise of the shellfish resources.
In response, closed seasons have been
established, although no seasonal bans on the
sale of closed-season species have been
applied. This has tended to encourage illegal
fishing. Traditional fishing areas have also
been designated as areas for aquaculture
concessions, putting further pressure on
fishermen and resources in the increasingly
restricted areas where they can fish.
On the other hand, an offshore artisanal
fishing sector has developed in the last few
years. Due to interference from the industrial
sector, artisanal fishermen have been
extending their range of operations to as far
out as 150 miles, according to Ilo fishermen.
But conditions are very harsh, with fishermen
spending more than two weeks away from
their families, and working in extremely
dangerous and exposed conditions. Not only
are there significant investment costs to be
made in navigation equipment and fishing
gear, but, with dramatically increasing fuel
prices, this fishery is also becoming an
economic struggle, particularly as fishing trips
may clock up distances of 700 miles.
Since its introduction, the December 2003
Supreme Decree has been hamstrung by the
extreme polarization of the situation. In
January 2004, the Ilo fishermen initiated a
‘Peruvian Five-Mile Zone Defence
Committee’, supported by fishermen from
Arequipa, Ilo and Tacna. This was followed
up by a number of strikes in the south, aimed
at disrupting fishing and related activities.
These local activities took on national
significance when, at the end of March 2004,
FIUPAP called for an indefinite national
artisanal fishermen’s strike starting on 5 April.
This was scheduled to coincide with the start
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of the Holy Week, a time when many
Peruvian families traditionally eat fish.
Subsequently, FIUPAP asked the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) to intervene formally in the
process, claiming that Article 6.18 of the FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
supported their claims for a five-mile zone,
and was a just cause for complaint.
On 1 April 2004, the Ministry of Production
suspended the implementation of the new
access regime for three months. At the same
time, an Enquiry Commission was established
to evaluate the proposed new fisheries
regime, and to report within 75 days. This
‘temporary suspension’ has since been
renewed twice—on 1 July for 90 days, and
then, most recently, on 4 October 2004 for a
further 90 days, up to January 2005. The most
recent suspension came four days after the
first International Forum on Artisanal Fishing,
and was considered a victory.
But although a battle may have been won,
the ‘windows of penetration’ law still poses
a very clear and present danger. It is only a
matter of time—three short months before
the current suspension expires. In the
meantime, the government and industrial
The first International Forum on Artisanal Fishing
convened by the International Defence Committee of
the Five-Mile Zone, meeting from 29 to 30 September
2004 in Ilo, Peru, declares that:
The conservation of marine biodiversity and the
protection of fishery resources are fundamental in
assuring a supply of indispensable food for humanity,
as well as in assuring the livelihoods of the communities
that depend on fishing.
The coastal zone within five nautical miles is pre-
requisite to the conservation of resources, providing
an area for spawning, growing and nutrient upwelling,
and, for these reasons, it should neither be subject to
intensive fishing activities nor used as a dump for the
industrial wastes that destroy it.
For these reasons, industrial fishing activities should
be excluded from this zone, which should be used
exclusively for artisanal fishing with selective and non-
destructive fishing gear. Under no circumstances should
industrial fishing be allowed in this zone through
’windows of penetration’.
In order to ensure its own ustainability, the industrial
fishing sector should try to overcome its dependence
on fishing for fishmeal, and target a greater variety of
species for producing value-added products, following
the principles of responsible fisheries and with greater
benefits for the fishing communities.
In order to ensure the sustainable management of
fishery resources and the marine environment, as well
as the full participation of fishermen in  decisions that
affect them, we demand that the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries be turned into an
International Treaty with the force of law.
The application of individual transferable quota systems
fragments and divides artisanal fishing communities,
depriving them of their rights and transforming them
into a low-cost workforce for the industrial sector, due
to which we reject their implementation.
In the case of Peru, we demand the lifting of Decree
037 that establishes ‘windows of penetration’ and the
aspects of the fisheries law that allow these kinds of
rules; in the case of Chile, we demand the lifting of the
regime of ‘windows of penetration’ in the north of the
country and an end to the quota system; in Mexico,
we demand that Rule 002 that prohibits trawling in the
five-mile zone be respected; and with regard to
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, we express our
concerns and reject the development of an anchovy
fishery for fishmeal, which threatens the ecosystems of
the region.
We call for the Second Forum of the International
Commission for the Defence of the Five-Mile Zone to
be implemented on the 29 and 30 September 2005 in
Sinaloa, Mexico.
Also, and on the invitation of the Chilean delegation,
we have decided to meet again during 20-22
November in Valparaiso, Chile, where the Congress
of the National Confederation of Artisanal Fishermen
will be held.
Final Statement of the Ilo Forum
The conservation
of marine
biodiversity and
the protection of
fishery resources
are fundamental in
assuring a supply
of indispensable
food for humanity,
as well as in
assuring the
livelihoods of the
communities that
depend on fishing
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sectors are gathering information to support
their case to lift the five-mile zone restrictions
in the south. Nevertheless, the artisanal
fishermen of Peru continue to protest, to
organize themselves in readiness for the next
onslaught, and to widen their support base in
defence of their sacrosanct five-mile zone—
a zone that is fast becoming the Holy Grail
of artisanal fishermen throughout Latin
America, and a banner under which they are
uniting to defend their rights. They will need
all the strength and support they can muster
if they are to prevail in the unequal power
struggle with the mighty industrial fishery
lobby, which have influential friends in high
places. 
...the artisanal
fishermen of Peru
continue to protest,
to organize
themselves in
readiness for the
next onslaught,
and to widen their
support base in
defence of their
sacrosanct five-
mile zone—a zone
that is fast
becoming the Holy
Grail of artisanal
fishermen
throughout Latin
America
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Defenders of Canada’s inshorefisheries policies got a major boostin April when a court decided that
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
(DFO) could effectively frustrate private
agreements designed to undermine its
policies.
The case, reported in the December 2004
issue of SAMUDRA Report, involves two
fishermen who had entered into a private
contract or trust agreement to transfer the
right to use a fishing licence that one of the
parties was not eligible to hold.
In recent years, these private agreements
have become increasingly widespread as fish
processors, wealthy inshore fishermen and
other investors attempt to purchase licences
from retiring inshore fishermen, particularly
in the lucrative crab and lobster fisheries. The
agreements often contravene two important
government policies designed to keep fishing
licences in the hands of individual working
fishermen in coastal communities.
The owner-operator policy states that
licences for species fished from vessels of
less than 19.8 m LOA (length overall) will only
be issued to individual, independent
fishermen who must fish the licence
personally.
Moreover, a qualified individual can only hold
one licence per species, that is, while an
individual can hold a portfolio of inshore
licences (crab, lobster, scallops, mackerel),
he or she can only hold one licence per
species. The fleet separation policy states
that corporations, in particular fish-processing
companies, cannot hold inshore licences,
making it impossible for them to vertically
integrate fish-harvesting and fish-processing
operations in fisheries like lobster and crab.
With the collapse of the groundfish resource
and the increasing values for shellfish species,
these inshore licences have become more and
more valuable and sought after. Over the last
10 years, ineligible investors have been using
trust agreements to accumulate these licences
and, by the same token, turn the licence
holders into their employees.
For years, the DFO ignored the problem,
claiming it was powerless to act in private
agreements. As the practice became more
and more blatant, fishermen’s organizations,
especially the Canadian Council of
Professional Fish Harvesters (CCPFH), the
national organization representing independent
owner-operators, pressured the federal
government to enforce its policies.
In 2002, the DFO’s Gulf region finally acted
in the case of five snow crab licences found
to be tainted by trust agreements. The DFO
suspended the licences and ordered the
licence-holders to extricate themselves from
the agreements. In one of these cases, the
holder of the trust agreement decided to
ignore the government’s action and asked the
courts to enforce the agreement.
After several years of legal wrangling, the
case finally came to trial. Lawyers for the
plaintiff, the holder of the trust agreement,
called a series of witnesses, including the
lawyer who crafted the trust agreement, a
former provincial cabinet Minister turned
lobbyist and a lower-level DFO official, all of
Frustrating private agreements
Marc Allain
The Canadian court battle over owner-operator policy
in inshore fisheries has resulted in a significant ruling
This article was
written by Marc
Allain, Senior Policy
Adviser to the
Canadian Council of
Professional Fish
Harvesters. This
article first appeared
in SAMUDRA Report
No. 41, July 2005
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whom downplayed the importance and even
the existence of the government’s owner-
operator policy.
Defence counter
The defence countered with testimony from
the DFO official responsible for fisheries
management decisions in the Gulf Region,
who explained in detail the nature of the
government’s policies and how it had applied
them in this case.
The CCPFH, which received intervener status
in the case, also presented a brief to the court
that strongly supported the government’s
policies and actions.
Citing an abundance of case law, CCPFH’s
lawyer argued that Canada’s Fisheries Law
grants the Minister of Fisheries absolute
discretion in the granting of fishing licences
and that the Minister has the right to adopt
policies to guide his discretion and the right
to delegate his officials to apply these policies.
On 11 April 2005, the judge ruled that the
contract could not be completed because the
DFO exercised its ministerial discretion in
such a way that the transfer of the fishing
licence became impossible. In legal terms,
the judge ruled that the contract was
‘frustrated’. Unfortunately, the judge did not
offer an opinion on the validity of the DFO’s
actions by stating that he did not have the
jurisdiction to rule on this question.
The ruling, however, is very significant
because a court has now determined that
private trust agreements involving fishing
licences can be made inexecutable by the
DFO actions. This supports the position of the
CCPFH. For the last six years, CCPFH has been
urging the government to use its power to
thwart agreements purposely designed to
circumvent public policy.
The court ruling increases the pressure on
the Minister of Fisheries to act, since it is
now clearly within his power to protect the
integrity of the public policy and the inshore
licensing system. The Minister has appointed
an official to report on what measures would
be required to solidify the policy framework
and committed himself to protect the policy.
The report is expected in early June.
What remains to be seen is how the
Department will deal with violators of the
policy, especially those fleets in the province
of Nova Scotia, which, although they remain
nominally owner-operator, have come
completely under processor control through
the use of trust agreements. Meanwhile, the
legal battle between the two fishermen to
clarify the strength of the government’s
fisheries policy will drag on as the plaintiff
has decided to appeal the judge’s decision.
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Co-management, intended as acollaborative and participatoryarrangement between governments
and resource users to share the responsibility
for resource management, is increasingly
being put forward as a framework for the
management of fisheries resources, partly
also due to the perceived failure, or inability,
of centralized fisheries management regimes.
Co-management arrangements may be more
effective in a context where property rights
are well defined. As pointed out by Svein
Jentoft (see pg 57), co-management
arrangements in situations where community
property rights are established and
recognized, are likely to be more effective,
as they enable communities to control
access, to sanction, and to exclude others.
However, the co-management framework
also has relevance in fisheries where property
rights are not defined, undoubtedly a more
common situation in fisheries across the
world where governance structures are still
poor. The advantage of co-management is
that it enables governments and fishery gear
groups to adopt and develop meaningful
fisheries management measures that can
minimize costs and that can also expect
realization of management goals in a
reasonable time frame. At least, it is one way
to develop appropriate fisheries management
measures that can engender ownership
among all user groups even in the absence
of property rights.
To the extent that co-management recognizes
the significance of the participation of
resource users at all stages of resource
management, it is important. However,
experience from various parts of the world
indicates that often the government
commitment to participation of actual users
remains on paper. The article from South
Africa (see pg 60), for example, points out
that all too often, brief consultation takes the
place of genuine local involvement in
decisionmaking in the co-management of
resources, in this case in the management of
marine protected areas (MPAs).
Co-management of fisheries resources needs
to ensure genuine involvement of gear
groups, and consultation with their
representatives. Particularly where traditional
institutions for management and conflict-
resolution exist, it would be essential to
recognize them and ensure their integration
within co-management arrangements.
Co-management efforts will also need to
recognize the fact of large power differentials
between various stakeholders in the co-
management process, and, in the interests of
equity, will need to take steps to prioritize the
concerns and participation of those lower
down in the power hierarchy—small-scale
fishing communities, and, particularly, the
women in these communities. Conversely, it
would be imperative to work towards
developing the capacity of communities to
engage with co-management.
Co-management should not mean pushing all
costs on to local communities, as is happening
in certain situations. Some costs, such as, for
example, the costs of effective enforcement
and keeping in check encroachments by the
industrial/large-scale/mechanized fleet, should
be borne by the State. The need is not for
‘less’ State, but for a more effective,
accountable and responsive State.
And finally, in the context of so many donor-
supported co-management projects working
in specific locations with communities, there
is a risk of a fragmented approach to
resource management. It makes little sense
The power of co-management
Co-management of fisheries resources needs to ensure genuine
involvement of gear groups, and consultation with their representatives
The advantage of
co-management is
that it enables
governments and
fishery gear
groups to adopt
and develop
meaningful
fisheries
management
measures
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if communities and local governments were
to manage adjacent areas, while rampant
fishing by the large-scale/industrial/
mechanized fleet continues unchecked just
outside the managed areas. Co-management
arrangements must be developed at the
larger level, taking into account the natural
management unit, with both small-scale and
large-scale fisheries being viewed through
the same lens, as it were.  
Co-management
arrangements must
be developed at
the larger level,
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natural
management unit,
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This article attempts to bridge twoseparate but potentially overlappingdiscourses in fisheries management—
that on property rights and the other on co-
management. The property rights discourse
is concerned with access rules, economic
efficiency and rent production. The co-
management discourse is predominantly
focused on decision-making, stakeholder
involvement and participatory democracy.
However, the two discourses tend to
converge on one important issue—power. In
the first instance, property rights entail the
power to exclude someone from access to
fisheries resources. In the latter instance, co-
management is about the power to define
the rules of access: who should decide on
fisheries management regulations, among
other things. Usually, a property right also
involves the power to make the rules. Thus
we would assume that one is a precondition
for the other; that, for instance, a co-
management regime would have to rely on,
and preside over, a property right. Or
conversely, that co-management comes with
a particular property right. In this article, I
argue that neither has to be the case. First, I
shall say something on property rights. Then,
I shall define what co-management is. Finally,
I shall discuss how they might possibly
connect in improving fisheries management
for the benefit of artisanal fisheries.
The important thing to stress about a property
right is that it is essentially a social relation.
It establishes the position of the holder of
some good vis-à-vis the position of other
contenders for the same good. A property
holder can lawfully deny others the possibility
to enjoy the good or the benefits that stream
from it. In other words, the key relation of
property is not between the rights holder and
the thing itself, but between people: the owner
and the non-owner.
Provided that the rights holder can effectively
deny the access and use of others, he or she
is also the holder of power. No wonder that
Karl Marx saw property rights as structuring
the relations among social classes, and turning
class into an instrument of power and
exploitation, and as a source of inequity.
Similarly, Pierre Proudhon, the 19th century
French anarchist, famously claimed:
“Property is theft.” This is also why the
property rights issue makes fisheries
management systems so controversial and
why artisanal fishers protest against
privatization.
Undoubtedly, property rights do serve a
purpose in fisheries management. The
absence of property rights places some risks
on the resources. But property comes in
many forms. A private individual may possess
a property right, and so may States and
communities. The question is what different
property rights are able to deliver to fisheries
management. The State is said to have only
thumbs and no fingers. Therefore, it is not
able to sufficiently use the power that property
vests in it, to manage diversity and complexity
and situations that require a lot of detailed
local knowledge and fine-tuned management
mechanisms.
Transferable quotas
Private property, on the other hand, leaves
communities at risk as it induces individuals
to care more about themselves than their
fellow community members and the places
Go for it
Svein Jentoft
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they come from. Thus, in many parts of the
world, individual transferable quota (ITQ)
systems have proven to concentrate fishing
rights, and hence fishing capacity, in the
hands of the few, while communities and
artisanal fishers have been stripped of their
access to fisheries resources.
Property rights vested in communities are an
alternative that has been largely neglected in
modern fisheries management theory and
practice. Instead, fisheries management has
been arranged as a relationship between the
State and the individual, with no institutional
mediating link in between, such as the
community. In this system, the individual is
placed passively at the receiving end of the
management chain, giving the State the role
of patron. This system also has its ideological
underpinnings, emphasizing the supremacy of
the market and the inferiority of the
community.
It is important to stress that there exists a
range of property rights types and that State
or private property is not the only remedy to
the problems involved with open access. Let
me also emphasize, because it is relevant to
co-management, that open-access systems
come in many forms, and that they do not
have to imply a rule-less fishery. Furthermore,
managers rarely find themselves in a situation
where they can simply make a choice
between one property-rights system or
another as if they are displayed on a shelf
when entering a store. In real life, property-
rights reform implies that you move from one
form to another. You always carry baggage,
and you never start with a clean slate; getting
rid of an old system can be as difficult as
implementing a new one.
We can think of a number of reasons for this;
one is that after a while property rights, as
institutions in general, acquire a status of
objective reality—they become like nature.
We take them for granted and can not
imagine how life and society would have been
without them. Another reason is that property
rights, as Proudhon hinted at, always produce
winners and losers. It is in the interest of
winners and generally also in their power to
keep the system as it is. Thus, property-rights
reforms are constantly imbued with social
conflict, as history has shown time and again.
I believe that we need more research into
the issue of property-rights reform. We know
fairly well how property-rights systems work
in fisheries: what their problems and benefits
are, what they do and do not do. Much less
attention has been paid to how one moves
from one system to another, and under what
conditions system changes occur.
Community property
Let me suggest, for instance, that it is much
easier to move from State and common
property to private property, than the other
way around. It is not for nothing that private
property is written into the constitutions of
many countries while community property is
not. It is also for this reason that it seems
like privatization of fish resources—as within
an ITQ system—is an irreversible process.
Once quota rights are privatized, there is no
way back. They produce what social
scientists call ‘path dependency’.
The moral is that property-rights reform
should not come easily and as a quick fix.
They do change social relations drastically,
and thus have an impact on how society—in
our case, the fishery—works. They have
implications that are not always easy to
foresee: for instance, on power structures,
settlement patterns and social values. You risk
empowering distinguished social groups that
are already enjoying power. So don’t do
something that you may later regret.
Co-management can be defined as a
collaborative and participatory process of
regulatory decision-making between
representatives of user-groups, government
agencies, research institutions and other
stakeholders. Power sharing and partnership
are essential elements. Co-management vests
authority over, and responsibility for,
regulatory functions outside the realms of
government, for instance, in user-
organizations or fisheries co-operatives at the
Property rights
vested in
communities are
an alternative that
has been largely
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modern fisheries
management
theory and
practice
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national, regional, and/or community level.
Co-management does not leave decision-
making to the vagaries of the market, but
draws heavily, but not entirely, on the forces
and capacities of civil society. If we think of
the relationships of fisheries management as
a triangle, with the State at the top, the market
at bottom left, and civil society at bottom right,
co-management would be placed right in the
middle.
I believe community-(or common-property)
rights is particularly effective as a co-
management tool. Communal or ‘collective’
property rights vested in the co-management
institution provide the authority with an extra
stick. It allows the co-management system
to control access; it gives the right to sanction
and, ultimately, to exclude. A system that
enjoys this power would ceteris paribus be
more effective than one that does not have
this leverage. A co-management system
operating within a State property, private
property or open-access system would
normally have no right to sanction by
exclusion. It can only rely on persuasion and
moral condemnation.
Exit alternative
Thus, a co-management system that is
underpinned by one of these three property-
rights types is vulnerable to free riding, as
members would always have an exit
alternative. If members do not like the
collective decision, they can simply opt out,
go solo. In a co-management system residing
over a communal property right, however,
people would have to use their voice to
express their dissatisfaction. If they should
then choose not to abide by the rules set by
the co-management authority, they risk being
penalized, not only through moral
condemnation, but also by losing access.
It should be noted that this does not mean
that co-management can not work in less-
than ideal circumstances. In many countries,
we see co-management systems operate
well on property rights other than communal
ones. If co-management could not function
in less-than-ideal circumstances, it would
hardly be much to strive for. It would then
only work in exceptional cases.
Since co-management can function
regardless of the form of property right, there
is no reason to wait for a property-rights
restructuring to launch a management reform.
The former is usually a more difficult
undertaking than the latter, as it tends to
provoke power. Comparatively speaking, co-
management takes an administrative reform
that, in many instances, does not need more
than marginal reorganization of administrative
boundaries, redistribution of management
functions, and readjustments of procedural
routines. Property-rights reform is more
consequential since it changes basic social
relations in lasting ways, as mentioned above.
Hence, it tends to be more controversial and
conflictive.
Co-management reforms and property-rights
reforms could certainly be mutually
reinforcing, and should, if possible, be
integrated as part of the same process. Yet,
they do not have to happen in concert. One
reform could run independent of the other.
Co-management could be initiated and
implemented in the short run, while the
property-rights transformation could be a
project for the longer term. If you should meet
obstacles in implementing the latter, it does
not mean that you can not succeed in the
former. So here is my advice for artisanal
fisheries: if you want co-management, go for
it. You don’t have to wait for the revolution.
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The African National Congress (ANC)contested the April 1994 elections inSouth Africa on the basis of a vision
of ‘a better life for all’, to be achieved
through its people-centred Reconstruction
and Development Programme (RDP) policy
framework. This created expectations that
many in the ‘marginalized’ fishing
communities would secure their own fishing
rights and small businesses. It was hoped that
the revised fisheries policy would deliver on
these expectations, while, at the same time,
maintain an internationally competitive fishing
industry.
Due to pressure from established economic
interests, in 1996 the new government shifted
its macroeconomic policy to a ‘homegrown’
structural adjustment programme called the
Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(Gear). The new framework abandoned the
key principles and policies of the RDP, and
instead adopted neoliberal economic
principles, including privatization, subsidy
removal and downsizing of the public sector;
and encouragement of small black
entrepreneurs.
Gear was aimed at achieving equity and
redistribution through economic growth and
job creation. The authors of Gear imagined
poverty alleviation would be achieved through
the ‘trickle-down’ effect of a new group of
entrepreneurs who would establish labour-
intensive small, medium and micro-
enterprises (SMMEs).
This was in direct contrast to the RDP’s
approach of redistributing wealth through
interventionist State policies based on socialist
ideology. The shift to Gear resulted in large
numbers of bona fide fishers being excluded
from the formal allocation process because
they could not demonstrate their
entrepreneurship through being able to
complete application forms and engage in
related bureaucratic procedures without help.
In order to understand how the
transformation process was supposed to
contribute to poverty alleviation, one needs
to understand the capital-accumulation/
wealth-generation and safety-net functions
of enterprise development and job creation.
In this article, we will use the concepts of
poverty, vulnerability and entrepreneurship to
look at the contribution (or failure) of fisheries
to the improvement of the livelihoods of
coastal communities, including the proposed
mechanism of co-management.
The shift in macroeconomic policy was an
important factor in relation to ‘transformation’
of the fisheries sector in that the focus for
transforming the sector moved from re-
allocation of access rights to one of promoting
black economic empowerment (BEE). BEE
was focused mainly on addressing racial and
gender imbalances within the industry.
It took the form of offering ownership of
shares in established enterprises to historically
disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) organized
in empowerment groups and/or labour unions,
transferring technical and management skills
to HDIs, and promoting HDI employees to
positions of management decisionmaking.
New fishing rights
The focus was not on the vulnerability of the
workers within the existing established
companies under BEE schemes, and new
Shifting gear?
Moenieba Isaacs, Mafaniso Hara and Jesper Raakjær Nielsen
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rights holders and the SMMEs that were
established after achieving access to fishing
rights.
‘Transformation’ is not defined in the Marine
Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998 or in
any other legislative or policy document. The
vision of the government’s new policy is
probably what was meant by ` transformation’
in the Act:
the marine resources are a national asset
and part of the heritage of the people of South
Africa, present and future, and should be
managed and developed for the benefit of
the country as a whole, especially those
communities whose livelihoods depended on
these resources; and that the allocation of
the resources would be made on an equitable
basis, with a view to ensuring the long-term
sustainability of the resources and their
healthy condition for present and future
generations.
Two approaches to transformation were
being used: the broadening of access rights
to new rights holders (individuals and
companies) through State intervention
(external transformation); and market-led
change within State BEE policy (internal
transformation). The Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT),
a branch of Marine and Coastal Management
(MCM), was given the responsibility for
external transformation.
The new Constitution with its ‘Bill of Rights’
and the new fisheries policy paved the way
for new entrants to the sector, but MCM
struggled with managing and administering
the process.
A complicating factor was that the sector
was already oversubscribed—making space
for new entrants would have required cutting
existing allocations. Internal transformation
was to take place through market-based
reforms within companies through change in
ownership, giving workers more benefits and
share schemes, assisting in the
empowerment of new rights holders, and so
on.
This market-based intervention had an impact
on the extent of State intervention from the
start, leaving little room for a more
community-based empowerment option for
transformation in the industry. The
responsibility of the State through MCM is to
ensure that equity and redistribution are
achieved without endangering the economic
stability of the industry and sustainability of
the resource.
From the very beginning, it was clear that
the goals of transformation would be in
conflict with the principles of resource
management since meeting the expectations
of the many potential new entrants would not
be in line with the limited room for expansion
that sustainable resource management
entailed.
Adding to this was the fear among the
established companies that allowing too many
new entrants could create chaos and result
in economic instability in the industry. Several
factors impeded—or were used to block or
slow—transformation, especially by those
already in the industry.
The following were the constraints to
transformation in the early years:
Unwilling sellers, unwilling buyers: As a
matter of principle, HDIs and HDI groups
were unwilling to ‘buy’ fishing rights that they
felt they had been dispossessed of under
apartheid. There were expectations that
government would put this travesty right by
simply taking these rights back from
established companies and redistributing them
to HDIs after the advent of democracy. The
established companies were equally unwilling
to share, sell or give up their fishing rights,
arguing that they had spent decades building
up their companies.
Foot-dragging tactics: Established
companies used foot-dragging tactics to delay
redistribution by employing leading lawyers
to find loopholes in the new fisheries policy
and to litigate on all large-scale cuts in their
quota allocations. Many courts ruled in favour
The responsibility
of the State
through MCM is to
ensure that equity
and redistribution
are achieved
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endangering the
economic stability
of the industry and
sustainability of
the resource
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of the established industry, hindering
government from taking large portions of
their quota allocations to accommodate new
entrants to the industry.
Court challenges on administrative
grounds: Numerous allocations by the
former Quota Board under the old Sea
Fisheries Act were successfully challenged
in court on administrative grounds from 1993,
following the promulgation of the 1993 Quota
Board guidelines. The constitutional
entrenchment of the right to just
administrative action reinforced the strength
of administrative remedies, as evidenced by
the number of court cases after 1996. For
example, the first quota allocations made
under the MLRA were successfully challenged
and set aside for reconsideration on various
administrative grounds.
Alliances between large companies and
labour unions to oppose transformation:
Established companies were able to secure
the support of their largely black labour unions
to oppose transformation using the slogan “A
cut in our quota allocations will result in a cut
in jobs”. The unions (especially the Food and
Allied Workers’ Union—FAWU) traded their
support for maintaining existing quota
allocations for better working conditions and
improved benefits for their members (pension
funds, shareholding schemes, medical aid, and
improved health and safety).
The irony was that FAWU is an affiliate of
the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(Cosatu), one of three partners in the ruling
ANC Alliance. The alliance between unions
and employers against redistribution of fishing
rights further marginalized poor bona fide
fishers who had expected fishing rights after
apartheid.
Constitutional protection of property
rights: The Constitution provides that nobody
may be deprived of property except in terms
of law of general application (the ‘property
clause’). This, together with the government’s
commitment to support market forces,
effectively gave established companies a veto
against the reform of the fishing industry.
Most established companies claim to have
implemented internal changes that meet the
requirements provided by DEAT guidelines.
The established industry quickly responded
to internal transformation requirements.
For example, Oceana Fishing Group sold half
of its equity to a black empowerment
consortium, while Premier Fishing shares
ownership with Sekunjalo, and Pamodzi/
Foodcorp owns Marine Products.
Allowing a larger degree of black ownership
strategically put such companies in positions
of strength for maintaining or even increasing
their quota holdings, since most of these
empowerment groups had good political
connections.
Companies like Sea Harvest and Irvin &
Johnson started on a fairly small scale,
offering limited shareholding ownership for
employees at favourable prices. Although
employee shareholding constituted a small
percentage of the total stock, the symbolic
effect was considered important. The
established companies wasted no time in
bringing in HDI leaders in an attempt to
transform the leadership structures of their
companies.
Within the labour unions, this was regarded
as a window-dressing exercise, since some
of these individuals were given the privileges
of power but not the right to make crucial
decisions.
The major dilemma that faced many new
entrants was the lack of infrastructure
(vessels, processing facilities and marketing
networks) and business knowhow. A possible,
seemingly obvious, solution to this dilemma
was the formation of joint ventures and
business partnerships as promoted by the new
fisheries law (the MLRA).
In spite of all this, most new entrants complain
that there has been no change in the power
dynamics in the industry as a whole or within
individual companies. Since established
companies own most of the infrastructure,
they retain control of fishing, processing and
The alliance
between unions
and employers
against
redistribution of
fishing rights
further
marginalized poor
bona fide fishers
who had expected
fishing rights after
apartheid
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marketing operations, even where new
entrants have entered into joint ventures with
them.
The prices charged for these services make
it very difficult for new entrants to succeed.
Established companies recoup their
transaction costs through reduced prices for
fish from new entrants or inflated costs for
their services. The top management of most
companies remains largely white. Where
blacks have been given top positions, their
ability to make management decisions is
frequently constrained or absent. Most
‘internal transformation’ appears to be
window dressing.
The lack of infrastructure and business
knowhow among new entrants and the lack
of real black ownership and power within
established companies leave black workers
and entrepreneurs vulnerable to manipulation
and exploitation. Eventually, everyone,
including the established companies, had to
accept that some re-allocation of rights was
unavoidable. MCM’s major indicator of
transformation has been quantitative—that
is, the number of new individuals (mostly
HDIs) or HDI fishing companies that have
been granted access rights. MCM’s stated
achievements after 10 years of
‘transformation’ are, for example, in the
abalone, West Coast rock lobster, small
pelagic and deep-sea hake fisheries.
Commercial allocation
In the abalone fishery, the number of rights
holders increased from five in 1992 to 271 in
2002. The five original quota-holding
companies retained 49.5 per cent of the total
commercial allocation, while original abalone
divers received 17.5 per cent. The 228 new
entrants under the limited commercial
category got the remaining 33 per cent in
allocations of 202 quotas of 430 kg and 26
quotas of 200 kg. Individuals held 95 per cent
of the limited commercial allocations.
A total of 87.5 per cent of the companies
holding commercial abalone quotas were
classified as SMMEs. According to DEAT, 90
per cent of the global abalone total allowable
catch (TAC) was allocated to SMMEs in 2002.
In the West Coast rock lobster fishery the
number of rights holders increased from 39
in 1992 to 745 in 2002. While the top 10
companies held 57 per cent of the quota in
1992, this had been reduced to 36 per cent in
2002. Ninety per cent of right holders were
classified as SMMEs and 66 per cent of these
companies were HDI-owned. In 2003, a
further 274 individuals were awarded limited
commercial fishing rights in the east of Cape
Hangklip area. In the limited commercial
sector, the allocations ranged from 200 kg to
1.5 tonnes (average: 712 kg).
A total of 91.5 per cent of the limited
commercial quota was awarded to HDI or
HDI-owned micro-enterprises. Thus, 70 per
cent of the global TAC was HDI-controlled.
Whereas there were only 12 rights holders in
the small pelagics sector in 1990, by 2002,
the number had grown to 91 sardine and 70
anchovy rights holders. About 85 per cent of
these were considered to be SMMEs.
Furthermore, 73 per cent of the rights holders
were HDIs and these held 75 per cent of the
pelagic TAC. Most of these got 0.3 per cent
of the TAC as their annual quota for the
duration of the medium-term rights.
This means the access of HDI rights holders
to the pelagic sector had increased tenfold
(from 7 per cent to 70 per cent) over the 10
years 1992–2002. Despite this, the established
companies have maintained their allocation
(in terms of volume) of anchovy and sardine
due to the increase in TAC. While only 21
predominantly white-owned companies had
rights to exploit deep-sea hake in 1992, the
number of rights holders had increased to 56
by 2000. The top five companies held 92 per
cent of the TAC in 1992.
This had been reduced to less than 74 per
cent by 2002. Furthermore, government
claims that the large companies had been
compelled to transform in terms of their
ownership and management structures. In
addition, 42 per cent of companies in the
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sector were classified as SMMEs, and 74 per
cent of rights holders were deemed to be
majority HDI-owned and managed by 2002.
According to DEAT, HDI shareholding in the
sector had increased from 0.5 per cent in
1992 to 25 per cent in 2002.
These reported results need to be compared
to the extent of internal transformation that
took place within the established companies,
that is, the link between HDI ownership and
quota allocation. External transformation is
directly linked to internal transformation and
it is situated in the need to maintain stability
and efficiency within the fishing industry.
A consequence of the direct link between
internal and external transformation means
that there was very little TAC left for MCM
to allocate to the new entrants. The industry’s
long-term economic viability could have been
compromised by the short-term political goal
of MCM—that is, to show the extent to which
it has allocated rights to new entrants.
Impressive as these figures would appear,
they do not describe the realities on the
ground. The guidelines for award of medium-
term rights outlined the objectives and
assessment principles for re-allocation of
fishing rights as being: “ability of applicants
to invest in the industry and to demonstrate
that they would be actively involved and
committed to the industry”; “past
performance and capacity to harvest and
process the resource”; “potential for
significant impact on local community
economies and development”; and “the
degree of risk of new entrants becoming
paper quota holders”.
Categoric commitment
DEAT categorically stated that while the
department was committed to bringing in new
entrants into the industry, the potential of such
new entrants to enter, participate in and share
the risks of the industry had to be examined
in the light of the degree of their knowledge,
experience, their fishing plans and business
acumen.
It was further stated that where joint ventures
had been entered into, these had to be capable
of validly empowering the rights holders.
In reality, most new entrants are finding it
very difficult to establish themselves in the
industry. A number of reasons have been put
forward for the problems they are
encountering:
• the quotas that they receive are too small
to set up, establish and operate
economically viable fishing businesses;
• banks do not accept fishing quotas as
collateral for loans, making it difficult to
raise investment capital;
• new entrants lack the technical and
managerial skills to survive in the industry
and no assistance is being provided in this
regard; and
• it is very difficult for new fishing
companies to compete with, or break into,
the monopolistic business systems and
structures that established large
companies have created and fiercely
guard in order to maintain their
competitive advantage.
In view of the foregoing, the new entrants
have adopted four main survival strategies:
• entering into joint-venture agreements
involving catching or processing or
marketing with established companies;
• pooling their quotas with other rights
holders and jointly obtaining a vessel to
exploit the pooled quota;
• selling their fishing rights outright to
someone (usually an established
company) with the ability to make use of
the quota as their own (such rights holders
are referred to as ‘paper quota holders’);
and
In reality, most new
entrants are
finding it very
difficult to
establish
themselves in the
industry
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• acquiring fishing rights for several species
(if they own a vessel) in order to create
an economically viable quota ‘package’.
Active participation
Since the first three strategies are the most
common, the number of rights holders
actively taking part in fishing operations is
actually at least 50 per cent lower than the
official number of rights holders. One analysis
suggests that approximately 25 of the 51 new
anchovy fishing rights holders sold their quota
to vessel owners or processing companies.
This accounted for about 25 per cent of the
TAC.
In deep-sea hake trawling, the 53 rights
holders have been consolidated into less than
20 operational clusters through joint-venture
agreements. Joint-venture arrangements
were being used by both sides for their own
benefit.
For new entrants, this would demonstrate
that they were actively involved in the
industry, while, for the established companies,
joint ventures provide increased raw material
for processing. If the motivation for joint
ventures was the transfer of skills in
management and operations, it has rarely
been successful—most new entrants are not
gaining any skills that would enable them to
stand on their own as independent and thriving
companies.
As pointed out earlier, government’s policy
goal was to award rights to new (mainly
black) entrepreneurs. In turn, these could
form viable fishing businesses in rural coastal
areas and so contribute towards poverty
alleviation by creating jobs. Little progress
has been made so far.
Apart from the lack of skills transfer, another
major stumbling block has been that the sizes
of quotas that have been awarded to most
new entrants do not meet the criteria of being
minimum viable quotas (MVQ). For example,
most new entrants in the abalone and West
Coast rock lobster fisheries were awarded
quotas under the ‘limited commercial’
category.
Under this category, the maximum size of
individual quotas is 430 kg (minimum 200 kg)
for abalone and 1.5 tonnes (minimum 200 kg)
for West Coast rock lobster.
The rights holders point out that these quotas
are fished up within a month or two. Since
one fisher could not apply to fish for more
than one species, there was no other source
of livelihood as soon as the annual quota had
been exhausted.
In the small pelagics, most new entrants got
quotas equivalent to 0.3 per cent of the TAC.
In an industry based on high-volume, low-
profit economics, such quota sizes are hardly
big enough as basis for investment and future
planning.
MVQs were seen as being necessary if
government intended to eliminate ‘paper
quotas’. The pooling of quotas by some new
entrants could be seen as an attempt to create
MVQs. But most new entrants were very
unwilling to pool quotas.
As entrepreneurs, they would prefer to go it
alone, but they face enormous constraints
such as lack of capital, infrastructure, support
systems and skills. An economic sectoral
study of the industry concluded that pooling
of resources (as most new entrants were
forced to do) went against that grain of
entrepreneurship that is usually based on
taking business risks.
By allowing too many rights holders into the
industry and spreading the cake too thin
without any support systems, the government
had set up the new entrants for failure. As a
result, the majority of new entrants have been
forced, de facto, to become paper quota
holders or have been forced to make
investments that were not based on firm
business calculations, but rather to
demonstrate activity with their quotas in order
to qualify for the next round of quota
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allocation. The non-viable quotas made new
entrants vulnerable and easy targets for
exploitation by those in more powerful
positions.
External transformation primarily focused on
allocating fishing rights to established
industries and to SMMEs. In the process, a
large number of bona fide fishers had fallen
by the side, as they could not get into either
of these groups.
Interim relief
In the 1990s, the government had attempted
to include this group through various interim
relief measures, such as the community
quotas of 1993, subsistence permits to fishers
in the Western Cape in 2001, the Eastern
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, and linefish interim
relief measures in 2003. The abolishment of
the subsistence sector for abalone and West
Coast rock lobster and institutionalization of
the ‘limited commercial’ category in the
Western Cape resulted in most members of
this group being excluded.
In a province where livelihoods from the sea
has been extremely important historically and
culturally, this is proving absolutely debilitating
for such coastal communities. It is this
category of bona fide fishers (who had been
excluded through the formal processes) that
are currently in litigation with government
over their rights to a livelihood from fishing.
The basis of the litigation is that government
should recognize and protect their historical
and cultural rights (and entitlement) to a
livelihood from fishing (with an option to sell
their catch), as provided for under the
Constitution.
Additionally, they argue that the
transformation process that favoured
commercial enterprises has so far been
unsuccessful in job creation in their
communities. They propose that a two-mile
zone should be allocated exclusively for
coastal communities for livelihood purposes.
Most of those who are supposedly benefiting
from internal transformation efforts in
established companies describe the changes
that have taken place as ‘cosmetic’ and mere
‘window dressing’. The external
transformation efforts of the State aimed at
increasing the numbers of new entrants to
the fishing industry. However, since most of
the beneficiaries have been allocated
economically unviable quotas, the result has
been a multiplicity of ‘paper quota holders’
who usually sell their rights to the established
companies. Both internal and external
transformation can thus largely be labelled
as cosmetic.
The lack of clear transformation objectives
in government and its inability to provide
direction for transformation for the
established companies gave the companies
carte blanche to restructure their enterprises
the way they chose to. Many have, therefore,
merely tinkered with their existing profiles in
order to create the impression that they have
changed.
The lack of real change within established
companies can be attributed to the lack of
political will on the part of the State to force
through real changes using quotas as
leverage. The introduction of neoliberal
macroeconomic policy enhanced the position
of established companies by providing them
with the argument that their ability to change
the way they do business was limited because
stability is vital for them to remain
internationally competitive in the age of
globalization.
Assessment needed
A future direction for fisheries in South Africa
must be based on an assessment of how
effectively internal and external
transformation processes have addressed
poverty, job creation and entrepreneurship.
Government’s policy for poverty alleviation
has been through promotion of SMMEs that
could new create jobs. This has not been
much of a success.
With regard to the workers within the
established companies, the process of
negotiation between labour unions and
External
transformation
primarily focused
on allocating
fishing rights to
established
industries and to
SMMEs. In the
process, a large
number of bona
fide fishers had
fallen by the side,
as they could not
get into either of
these groups
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established companies, which started in 1995
to improve working conditions and secure
jobs for workers, seems to have run its
course.
According to FAWU, many permanent jobs
are being lost in the fishing industry.
Established companies have followed the
trend towards casual, temporary and contract
employment. Women engaged in processing
fish have been most affected by
‘casualization’ in the industry.
A number of interventions are necessary in
order for genuine transformation to occur
and the fishing industry to contribute towards
poverty alleviation. Many of the new
operators in the industry did not have any
access to credit (other than the value of the
quota when sold). Government intervention
is necessary to support new entrants in
becoming more competitive and visible in the
industry through providing access to
affordable sources of capital.
There is an urgent need to establish training,
especially in entrepreneurial skills. If the aim
is to level the playing field, MCM has a
responsibility to provide training, in co-
operation with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other interested
parties. Training should be a requirement for
all successful new applicants. The established
industry should be made to share in this
responsibility.
One way of addressing the training needs of
the new entrants is the introduction of a
resource fee for leasing a fishing right, which
can be used for capacity-building
programmes for new entrants. A resource
fee is a means by which society can benefit
from giving the fishing industry the privilege
of using a limited national resource. Since
most of the marine resources in South Africa
have been utilized to the maximum capacity,
only a few can be given commercial fishing
rights.
Such a tax could be used for general
development projects like education, health
and housing, and the provision of welfare,
especially in fishing communities that
unsuccessfully applied for fishing rights.
It is clear from the experience of the last 10
years that there is a definite need for
institutional support to new entrants.
Interestingly, such an approach was used in
the 1940s by the government of the time. The
Fishing Industry Development Corporation
(FIDC) was established to, among other things,
establish rivals to Irvin & Johnson in the deep-
sea hake trawl fishery by granting fishing
rights to a limited number of rights holders in
order to enable them to develop vertically
integrated, economically viable companies.
What later became Sea Harvest only
materialized because the FIDC was able to
support skills development and provide
capital. Similar human and financial support
is needed for emerging companies to be able
to ably compete with established companies.
Although a verification unit was established
for the technical vetting and verification of
applications for medium-term rights, it
appears that no unit has been in place
thereafter to audit progress in internal
transformation in established companies and
ensure new entrants are genuinely engaging
in the industry. Such a unit is supposed to have
been vital for vetting this progress as part of
the process for awarding the proposed long-
term rights from 2006.
In order to avoid having the kind of ‘fox in
the henhouse’ situation that led to the Enron
scandal in the United States, it is important
that the verification unit is completely
independent. An independent verification unit
must have the ability to audit internal
transformation within companies, joint
ventures, as well as ‘paper quota holders’ in
a credible and transparent manner.
Bona fide fishers
The inshore resources could have largely
been left aside for bona fide fishers.
Government could have used this as a
bargaining chip against the arguments of the
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established companies for maintaining their
rights in the commercial sector.
This would have gone a long way in providing
a source of livelihoods and so contribute
towards poverty alleviation for these fishers
and their communities. Regarding capital-
intensive fisheries, government could have
followed the advice from the Access Rights
Technical Committee and acknowledged that
it would be very difficult to transform these
fisheries.
Instead, these fisheries could have been seen
as a generator of funds for the development
of coastal communities or society at large by
imposing a special levy on fishing rights, like
the resource tax charged in Namibia.
Established companies would most likely
have argued that they already pay tax on
profit and a levy on fishing rights would thus
be unfair. It is clear, though, that, under the
medium-term rights, established companies
were willing to buy and pay for fishing rights
under many different arrangements. By
institutionalizing transformation through, for
example, a Trust Development Fund, the
transaction costs for the established industry
to acquire access rights would have been
substantially lower.
In South Africa, as elsewhere in the world,
fisheries co-management has become a
frequently used term to refer to involvement
of fishers and fishing communities in order
to improve their livelihoods in a consultative/
collaborative manner. However, as with the
concept of transformation, there is no clear
definition of co-management in a South
African context, even though it appears to
be seen as a panacea by government and
academia for the sustainable utilization of
fisheries resources and the economic
development of fishing communities.
Experiences so far with fisheries co-
management in South Africa indicate that the
existing co-management arrangements have
primarily focused on management of the fish
resources rather than being a mechanism for
facilitating economic development within
fishing communities.
Livelihoods issue
Except for KwaZulu-Natal, the government
has generally not taken its responsibility for
collaborative management seriously. In
addition, one can not expect poor communities
and individuals to buy into the concept if they
can not see that it would improve their
livelihoods. Thus, it will be important that
poverty-reduction strategies are embedded
in co-management arrangements.
The government’s intention for the
redistribution of fishing rights was for fish
resources to contribute towards poverty
alleviation in coastal communities. Allocating
fishing rights to new entrants was a
necessary step to start addressing the legacy
of apartheid’s economic and social
deprivation of black communities.
The shift to Gear meant that government’s
poverty-alleviation approach focused on
poverty prevention (through SMMEs) and
poverty reduction (through job creation). It
envisaged giving fishing rights to
entrepreneurs within fishing communities who
could start businesses using their rights,
thereby creating jobs within these
communities. While rights would act to
reduce poverty for the rights holders and
entrepreneurs, the creation of jobs would
prevent poverty for a few. It is clear, though,
that the market solution (Gear) has been
insufficient in effective transformation and
contributing towards poverty alleviation in
coastal communities. It is imperative, at least
for the time being, that government should
still play an interventionist role in order to
contribute to poverty alleviation. 
There is no clear
definition of co-
management in a
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Fishing in Norway is—and has been—a highly gendered activity, with only afew women working on fishing boats.
The total number of Norwegian
fisherwomen—and men—has decreased
enormously after the cod moratorium in 1989
and the introduction of the quota system in
1990. The table overleaf illustrates this
decline.
According to the table, women fishers in
Norway registered as full-time fishers have
decreased by almost 50 per cent in the last
five years, while the number of female part-
time fishers seems to be more stable, though
with certain variations. The table also shows
that between 1988 and 1998, the number of
female fishers was relatively stable, while
the number of men fishers decreased
throughout the whole period, but at a greater
rate after 1990. Such a marked decrease says
something about the changing fishing industry.
In the following sections of this article, I shall
go further into why there are so few women
in fishing and relate the phenomenon to the
regulation of the Norwegian fisheries. Finally,
I shall also try to comment on men’s
changing situation, and point to some social
and cultural changes that fishing communities
might face.
Following the moratorium and the first years
of the quota system, Norway had the largest
number of registered female fishers since the
gendered registration started. The registered
female fishers work on big factory ships
filleting fish as well as on boats that are
considered ‘small’ in a Norwegian fishery
context. In Finnmark, one of the most fishing-
dependent areas of Norway, I know of only
one woman, who is skipper on her own boat
of 14.98 m length and has her own crew. It
should, however, be mentioned that
throughout Norwegian history, women have
been engaged in shore-based activities as
wives, daughters, relatives and neighbours,
without having been officially registered as
fishers. Even today, women function as such
shore or ground crew, carrying out work that
has helped develop an efficient fishery.
It should also be mentioned that only a small
number of women have formal ownership in
boats. As of August 2004, only 181 women
had more than 50 per cent of ownership shares
in fishing boats, while 296 women had less
than 50 per cent. In the municipality of
Nordkapp, close to very good cod grounds,
only one woman has been registered as sole
proprietor of a boat (5.1 m long), while some
are registered as shareholders and part-
owners in the companies that own fishing
boats. Considering that there are 8,184
registered fishing boats of various sizes in the
whole of Norway, the number of female
owners seems very small indeed.
Norwegian fisheries are heavily governed by
different laws and regulations like the Raw
Fish Act, the Participation Act and the Act of
Fishing in Salt Water, to mention a few. In
order to be registered as a fisher, one has to
send in an application to the Directorate of
Fishery. To be accepted as a registered full-
time fisher, one has to earn 60 per cent of
one’s income from fisheries, and spend at
least 20 weeks in a year fishing.
Different criteria
The criteria for the part-time fishers are
different. They can show earnings from
shore-based work and spend less time at sea.
Important yet marginalized
Siri Gerrard
Why there are so few registered women fishers in
Norway and what the consequences might be
This article, by Siri
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peared in SAMUDRA
Report No. 42,
November 2005
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In order to buy a fishing boat with a quota,
one has to have been an active registered
fisher for at least a year. In addition to these
regulations, there are also specific rules for
buying and selling boats with a quota,
depending on the region where one lives.
Eva Munk-Madsen argued some years ago
that a resource that was common property
and open to ‘everybody’, has, with the quota
system, become closed for most women—
in her view, about half of the fishery
population. In view of the low numbers of
registered women fishers and boatowners,
and the fact that women in 1994 owned 192
of 16,216 units of quotas, Munk-Madsen
concluded that quotas have become “men’s
formal property right”. Since Munk-Madsen
presented her work, even fewer women have
been registered, and, consequently, fewer
women have formal rights to the quotas.
There are several examples of widows who
have had to sell their boats with the quota
even when they wanted to keep them and
start fishing—because they were not entitled
as ‘fishers’, according to the Norwegian laws
that regulate fishing. This has been the case
even if the woman had performed substantial
unpaid work related to fishing and to the
upkeep of the boat. Instances of divorces also
illustrate the imbalance between women and
men as far as quotas and other type of capital
investments are concerned. As few women
have the right to quotas in Norway, they are
effectively a marginalized group in
Norwegian fisheries, with little access to the
wealth that the resources in the fisheries
might represent.
Why are there so few registered women in
Norwegian fisheries? This is a question I have
often asked since Norway is a country
famous for its policies of gender equality. I
will explore some possible explanations. First
of all, it is important to remember that the
majority of women in fisher families have,
for ages, performed work on shore,
connected to, and important for, the fishing
boats. However, this work has, in most cases,
not been registered or officially recognized,
neither by fisheries officials nor by
employment authorities. It has not been
considered as a type of work that qualifies
for membership in fishermen’s unions or
resource policy-making institutions. Fishery
institutions beyond the community level, and
fisheries policymaking have, in this way,
remained the domain of men.
Recent years have seen more examples of
women who are active in fish harvesting and
working together with their husbands. Some
of them are registered fishers and enjoy a
formal status. Some are also active members
of the Norwegian Fishermen’s Union.
However, neither do the policies of unions
Women % Men % Women % Men
1983 182 0.64 22,273 78.69 106 0.37 5,74
1988 575 1.95 21,473 72.69 102 0.35 7,20
1990 554 2.01 19,921 72.39 112 0.41 6,93
1993 572 2.26 18,500 73.21 105 0.42 6,21
1998 530 2.49 14,611 68.60 166 0.78 5,99
2003 283 1.64 12,957 75.31 130 0.76 2,83
2004 281 1.80 12,396 79.53 114 0.73 2,79
Year
Full-time Part-time
Table
Full- and Part-time Women and Men Fishers in Norway, 1983–2004
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and associations focus on questions relevant
for women, nor do they recognize that
women have contributed to the production
in fisheries.
White papers
This neglect is also mirrored in public white
papers on fisheries. Fishery questions are also
left out in most Norwegian white papers on
gender equality. A contrasting example is a
2004 white paper from the Sami Parliament,
where women’s participation in fishery and
fishery politics is heavily emphasized.
The quota system has not made it easy for
the majority of women and men in
Norwegian fisheries. Even though only a few
women were fishing before the quota system
was launched, they could, under certain
conditions, continue to own their boat or rent
it out if their husbands passed away. This is
almost impossible today since a widow
seldom has the right to the quota. And,
obviously, a boat without fishing rights has a
low value. Today even a very old boat with
a quota can be sold at a very good price.
Thus, it is not only fish in the market that is a
commodity, but fish rights through the quota
system are also now a part of the market. If
we examine the quota system—at least, the
way it is applied in Norway—we will find it
consists of a complicated arrangement of
decisions, practices, rules and regulations at
so many levels as to make it difficult to get a
comprehensive overview. For most people,
the quota system appears to result from a
rather complicated and faceless power
process.
Fishery politics and quota questions are still
the men’s domain since there are few women
in the institutions that make the most
important decisions. The Norwegian Russian
Fishery Commission that decides upon the
total allowable catch (TAC) of cod in the
Barents Sea is an example where the gender
balance is very uneven. In 2004, four women
and 24 men from Norway and the same
number of women and men from Russia met
to negotiate the TAC for the cod stock in the
Barents Sea. A national-level example is the
committee that advises on the size of the
quotas. This committee has always had a
heavy deficit of women.
Both these important committees have applied
for exemptions from the gender equality Act
that mandates 40 per cent women’s
participation in public committees. They argue
that the fishery organizations have few
women as members. Representatives from
the Ministry of Fisheries also claim that few
women are interested in, and seen as eligible
for, such posts.
Such a view reflects the Ministry’s attitudes
on who ought to be considered as experts in
fishing and who should hold special offices.
The net result is that women have little
influence when quota questions are discussed
at the political level. Some have tried to
influence the policy, for example, in the
committee that advises the Ministry regarding
fish stocks. Fisheries and resource
management policies are arenas where some
men still have the power to define the agenda.
The quota system and the debate about this
system can, therefore, be looked upon as a
strong symbol of men’s maintenance of the
power in fishery policy and the hegemony of
some men. Some say that women’s position
in fishery policymaking only reflects their
position in society at large. This might have
been the case if only the number of registered
women is taken into consideration. However,
if we also consider the number of women
who work alongside men, often their spouses,
I would rather say that Norwegian fishery
policy is facing a democratic deficit.
It should, however, be mentioned that even
though little attention has been given to
women in relation to resource questions,
women’s positions have, once in a while, been
put on the fishery policy agenda. In the 1970s
and 1980s, students and researchers, along
with members of the Fisherwomen’s
Association, raised questions about women
in fisheries, in fishing communities and
women’s influence on fishery politics. The
Fisherwomen’s Association also emphasized
local welfare and cultural questions. The
association was among those that put safety
...it is important to
remember that the
majority of women
in fisher families
have, for ages,
performed work
on shore,
connected to, and
important for, the
fishing boats.
However, this
work has, in most
cases, not been
registered or
officially
recognized, neither
by fisheries
officials nor by
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at sea on the political agenda. Coastal women
from Srya in Finnmark went on the barricades
in 1989 after the moratorium was declared
and tried to influence policymaking. Women
from the environmental association and the
Sami Parliament have been among those who
have tried to influence the national committee
discussing quotas.
Women’s projects
Some of the 1980s’ activities resulted in the
fishing industry’s Committee for Women.
This Committee put women in coastal
communities and women in the different
sectors of fisheries on the fisheries agenda
and tried to support women and women’s
projects in different ways. However, it was
not considered a policymaking institution and
had little influence on the resource
management policy. The committee lasted
until 2000, when the Minister of Fisheries cut
off financial support.
In recent years, women in the Lofoten area
have tried to give more attention to the
importance of coastal fisheries, through the
mass media and by circulating petitions.
Women parliament members drew attention
to resource policy matters, just as their
counterparts in the Sami Parliament had
done. The gender-oriented white paper
mentioned earlier was a result of their work.
In spite of such efforts, the women’s situation,
the challenges in fisheries and fishing
communities and the lack of recruitment in
many of the fishery districts are topics that
seem to be very difficult to get on to the
political agenda in the new millennium.
To be sure, there have been several changes
in the men’s situation as well. In one
community in Finnmark, there are about 20
boats, 20 local and some non-local registered
fishers, of whom three are women. All the
fishers are over 30 years old. The majority
are more than  40. Four owners or enterprises
own half the boats and quotas. The number
of quotas exceeds the number of boats used
in the daily fishery. This is possible due to
the new arrangements that have been
adopted which states that one can transfer
for a limited period one quota from one boat
to another boat within the same length class
(for example, within the group of boats of
length 10 to 15 m). Two of the owners have
organized themselves into private limited
companies, while two others have individual
or sole enterprises, the traditional ownership
model in this area. We can see a
concentration of ownership of boats and
quotas and a change in the ownership pattern:
Some fishers are trying to succeed in the
fishery by getting more quotas, others manage
with one boat and one quota, and yet others
are leaving the fishery. The ‘deficit’ of
youngsters entering the fishery is quite
obvious and the number going into the fishery
from this area is smaller than ever before.
For the young ones, the fishery industry seems
to be a closed industry.
Loose connections
Today, more and more women in the coastal
areas of Norway seem to have only a loose
connection with fishing, fisher’s work and
processing in general, compared to the
situation years ago when women contributed
with an enormous amount of work. Today,
they can be their husbands’ consultants and
share the financial burdens of the household.
The majority of women are employed outside
the fishing sector, for example, in teaching,
or in other public-and private-sector jobs,
since fishery work has been so heavily
downscaled in Norway.
Young women and men are moving away
from fishing villages. Youngsters and women
in fishing and fishery-related activities seem
to be the main losers in the fishing industry.
But there are also other considerations to be
taken into account. When women leave
fisheries, fishing-related households seem to
weaken or disappear. When fishing-related
households weaken or disappear, fishery as
a way of life for women, men and children
seems to weaken. When this happens, the
population in the fishing villages decreases.
These tendencies also have consequences
for men—especially for those who are not
willing to compete for more and more
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quotas—and for the young women and men
who, in future, would like to go into fishing
and fisheries and live in fishing communities.
Unless we all succeed in changing the
market-oriented resource policies and the
male hegemony in the majority of fishery
institutions, the entire fishery-dependent
population—women, the majority of men, and
the future generations—will all be losers.   
Today, more and
more women in
the coastal areas
of Norway seem
to have only a
loose connection
with fishing,
fisher’s work and
processing in
general, compared
to the situation
years ago when
women
contributed with
an enormous
amount of work
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The  workshop on “FishingCommunities and SustainableDevelopment in Eastern and
Southern Africa (ESA): The Role of Small-
scale Fisheries” was organized by the
International Collective in Support of
Fishworkers (ICSF) in collaboration with the
Western Indian Ocean Marine Science
Association (WIOMSA), the Masifundise
Development Trust and the Coalition for Fair
Fisheries Arrangements (CFFA). It was held
at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 14 to 17
March 2006.
Among the various issues discussed,
considerable interest focused on co-
management in fisheries. Simeao Lopes of
the Institute for the Development of Small-
scale Fisheries (IDPPE), Mozambique, said
fishing contributes to the country’s
employment, food security and foreign
exchange. The sector is organized into the
industrial, semi-industrial and artisanal
fisheries. Private and joint-venture companies
engage in industrial fisheries, especially for
shrimp resources in the Sofala bank. The
semi-industrial fishing vessels are mainly
Mozamibque-based trawlers that target
shrimp. They also include handlines as well
as freshwater fishing platforms for kapenta.
The artisanal fisheries are spread along the
seaboard and the inland waters, employing
about 130,000 in canoe fishing and fish
processing. There are about 11,000 artisanal
fishing vessels, only 3 per cent of which are
motorized. Beach-seines, gill-nets and
handlines are the popular artisanal fishing
gear.
The development of co-management in
Mozambique began, Lopes said, with the
structural adjustment programme (SAP) in the
post-Second World War era, as demands
increased on Africa to democratize and
implement SAPs, from its traditional Western
donors, led by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), who
stressed resource management based upon
participatory approaches, devolution of
authority and decentralization of powers.
Thus, by the early 1990s, user participation
had become almost a given requirement for
donor-funded development projects in
Mozambique.
Within the fisheries sector, studies were
conducted to evaluate fisheries programmes
and projects implemented during the previous
two decades so as to draw lessons and
propose appropriate future interventions. A
Fisheries Master Plan (FMP) was developed
and approved by the Mozambican
government in 1994. The process of
elaboration of the FMP involved many central
fisheries institutions, fishing communities and
other stakeholders, Lopes said.
The FMP laid out the priorities and strategies
for development to be pursued in the
subsequent years. With regard to the
management of small-scale fisheries, the FMP
emphasized the involvement of fishermen in
setting and enforcing management regimes.
It was from the FMP that co-management
approaches were formally declared as part
of the general new strategic interventions for
fisheries management and development.
Better analyses
A subsequent evaluation underscored the
importance of more careful and
comprehensive analyses and discussions, and
Empowering co-management
Sebastian Mathew
The issue of co-management came up for detailed discussion at
the ESA Fish Workshop organized by ICSF at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
This report has been
filed by Sebastian
Mathew
(icsf@icsf.net),
Programme Adviser,
ICSF. This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 43, March 2006
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the development of more active participation
of beneficiaries. Pilot measures for user-
sensitization began in the late-1990s. Several
co-management committees were since set
up in the marine coastal areas of the country
to improve the efficacy of fisheries
management through developing a sense of
ownership of management programmes
amongst active fishers.
However, Lopes identified several constraints
to realizing co-management goals in
Mozambique. Firstly, the State acts as the
custodian of all natural resources, including
marine resources. Through the Ministry of
Fisheries’ directorates and autonomous
institutes, the State has the right to manage
marine resources for the benefit of the
people. In artisanal fisheries, the users
(coastal communities) have the right to use
fisheries resources; however, they do not
have the right to participate in planning for
the use nor the right to legally act, individually
or collectively, in respect of management of
the fishery resource. This is a serious
constraint to the goal of better resource
management.
Secondly, there are restrictive meanings
associated with the concept of participation.
Thus, for example, as far as fishing
communities and their traditional leadership
are concerned, participation does not apply
to the crew on board fishing vessels. It
applies only to those who have the political
and economic power to take strategic
decisions, to the local elite, the traditional and
religious leaders and other individuals who
are willing to offer their services on behalf
of others. These people may not be the most
appropriate to deal with issues related to
fisheries co-management. There could thus
be conflicts between participatory
democracy as demanded by the main donors,
and effective fisheries management.
However, to guarantee the success of co-
management, the government should
understand these socio-cultural aspects (as
traditional leaders are still respected by the
majority of rural people), and ensure that all
relevant institutions, individuals or interest
groups, which are considered legitimate by
different members of fishing communities, are
engaged in the process, Lopes added.
Thirdly, the government has not been able to
empower fishing communities (legally,
through economic incentives or through
capacity building) to cope with resource
management responsibilities. Neither has
there been an effort to use local knowledge
in decision-making processes or to explain the
criteria used to make some management
decisions. As long as there is poor
understanding of fisheries management
amongst the fishermen, there might be
unwillingness to comply with fisheries
regulations.
Local knowledge
It is important to integrate traditional/local
authorities, as well as local knowledge, into
co-management as a means to connect
political and scientific objectives of the
government to the community. For the fishing
community, it could be a way to reach full
control of their marine resources through the
devolution of power and responsibilities from
government, Lopes observed.
The pressures on the coastal fishing resources
in Mozambique result, among other things,
from the overall unhealthy economic situation
in the country, he added. To raise enough
income for subsistence, fishing communities
are putting pressure on the resource by
increasing fishing effort through the use of
inappropriate fishing gear like fine-meshed
nets in beach-seines that target small pelagic
fish. Open access to fisheries resources
further complicates the matter, resulting in
serious threats both to the resource and to
the economic development of fishing
communities.
The fishermen themselves say that the catch
rates from the nearshore waters have
declined, and the average size of commercial
fish species have decreased. The falling
productivity of fishing units indicates the need
to manage the fishery and exercise caution
in promoting any increase in fishing effort.
Co-management arrangements should be able
to reconcile conservation with the subsistence
In artisanal
fisheries, the users
(coastal
communities) have
the right to use
fisheries resources;
however, they do
not have the right
to participate in
planning for the
use nor the right
to legally act,
individually or
collectively, in
respect of
management of
the fishery
resource
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or livelihood interests of fishing communities.
The competition for the marine coastal
resources of Mozambique is becoming
increasingly evident, with both artisanal
fishing communities and tourism relying on
the resources for livelihoods and
development. At present, the Government of
Mozambique (GoM) is encouraging tourism
as a way to rapidly develop the economy,
Lopes said. As part of this process, the GoM
has delegated the management responsibility
of some areas of the coastal zone to private
tourism developers.
Artisanal fishing communities are concerned
about the use of, and access to, the same
coastal resources, leading to conflicts where
fishing communities have been displaced
from their traditional living and fishing
grounds. These are more evident where
tourism interests are promoting the
preservation of marine coastal resources as
their primary asset, which contrasts with the
extractive value of the coastal fishery
resource, as perceived by the fishing
communities.
On the one hand, the GoM is supporting the
development of co-management in the
artisanal fisheries sector without the
legislative framework that can delegate
resource management responsibilities to the
communities. On the other, it is providing the
legislative framework for delegating resource
management concessions to private tourism
developers without the co-management
institutional framework that would consider
the needs of all resource users. In both
instances, the result of partial regulation and
control over each resource user group risks
overexploitation of marine coastal resources.
Co-management is seen by the GoM as a
means to better control fisheries activities
(especially the fishing effort and conflicts of
interest) through sharing or decentralization
of some responsibilities to the local
institutions. But the communities view the
arrangement as a step to achieve full control
over the fishery resources through the
devolution of power and authority to the local
institutions.
However, the GoM may not be able, or even
willing, to devolve the authority, as that would
require some changes to the country’s
constitution. Sufficient financial capacity
would also be needed to ensure appropriate
collective organizations among the
communities. Lopes raised the following
questions in the light of the experience of
Mozambique with co-management: (i) What
are the different approaches of different
players in co-management and what is their
understanding of ‘sustainable development’?
(ii) How could balance between conservation
objectives of governments and the livelihood
needs of fishing communities be established
while implementing co-management
programmes? (iii) Could co-management
achieve the objectives of all players, given
that the outcome might not always be exactly
the same and may often be contradictory in
nature? (iv) How could participatory and
traditional elements work together? (v) Are
co-management institutions willing, or able,
to use multiple sources of knowledge in
management decisionmaking? (vi) What
could be the implications of the two models—
decentralization and devolution—for fisheries
co-management arrangements? (vii) What
are the impacts of participatory development
approaches on the traditional and (new)
economic power structures in a co-managed
resource environment?
In the discussion that followed Lopes’
presentation, it was observed that co-
management basically referred to shared
management responsibility between the
government and the community. It was noted
that it is important to have an understanding
of what definition to use in the ESA context.
It was further observed that the participation
of women in co-management initiatives is
poor.
Friday Njaya of the Fisheries Department of
Malawi spoke about the status of
participatory fishery management (PFM) in
Malawi lakes. PFM was introduced in Lake
Malawi at the behest of international agencies
in the 1990s in response to declining lake
fishery resources and intensifying conflicts
between small-scale and commercial
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fisheries. Historically, there were traditional
controls over fisheries resources in some parts
of Lake Malawi and Lake Chiuta, and user
committees and associations called beach
village committees (BVCs) were formed to
establish PFM in all the lakes.
The composition of the BVCs varied from lake
to lake. While some were associations of
chiefs, others had mixed composition. The
issue of devolution of fisheries responsibilities
to local district assemblies is still an
outstanding one. BVCs have to be redefined
to allow for the participation of all
representatives of different fishing activities.
Formal bye-laws are yet to be developed for
effective devolution of fishery management
powers.
There are doubts whether or not PFM could
work in Lake Malawi, which is a large water
body supporting small-scale, semi-industrial
and commercial fisheries, including trawling.
The fishing communities along Lake Malawi
are multi-ethnic. There are problems in
successfully imposing access regulation on
fishing, in demarcating boundaries and in
enforcing fishery regulations, Njaya said.
Yet, despite difficulties, it is possible to set
up ‘broadbased co-management’ in Lake
Malawi, with the participation of stakeholders
such as the police, magistrates, chiefs, natural
resourcesbased government departments
and the district assembly. There is a move
now to introduce a closed season for
trawlers. In smaller lakes such as Lake
Chiuta, PFM structures are useful
mechanisms to resolve transboundary
conflicts between Malawi and Mozambique.
Njaya said co-management should be based
on local conditions, and defined and
developed in a contextual manner. It is
important to make a policy distinction
between the rural poor and the village elite
in co-management programmes. There
should be clarity on the introduction of
property rights or access regulation regimes.
Sufficient caution should be exercised while
applying theories in practice. Implementation
of a co-management initiative is a learning
process and it evolves with time, Njaya
concluded.
Mafaniso Hara of the University of Western
Cape, South Africa, gave a presentation on
the implications for coastal communities of
co-management perspectives and
experiences in the ESA region. The objectives
of fisheries management mainly involve three
aspects: setting management objectives;
defining and providing the knowledge base
for management decisions; and
implementation of management decisions.
Historically, fishery management decisions
have been top-down. The fisheries resources
have been treated as State property, and the
objectives of fisheries management have
mainly been confined to conservation of
fishery resources, relying on biological
sciences. The implementation of fishery
management was through policing measures.
Conventional regimes
Co-management of fishery resources was
proposed in light of the failure of conventional
fishery management regimes to prevent
overexploitation of fishery resources. It is also
proposed as an effective mechanism to break
the barriers between fishery administrators
and user communities—a legacy of the top-
down approach through democratic
decentralization, Hara said.
Co-management of fishery resources mostly
as short-term, externally funded projects—
was led by government line agencies through
the creation of ‘user’ representative
organizations (‘democratically’ elected
committees). The process has sometimes
lacked flexibility because of specific donor
requirements.
The experiences with co-management in the
ESA region have so far been mixed. The most
common types of co-management have been
‘instructive’ or ‘consultative’. Hara discussed
several critical aspects of co-management as
it is currently practised in the region. Firstly,
there are conflicting objectives between
conservation of fishery resources and
socioeconomic development of fishing
The objectives of
fisheries
management
mainly involve
three aspects:
setting
management
objectives;
defining and
providing the
knowledge base
for management
decisions; and
implementation of
management
decisions
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communities. The government approach has
usually been instrumental; it co-opts users
into the management process to achieve the
same old conservation objectives without
really accepting alternative knowledge, ideas
and views from them. By and large,
governments do not perceive co-
management as a means of introducing more
democratic principles of fisheries
management, but as a means to better
achieve the government’s original
conservation objectives.
Secondly, co-management has been
proposed as a way to deal with open-access
problems. The introduction of access rights
has been with the idea of enabling effort
control. However, such measures often clash
with historical fishing practices. Enforcing
access control was particularly problematic
in areas lacking alternative economic
opportunities.
Thirdly, centralized co-management systems
are favoured that rely on the government’s
natural scientists. Very few inputs from users
are incorporated into such systems. Usually,
only tasks that the governments have failed
to implement, or are costly, are left to the
user groups.  The local communities are
usually not legally empowered. Their
negotiating position in relation to the
government is still weak. The governments
are also reluctant to devolve real power and
genuine authority to user groups.
Fourthly, co-management usually requires
customary sources of power held by
traditional leaders for effective application of
sanctions. There is thus a need to involve
traditional authority. The traditional authorities
or local elites often capture power to offset
any challenge to their authority that could crop
up from co-management programmes.
Fifthly, while the governments may lack
appropriate skills and capacity to undertake
co-management, communities might not have
the economic, social and political incentives
or capacity to undertake some responsibilities
required under co-management.
Finally, the definition of ‘user community’ and
‘stakeholders’ can be evolving and dynamic
in a temporal and spatial sense. Existing
mechanisms cannot define the users and
decide on how to represent them in co-
management structures. There is also the
problem of lack, or low degree, of downward
accountability of representative
organizations. However, tacit threats of
governments to revoke powers and authority
force upward accountability.
Hara had the following recommendations for
“efficient, equitable and sustainable fisheries
management” in the ESA region. Firstly, co-
management models should acknowledge
and integrate the role of poverty in
community/individual decisions, and
occupational and geographic mobility in
community/individual livelihoods. The role of
fishing in the community’s livelihood interests
should be better understood.
The community should know the status of
fishery resources and be better informed
about alternative sources of livelihoods that
could possibly combine with fishing. In this
context, how far occupational and geographic
mobility could help improve socioeconomic
status is important, Hara added.
Secondly, there is a need for “empowering
co-management” by fully involving users in
setting up management objectives, in
integrating `user knowledge’ into formal
science and in the implementation of
management decisions.
And finally, it is important to improve the ability
of communities to agitate. They should
challenge formal science (including
international conventions) using their local
knowledge to balance conservation with local
socioeconomic concerns. They should agitate
for enabling legislation and improvement in
the attitude of governments to their concerns.
They should agitate for better information and
better organization of co-management
structures with improved human and financial
resources, Hara concluded.  
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The main objective of this document isto make a modest attempt to highlightthe challenges which are emerging
with the current phase of Cambodia’s
aquarian reforms—the most important
component of which is the current transition
from fishing lots to community fisheries. The
challenges include the realms of institutional
and policy reform, local action, innovation and
research. We contextualize our effort by
commencing with an assessment of the
importance of the aquatic resources and by
providing a brief historical background to the
reforms. This is followed by an examination
of the changes in the access and property
rights and the system changes which have
been brought about as a result of the reform.
How some of the transitional changes can
be assessed and the manner in which the
efforts at community fisheries can be made
more economically and socially viable are
also addressed. We deal with the complex
issue of social identity and the aspirations for
creating a new sense of community. The new
role of women, the importance of creating
networks and closer collaboration with
Cambodia’s local governance structures and
vibrant civil society organizations are also
highlighted. The reforms have created new
legal realms of local ‘micro’ ecosystem space
and resource governance.
But this should not detract from the need for
an understanding of the larger ‘global’
context—be it in relation to the ecosystem
dynamics or governance priorities. We
suggest that research and development
priorities must be re-oriented to consider
ways of dealing with the vast number of new
and evolving ‘local realities’ and yet, link them
up contemporaneously to the big ‘global
picture’. We end with a few
recommendations addressed to different
actors involved in the process of aquarian
reforms. There is a call for a new mission
and greater collaboration by research
institutions; new methodologies for data
collection; greater participation with local
governance structures; an exit strategy for
aid agencies and the need for setting up a
national institute for co-management
applications and training.
Developing countries have been recently
challenged by many opportunities and
problems pertaining to their efforts to facilitate
economic growth and promote human
development. Providing a growing population
with the entitlements and capabilities needed
to meet rising aspirations in a globalized,
market-dominated economy is often a
daunting task before policymakers and
politicians. Tapping into the renewable natural
resources in a country—its real wealth—is
often the ‘fallback option’ which both the
State and the people adopt when crisis brews
in the other sectors of the economy. The
market-oriented option of converting natural
resources to wealth often ends up in what
economist Herman Daly recently referred to
as the tragedy of artificial or self-inflicted
scarcity. This approach generally leads to
private riches for a few and exclusion from
the public wealth for the many.
Under pressure
Recognizing the pitfalls of such an approach,
but often under pressure from the people and
civil society, States have increasingly resorted
A meaningful beginning
John Kurien, So Nam and Mao Sam Onn
The following is from a document published by the Inland Fisheries
Research and Development Institute (IFReDI), Cambodia
This excerpt is from
Cambodia’s
Aquarian Reforms:
The Emerging
Challenges for
Policy and
Research by John
Kurien, Fellow,
Centre for
Development
Studies, India, So
Nam, Deputy-Chief,
Fisheries Domain
and Extension
Division, and Mao
Sam Onn, Deputy-
Chief,
Administration and
Personnel Division
and Assistant of the
DG, Department of
Fisheries, Phnom
Penh, Cambodia.
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 43, March 2006
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to measures to open up the terrain of
renewable natural resources to communities
who depend on them for a livelihood. Doing
so without the appropriate institutional
arrangements to modulate the use and
management of these resources has often
led to the tragedy of open access.
Finding the ‘middle-path’—wherein both
efficiency and equity considerations can be
adequately met within their social, cultural
and political frameworks—has been on the
agenda of many developing countries.
Cambodia is pictured in international per
capita income comparisons to be one of the
poorest countries in the world. There is
certainly much truth in this statistic. However,
viewed from the perspective of availability
of per capita natural resource—land, aquatic
resources, particularly fish, and forests—it
is certainly one of the richest countries in
Asia. Converting this latter statistical average
into equitable access and well-being for the
majority is indeed the greatest challenge
before the State and the people of Cambodia.
The challenges to achieve this goal with
respect to the most valuable aquatic resource
of the country—the fish in its inland waters—
are the focus of this document.
We term the efforts at aquatic resource
management which have been unfolding in
Cambodia as ‘aquarian reforms’. We adopt
the term ‘aquarian reforms’ rather than
‘fishery reforms’ for a variety of reasons.
The reforms have a historical context. In the
past, government intervention in the sector
was focused on gathering revenue rather than
managing fish production or promoting local
livelihoods. In the current phase, the attention
of the reforms is focused on the institutional
changes which are being made—
contemporaneously by the State from above
and the communities from below. These
reforms are meant to empower people to
relate collectively to the country’s rivers,
lakes, floodplains and the fishery resources
therein. In future, the reforms will play a role
in conditioning the technological choices and
organizational decisions that people make in
order to obtain sustainable gains from their
collective action. In brief, we are concerned
with a dynamic process of transformation.
The focus is not merely on fish but on the
whole aquatic terrain and the evolving manner
in which people relate and intervene in it. Our
contention is that the ecological and
socioeconomic initial conditions have a
definite bearing on these evolving
circumstances. The present course and the
future trajectory of the new institutional
changes sought to be introduced need to be
envisioned with this perspective. Aquarian
reforms cover this entire canvass.
Good scholarship
An excellent body of scholarship already
exists about these reforms written before the
sub-decree of community fisheries
management was formally approved. Our
efforts build upon that corpus of information
and on recent (late 2005) discussions with
fishery officials and researchers and field
visits to several provinces for firsthand
information from the women and men in the
villages most impacted by these reforms. The
document primarily addresses the various
actors associated with the aquarian reforms
in Cambodia. It seeks to provide them with
some guideposts on the range of issues that
may arise if the reforms are to be taken to
their logical conclusions.
The community access to resources, if
managed well and strengthened, can yield
significant familial and societal changes that
sustain resources and foster convivial
livelihoods.
More than mere poverty alleviation, it can
contribute significantly to enhancement of the
capabilities and entitlements of the rural
masses in Cambodia. Combined with
enlightened advice and support from research
and development agencies, local control over
resources can lead to greater care and nurture
of the unique aquatic ecosystem of
Cambodia.
During our visits to community fisheries we
were informed about the greater livelihood
These reforms are
meant to empower
people to relate
collectively to the
country’s rivers,
lakes, floodplains
and the fishery
resources therein
○○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
77Sizing Up: Property Rights and Fisheries Management
SAMUDRA Dossier
opportunities available for men and the
increased employment and income-earning
opportunities for women.
People spoke about the manner in which the
availability of greater money income was
utilized to keep children healthier and
educated. They spoke about reduced
domestic violence.
The greater control over local natural
resources also leads to reduction in ‘push-
pull’ migration of men in search of work.
These factors taken together can yield
intergenerational reduction in infant mortality,
family size, enhancement of educational
levels and greater gender justice.
Such positive socioeconomic and
demographic changes will create different
occupational expectations in the next
generation. This can yield reduced population
pressure on the aquatic resources in the not-
too-distant future.
Coupled with changes in the access right to
aquatic resources, if there is a general revival
of economic growth and employment
opportunities in the country, this can result in
the new generation opting for other gainful
occupations.
These opportunities can arise in small and
medium village enterprises dealing with
aquatic resource processing, which can be
rural-based, urban-or export-market-
oriented, and yielding higher incomes.
Greater economic democracy is a necessary
condition for raising human dignity and
creating stable political democracy and
peace. This will have far-reaching
implications for the future of the country.
Aquarian reforms in Cambodia have a long
history. The earlier phases were measures
taken with considerations aimed at efficiency
and maximum rent extraction, and tempered
in accordance with some sociopolitical
considerations.
The current phase is anchored in the context
of the country’s recent voyage towards
greater democratization and integration into
the global economy. It is part of the
government’s Rectangular Strategy which is
intended to “firmly and steadily build
Cambodian society by strengthening peace,
stability and social order, entrenching
democracy and promoting respect for human
rights and dignity.”
These are indeed laudable objectives. The
current move towards community fisheries
should be seen as an important commitment
towards achieving these goals. Being
simultaneously a top-down and bottom-up
approach, it is only natural that there will be
doubts and anxieties about the sense and the
viability of the whole enterprise, both on the
part of the government and the people.
There is no need to concentrate excessively
on the organizational form of the reforms. The
debate is not about whether the inland fish of
Cambodia are better harvested through large
fishing lots or small community fisheries
organizations.
Complete reforms
Aquarian reforms are complete only when
those who directly relate to the aquatic
resource through their labour, to give value
and meaning to it, are assured the freedom
and given their rightful rewards for doing so
on a sustainable basis. On this count, a
meaningful beginning has been made in
Cambodia. But there will be many challenges
ahead and a long way to go.  
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Fremantle, Australia, the site of theSharing the Fish Conference 2006,was not exactly temperate between 26
February and 2 March 2006, with Celsius
temperatures in the mid- to high-30s.
Nonetheless, the intellectual climate of the
conference was distinctly Northern. In
retrospect, perhaps this should not have been
a surprise, given that it was hosted and
supported by various Australian fisheries
agencies and the New Zealand Ministry of
Fisheries. However, the lack of representation
from the South was still a shock, considering
that the theme of the conference—allocation
issues in fisheries management—is of
enormous global importance currently, and
also considering that the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) co-
hosted the conference.
As someone with experience of primary
fisheries research in both the South (India)
and the North (Canada)—sufficient to have
generated an international perspective—I
offer this review from the perspective of the
majority of world fishers, whose interests and
concerns were largely left out of the
conference, which was, nonetheless, a
stimulating and thought-provoking
experience.
Sharing the Fish 2006 was an expensive
event. Conference fees were AUD700
(US$500). For those who wished to stay in
the hotel where the conference was held,
room rates were another AUD175 (US$125)
a night. Such rates allowed the conference
committee to hire a professional event
management company to run the event , and
thus it was extremely well organized. The
downside, of course, was that ordinary
participants from other parts of the world,
not already dissuaded from attending by the
high cost of travel, would have had to think
twice about participating because of the high
fees.
There was thus a paucity of representation
from the most important fishing regions of
the world and even a surprisingly small
number of academic participants, particularly
from the non-economic social sciences. I
counted only three of this last group, along
with the economists, lawyers and biologists
who made up the academics at the
conference, although there may have been
several more than were immediately
apparent. The character of the conference
was thus professional and corporate. Tables
1 and 2 give a breakdown of conference
participants by region of origin and by work.
Table 1. Origin of Speakers
Country Speakers
Australia 61
New Zealand 15
United States 11
Northern Europe 8
Canada 7
Africa 4
South Pacific 3
Southeast Asia 3
Asia 2
Latin America 1
FAO 1
The allocation theme of Sharing the Fish
2006 was divided into three subtopics:
“allocation across jurisdictions” (26 papers);
Who’s sharing the fish?
Derek Johnson
This is a reaction to the ‘temperate minority’-worldview on the allocation
of fishing rights that dominated the Sharing the Fish Conference 2006
This review is by
Derek Johnson of
the Centre for
Maritime Research
(MARE), Amsterdam,
The Netherlands.
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 43, March 2006
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“allocation across sectors” (51 papers); and
“allocation within sectors” (25 papers).
Thirteen papers did not fit into these
categories. The three conference subtopics
were further divided. The “allocation across
jurisdictions” subtopic included “high seas,
regional and national cases”. “Allocation
across sectors” included “extractive vs. non-
extractive uses”; “allocation between
commercial and recreational sectors”;
“indigenous, recreational and commercial
allocation”; and a number of more conceptual
papers grouped under the headings of
“temporal and spatial systems of allocation”
and “approaches to the allocation problem”.
“Allocations within sectors” included
“recreational allocation” and “allocation and
reallocation within the commercial sector”.
Table 2. Speaker Affiliations
Affiliation Speakers
Government 62
Academic 27
NGO 13
Private Sector 11
Other 3
The notion of “sector” was debatable, in the
sense that the indigenous sector overlaps
with the commercial and that some papers
did not fit into either the “allocation across
sectors” or the “allocation within sectors”
subtopics. On the whole, however, the logic
of the division was clear and as consistent
as possible under the messy circumstances
that characterize fisheries.
A final distinctive element of the conference
was the large number of keynote and invited
speakers, who numbered 22 out of the total
116 speakers. In combination with the
effective use of daily rapporteurs and
conference overview speakers on the last
day, this innovation gave the conference an
admirable coherence and sense of purpose.
Allocation can be seen as the implementation
challenge of assigning rights to fish. In this
sense, Sharing the Fish 2006 built directly
on the foundation laid by its predecessor, the
Fish Rights 1999 conference. Whether
deliberate or not, the selection of keynote
speakers for Sharing the Fish 2006 fostered
the impression that individual transferable
quotas (ITQs) are the ideal path to allocation.
Two of the three conference keynote
speakers, Peter Pearse and Gary Libecap,
purveyed this point of view along with Ragnar
Arnason, one of the invited speakers for the
conference.
The argument for ITQs is well known and
was clearly presented by these three
speakers. When quota rights can be assigned
such that they are secure, transferable and
permanent, they result in fisheries that are
ecologically sustainable because quota
holders gain the incentive to care for the
resource that they now own. Ecological
considerations, previously externalities, are
now internalized under ITQ systems.
Of most interest in relationship to this
perspective, and perhaps in dissonance with
the intentions of the conference organizers,
several strong voices pointed to the limitations
of the ITQ approach. The most forceful
critique came from the invited speaker and
representative of the International Collective
in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF), Chandrika
Sharma, whose staunch advocacy of the
small-scale fisher perspective came like a cry
in the wilderness. Sharma pointed out that a
very small minority of the world’s fishers are
subject to ITQs and wondered why such a
high-profile conference was devoting so
much attention to an issue of relevance only
to a small proportion of the globe. As she and
members of the small South African
delegation to the conference noted, ITQs
threaten the livelihood basis of small-scale
fishers. Moeniba Isaacs and Andrew Johnston
showed in their presentations how artisanal
fishers in South Africa have been badly
divided, and had their ability to make a living
from fishing undermined by the recent South
African legislation that has based all South
African fisheries on ITQs. The inequity of
ITQs was echoed by Frank Alcock and the
two end-of-conference overview speakers,
When quota rights
can be assigned
such that they are
secure,
transferable and
permanent, they
result in fisheries
that are
ecologically
sustainable
because quota
holders gain the
incentive to care
for the resource
that they now own
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Susan Hanna and Ray Hilborn, who affirmed
the challenge to equity that ITQs represent
even in countries of the North.
Weak defence
The three proponents of ITQs seemed unable
to defend themselves against these
challenges, saying that while ITQs might
increase inequity, the broader environmental
and social benefits they brought were worth
it. Pearse succinctly encapsulated this
response by stating that it is the end, not the
means that is important, a statement I
personally found highly problematic as it goes
against the increasing emphasis on process
and social justice that has informed theories
of co-management and fisheries governance
in recent years. I was also troubled by the
amiable reasonableness of the ITQ
proponents, which softened an otherwise
harsh message.
The lack of sufficient participation by
delegates representing the world’s most
populous fishing regions meant that the
conference did not adequately discuss
allocation and rights-based approaches
appropriate to the majority of the world’s
fisheries, which are highly complex, diverse
and rapidly changing. The invited speaker
Mahfuzzudin Ahmed did list allocation
alternatives for tropical fisheries but at a level
of generality that sparked little debate. ITQs
are clearly of little relevance in most complex
developing country fisheries. What is the
cutting edge in community-based quotas?
How can allocation be worked out between
semi-industrial fleets and small-scale
subsectors with thousands of units? While I
can see the real advantages of introducing
ITQs for semi-industrial fisheries in
developing countries for capacity reduction
and sustainability, how could such ITQs co-
exist with other forms of rights for the small-
scale subsector that would have to be
extremely well protected? How do we
manage large and complex fisheries that are
also data-poor and in regions where
governance is weak? How can fishers be
protected when coastal tourism, industrial
development and oil exploration move into
traditional fishing grounds? It is not enough
to leave such questions to the very end of
the deliberations, for the conference
overview speakers; and it makes me wonder
why the FAO was not able to put such
questions more forcibly on to the agenda of
the conference.
Despite these concerns about the
conference, within the confines of the largely
antipodal group of papers at the conference,
there were many that provided examples of
challenges—and creative solutions—similar
to those encountered in the fisheries of the
South. The Maori case in New Zealand, for
example, as introduced by the invited speaker
Alison Thom, shows that strong communities
can participate in an ITQ process and come
out ahead.
Equity implications
It would be interesting, nonetheless, to see a
more disinterested presentation of that
process, and to hear about the equity
implications of sharing quota for the
communities. The Alaskan native quota
allocation case would be another example to
consider. There are surely lessons from many
of the other papers presented at the
conference that may be helpful for the
majority-world fisheries. One example was
the paper presented by Claire Anderson,
which discussed the development of a more
transparent instrument for inter-sector
allocation by the Queensland government.
If the debate over the applicability and equity
of ITQs bumped along mostly in the
background during the conference, two topics
created a buzz during the event. The first of
these followed the presentation of Rosemary
Rayfuse, who talked about allocation across
jurisdictions. She argued that the principle of
freedom of the high seas has now been
sufficiently constrained by international
agreements that it should be withdrawn.
In effect, obligations under international law,
particularly when regional marine fisheries
organizations are involved, have created a
situation where there are now legal
The lack of
sufficient
participation by
delegates
representing the
world’s most
populous fishing
regions meant that
the conference did
not adequately
discuss allocation
and rights-based
approaches
appropriate to the
majority of the
world’s fisheries,
which are highly
complex, diverse
and rapidly
changing
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instruments to control access and allocate
fish stocks on the high seas. These
instruments are still far from perfect, and
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing persists to the degree that some
observers, such as another invited speaker,
Gordon Munro, are pessimistic about their
ever being controlled.
The increasing concern of international
organizations like Greenpeace, represented
at the conference by Alistair Graham, for the
protection of deep-sea mounts may be a
recognition that the time may have come for
effective restrictions on such sensitive areas.
The question that arises, however, is whether
so much effort on the part of international
organizations should be invested in
environmental areas that are marginal to the
livelihoods of the world’s fishers. In terms
of social benefit, it would seem a better use
of resources to focus on threats to the
tropical coastal waters where most of the
world’s fishers and marine biodiversity co-
exist.
The second topic that stimulated considerable
interest at Sharing the Fish Conference
2006 was triggered by an example given by
Pearse, and relates to ITQs and allocation
across sectors. Pearse stated that the
Canadian Minister of Fisheries has recently
given an ITQ share to the recreational fishery
sector for halibut on Canada’s Pacific coast.
This arrangement satisfied the commercial
halibut sector, which had been increasingly
concerned about the growing share of fish
caught by the recreational sector. The
advantage for the commercial sector was
that, in future, any further growth in the
recreational catch would have to be
purchased from them, and they would thus
get a fair market rate instead of the gradual
erosion of their quota as had been occurring.
The buzz at the conference revolved around
the innovation of giving a transferable quota
to a disparate group of unorganized
recreational fishers who would have little
choice but to become organized in order to
administer their new right. This experiment
clearly stimulated the minority-world
fisheries managers present, all of whom face
large and growing demand from recreational
stakeholders. It is less relevant for places like
India, where recreational fishing is virtually
nonexistent. Nonetheless, it does raise an
interesting comparison with small-scale
sectors in majority-world fisheries, which also
have large numbers of diverse stakeholders
who often lack effective institutional means
for negotiating their rights.
As these points demonstrate, the Sharing the
Fish Conference 2006 was a stimulating
forum. Clearly, however, it would be
preferable, in future, to seek much greater
participation from the majority areas of the
fisheries world. If that is not possible, then it
would be wise to indicate more clearly that
such a conference is geared primarily
towards the interests of the fisheries of the
North, a small minority in global terms. It would
be a pity if this were the outcome, however,
as Sharing the Fish Conference 2006 and
its predecessor FishRights99 have been
important milestones on the path to improving
fisheries management.  
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I refer to Derek Johnson’s article, “Whois Sharing the Fish?”, in SAMUDRA ReportNo 43 (March 2006), discussing the
Sharing the Fish 2006 Conference that
was held in Australia last February and to
which the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO) gave technical
support. While the tone of the article is positive
regarding the conference, and its outcome in
supporting better-managed fisheries, I would
like to emphasize a few points:
The FAO Secretariat has moved, beyond a
doubt, on the matter of whether fishing rights
are good or not. They are absolutely
necessary and fundamental to the
sustainability of the world’s fisheries
resources.
However, fisheries policies, management
approaches—and fishing rights—need to be
tailored to the specific context of countries
and localities with respect to the fisheries in
question, the social setting, culture, etc.
Indeed, fishing rights have been allocated
under long-standing programmes, such as the
community development quota (CDQ)
systems that have been operating in fishing
communities in the Bering Sea; the various
types of territorial use rights in fisheries
systems (TURFs) such as those found in
Japan, the Philippines, Samoa and Fiji; the
Management and Exploitation Areas for
Benthic Resources of Chile; and the beach
management units (BMUs) found in Uganda,
Tanzania and Kenya. It is for communities
to decide on how efficient they would like
their fisheries to be, with few or many boats
of small or large size.
Fishing rights do not simply equate to the big
individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems
that have been designed for large-scale
fleets. Moreover, fishing rights should not be
limited to large-scale fisheries. The current
variety of schemes for formally allocating
fishing rights has vastly expanded the range
of fisheries and fishing situations to which
rights-based schemes can be applied. They
should apply to large and small fisheries, both
with large and small boats. They are, by far,
the best tool to re-establish and formalize
traditional fishing rights and, thus, protect the
rights of fishermen. Even ITQs need not
threaten the livelihoods of small-scale
fisheries, and they should not foster inequity
if well designed.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach, and
more attention needs to be given to
appropriately sequence policies and policy
reforms. Perhaps it is time to convene an
international conference on the allocation of
rights in small-scale fisheries, to which I am
sure ICSF would be able to contribute.  
No one-size-fits-all approach
Ichiro Nomura
This response to an article in SAMUDRA Report
No. 43 discusses rights-based schemes in fisheries
This Letter to the
Editor is from Ichiro
Nomura, Assistant
Director General,
Fisheries
Department, Food
and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations
(FAO). This article
first appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 44, July 2006
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A group of South African artisanalfishers has launched class actionlitigation against the Minister
responsible for fishing rights allocation on the
grounds that the policies pursued by the South
African government are inequitable and
discriminatory, and violate the human rights
of artisanal fishers in the country. Is it
possible that the introduction of a rights-based
management system might violate the human
rights of certain fishers?
South Africa began introducing a rights-
based fisheries management system as early
as the 1960s, when quotas were introduced
by the Department of Sea Fisheries for a
limited number of commercially exploited
species. From 1988 onwards, the Department
allocated rights in terms of the Sea Fisheries
Act 12 of 1988. These quotas were allocated
within a racially defined fisheries structure
and were largely held by white rights holders,
while the artisanal fishery was being
marginalized. Highly capitalized commercial
companies predominated in the industry
during this period.
Following the election of the first democratic
government in 1994, the government began
a process of restructuring the fishing industry
and developing new legislation and policies
to guide the allocation of fishing rights and
the management of these rights. Towards this
end, the Marine Living Resources Act
(MLRA) was introduced in 1998.
This Act empowered the Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism to allocate
fishing rights in three defined fishing
categories: subsistence, commercial and
recreational. No provisions for artisanal
fishers were included in this Act and the
legislation states clearly:
“no person shall undertake commercial
fishing or subsistence fishing, engage
in mariculture or operate a fish
processing establishment unless a right
to undertake or engage in such an
activity or to operate such an
establishment has been granted to such
a person by the Minister” (MLRA,
1998,18 (1)).
In terms of the MLRA, a fishing right is granted
to a specific person or entity and, “in terms
of Section 21 of the MLRA, the right may not
be transferred without the approval of the
Minister or his delegate. Upon the death,
sequestration, or liquidation of the right holder,
the right vests, respectively, in the executor,
trustee or liquidator and the right may continue
to be exploited for the period of time permitted
by the applicable legal provisions. However,
any transfer of the fishing right to a third party
requires approval” (General Fishing Policy,
2005).
Following the introduction of this Act, the
government established a Subsistence
Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) to investigate
the nature and extent of subsistence fishing
and to advise on the management of this
sector. This task group undertook research
along the coast in South Africa and identified
approximately 30,000 subsistence fishers.
Most significantly, the SFTG recognized that
three categories of fishing practices could be
discerned amongst these fishers, based on the
empirical survey data that was gathered for
this purpose.
Fishing rights vs human rights?
Naseegh Jaffer and Jackie Sunde
An ongoing class action litigation in South Africa brings to focus the
challenge to the rights-based management system in the country’s fisheries
This article is by
Naseegh Jaffer,
Director of
Masifundise
Development Trust,
South Africa, and
Jackie Sunde, a
Researcher for
Masifundise, and
Member of ICSF.
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 44, July 2006
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According to a 2005 affidavit by Ken Salo,
presented in support of the court case of
Kenneth George and others vs the Minister
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, these
three categories “were classified as
subsistence, artisanal and commercial
according to a comprehensive combination
of social, economic, technical, spatial,
ecological and historical criteria that did not
weigh any one criterion more than the other”.
In South Africa, the artisanal fishery has
specific characteristics. Artisanal fishers
historically live in communities near the
shoreline, use low-technology fishing gear,
and harvest a variety of marine species found
near the shoreline. Over generations, they
have developed an understanding of the main
biological lifecycle and migration patterns of
certain marine species. Their catch is either
consumed, shared, bartered or marketed
through a complex set of relations and
traditions developed between men and
women, families, neighbours and local
retailers. In this manner, fishing communities
have developed a culture and caring for one
another’s livelihood.
There was considerable debate regarding the
definition of artisanal fishers, and, although it
was acknowledged by the Task Group that
their needs should be accommodated, no
formal recognition of this group legally
ensued.
Business and the large-scale commercial
companies actively lobbied the authorities to
maintain the status quo regarding the
allocation of quotas and not to re-allocate to
the artisanal or small-scale sector to any
extent. They argued that government could
best achieve its transformation and
redistribution goals by supporting established
industry to provide employment and to
increase its black empowerment component.
They were also successful in wooing
organized labour in these companies to
support them by promising them job security
and, in some instances, a share in the profits
through worker share schemes.
Following the introduction of the new
legislative framework, the government
department responsible for allocating and
managing fishing rights, Marine and Coastal
Management, developed a medium-term
fishing rights allocation policy with a view to
allocating rights for the period 2002 -2005. It
was intended that a long-term rights
allocation policy would be implemented
following this initial period. The medium-term
rights period did not recognize artisanal
fishers as a category of fishers on their own
and instead forced them to apply for
‘commercial’ or ‘limited commercial’ rights.
Limited rights
Only a small number of artisanal fishers were
successful in obtaining these limited
commercial rights and those who did get
rights were allocated totally unsustainable
quotas. Many bona fide fishers were left out
of the system completely and hence no longer
had access to the sea. Others were able to
eke out an existence by working for rights
holders in one or other sector at certain times
of the season but often had no income during
other times of the year.
During 2005, Marine and Coastal
Management released the Draft Long-term
Fishing Rights Policy, which would
effectively allocate long-term rights for up
to 15 years in 19 of the commercial species.
Artisanal fishers up and down the coast held
high hopes that this policy would recognize
and accommodate them; however, this new
policy further entrenched their exclusion. The
application process was extremely costly and
complicated, and the application forms were
only provided in English, which is not the
home language of the fishers. The fishers
were forced to either form companies or
other legal entities with others and compete
with the large commercial companies for the
high-value species or apply as individuals for
meagre quantum in a few limited nearshore
species.
The majority of the artisanal fishers have
been completely excluded from obtaining
Artisanal fishers
historically live in
communities near
the shoreline, use
low-technology
fishing gear, and
harvest a variety
of marine species
found near the
shoreline. Over
generations, they
have developed an
understanding of
the main biological
lifecycle and
migration patterns
of certain marine
species
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long-term fishing rights. For example, in the
nearshore West Coast rock lobster sector,
of the 4,070 fishers who applied, only 813
have been allocated rights. Those who have
been allocated rights have only received
between 250 and 750 kg per annum. Once
their catching and marketing costs have been
deducted, these fishers will barely be living
above the poverty line and those allocated
only 250 kg will be way below the poverty
line. Those who did get long-term rights have
to operate in the narrow confines laid down
in the policy. They are not skilled operators
within this system and thereby remain totally
vulnerable to exploitation.
The past 18 months have seen unprecedented
action by the artisanal sector in South Africa
as the fishers fight for their rights to their
traditional livelihoods and those of the coastal
communities in which they live, which depend
on the artisanal fishing economies. They have
embarked on a range of advocacy and
lobbying activities, including numerous letters
and memorandums to the Ministry and
Presidency, meetings with officials, marches
on Parliament, the chaining of leaders to the
gates of Parliament, a hunger strike and vigil
by veteran artisanal fisher activist Andrew
Johnston, and building strong alliances with
other stakeholders in civil society.
Currently, the fishers’ hopes are pinned on
the outcome of litigation, which they have
launched with the support of Masifundise
Development Trust, members of the Artisanal
Fishers Association of South Africa and the
Legal Resources Centre. The Legal
Resources Centre, a non-governmental
organization (NGO), is funding this class
action against the Minister, and has launched
papers on behalf of the artisanal fishers in
this regard. The court cases have been
launched in both the High Court and the
Equality Court. The Equality Court is a new
court introduced in South Africa, following
the introduction of the first democratic
Constitution in the country in 1996. The
Equality Court aims specifically to give effect
to the Equality Clause in the Constitution,
which states that “everyone is equal before
the law and has the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law” (Section 1).
In order to provide the legal framework for
this protection, the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of
2000 was promulgated. This Act states:
“Neither the State nor any person may
unfairly discriminate against any person”
(Section 6). The argument presented by legal
counsel for the artisanal fishers centres on
the belief that the Minister’s failure to define
and provide for the artisanal fishers in the
Marine Living Resources Act of 1998, and
the consequences of this failure on the lives
and livelihoods of this fishing community,
constitute a violation of a number of human
rights contained in the South African
Constitution. Matters of ‘non-equality’ nature
in this case will be argued in the ordinary High
Court.
Right to choose
The artisanal sector argues that the Minister
has deprived them of their right to choose
their trade or occupation. Section 22 of the
South African Constitution provides that
“every citizen has the right to choose their
trade or occupation freely” (Constitution of
South Africa, 1996, Section 22). According
to a 2004 affidavit filed by Naseegh Jaffer
on behalf of Masifundise in the matter
between Kenneth George and others vs the
Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism: “These fishers are faced with the
untenable options of either forsaking their
traditions and the skills passed between
generations of fishers, and entering a
commercial fishing industry for which they
are not skilled, or resigning themselves to a
life of poverty outside the framework of legal
fishing operations, risking prosecution and
criminal sanction. It is thus believed that these
options do not constitute a proper ‘choice’ of
trade or occupation as contemplated by the
Constitution and are, accordingly, unlawful
and unconstitutional”.
It is also argued that the current legislative
framework violates a number of other basic
socioeconomic rights, most notably, the right
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of access to sufficient food, and hence the
internationally recognized right to food
security is threatened. The impact of this
violation is felt by not only the fishers but by
all members of their households and the
extended community that depend on these
livelihoods within the local marine and coastal
economy. The right to healthcare, housing and
education, and the rights of the child to basic
nutrition are threatened by this violation, and
hence are also cited in the arguments to be
presented to the Courts. The right to have
the environment protected through reasonable
legislative and other measures is central to
the case as the Minister has a duty to develop
legislation that fulfills this right whilst
promoting the sustainable use of the country’s
natural resources. In addition to the
abovementioned socioeconomic rights, the
fishers argue that the way in which the policy
and application process has been
administered violated several key
constitutional provisions, namely, the right of
everyone to use the language of their choice.
Enshrined in this is the duty imposed on the
State to “use at least two official languages
and to ensure that all official languages are
treated equitably”. The failure of the
Department to provide application forms in
the home languages of the fishers greatly
exacerbated the difficulties experienced by
the artisanal sector in understanding what
was required of them when applying for
rights. This aspect is directly linked to the
right to reasonable administrative action,
which is also a right protected by the
Constitution.
This case argues that all of the above-alleged
violations of the rights of artisanal fishers
arise because the State, through the Minister,
has failed to treat the fishers equitably in
comparison to the other fishing sectors. In
failing to do so, the law is inequitable and
discriminatory and hence violates the central
tenet of the Constitution, that of the Equality
Clause.
The Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism has, to date, fought the legal
proceedings by appealing against the decision
to hear the matter in the Equality Court. The
fishers were heartened by the judgment of
the Appeal Court that insisted that the fishers
had the right to have the matter heard in this
Court and noted that the Minister should not
deny the fisher’s prayer to have their say in
court. The advantage of the matter being
heard in the Equality Court as well as the
High Court is that the Equality Court is
empowered to order a variety of forms of
redress, if it is deemed necessary. This raises
the hope that it may yet be possible to
envisage a real, rights-based fisheries
management policy in South Africa, one
based on the principles of social justice and
the rights enshrined in the country’s
Constitution, and upon which the future of
South Africa’s new democracy rests.  
The fishers argue
that the way in
which the policy
and application
process has been
administered
violated several
key constitutional
provisions
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Through the last two issues ofSAMUDRA Report, we havewitnessed an interesting debate
regarding the allocation of fish rights. First,
Derek Johnson reflected on the Sharing the
Fish Conference 2006, held in Australia,
pointing out the traditional dominance of the
rich ‘temperate minority’ countries over the
Southern developing countries in matters of
presentations, discussions and solutions (see
SAMUDRA Report No. 43, March 2006, pg.
11). Later, Ichiro Nomura, Assistant Director
General in the Fisheries Department of the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), came up with a reply,
claiming that rights-based fisheries are the
solution but admitting that ‘one size does not
fit all’, ending with the suggestion for a
conference where focus should be on the
challenge of allocating fishing rights in
developing countries (see SAMUDRA Report
No. 44, July 2006, pg. 25).
My reflection here is on the dilemmas
contained in this challenge. Before that,
however, a clarification on rights-based
fisheries management in the North. Rights-
based management comes in many forms,
including licensing and individual as well as
community quotas. Individual quotas may
again be allocated as individual fishing quotas
(IFQs), individual vessel quotas (IVQs) or
individual transferable quotas (ITQs), each
with special features and outcomes. All
solutions are well known in the North (and
‘down under’ South), but during the last 10
years, focus has increasingly been on the
ITQs, a fact reflected also at the first Fish
Rights 1999, where New Zealand and
Australia featured prominently.
I think it is fair to say that ITQ systems, as
originally developed in New Zealand and
Iceland and later copied in at least 15 other
countries, have experienced differential
success. They have, most often, improved the
economic performance of the fisheries, and
have contributed to more sustainable fisheries
in biological terms (although hard evidence is
still often lacking), but they have generally
been weak on equity, especially in terms of
neglecting crews and local communities.
Some countries, like the United States, have
introduced community quotas (as in Alaska),
but these attempts have been few and
marginal compared to the massive drive
towards ITQs or systems closely resembling
them (as is the case with the Norwegian IVQ
system). Generally, these countries have the
human and economic resources necessary to
run ITQ-systems, and, even more important,
they have (although to a variable degree)
alternative employment possibilities for fishers
who are made redundant. To illustrate,
Norway had 115,000 fishers in 1946, but it
now has fewer than 15,000. Yet, this decline
has not created any major unemployment
problems.
The problem arises, as pointed out by John
Kurien in People and the Sea: A Tropical
‘Majority World’ Perspective, when the
ITQ-missionaries start preaching the ITQ
gospel to large developing countries with
thousands of artisanal fishers, like China,
India, Indonesia and Vietnam, and also smaller
ones in Africa and Latin America.
Greater caution
FAO is a little more cautious, advocating in
favour of rights-based fisheries
This article is by
Bjørn Hersoug of
the Norwegian
College of Fishery
Science, University
of Tromsø, Nor-
way. This article
first appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 45, November
2006
Opening the tragedy?
Bjørn Hersoug
Institutional reform and the need for reallocation should figure
prominently in policy on fishing rights, especially in developing countries
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management (although not necessarily ITQ
systems), with the rhetorical bottom-line that
without biological sustainability, all fishers are
going to end up poor. According to Nomura,
“The current variety of schemes for formally
allocating fishing rights has vastly expanded
the range of fisheries and fishing situations
to which rights-based schemes can be
applied.
They should apply to large- and small-scale
fisheries, both with large and small boats.
They are, by far, the best tool to re-establish
and formalize traditional fishing rights and
thus, protect the rights of fishermen. Even
ITQs need not threaten the livelihoods of
small-scale fisheries, and they should not
foster inequity if well designed.”
As indicated by Johnson in his SAMUDRA
Report article, there are good reasons to be
sceptical about too simple solutions. While
donor agencies have gradually changed their
priorities, more in favour of small-scale
fishers and, in particular, targeting the poor
(and for a period ‘the poorest of the poor’),
the underlying logic has all along been that
fishers in developing countries are generally
poor, measured against any standard.
However, as pointed out by C. Béné (When
Fishery Rhymes with Poverty: A First step
Beyond the Old Paradigm on Poverty in
Small-scale Fisheries, World Development
31, No. 6, 2003), in the current literature on
poverty there is almost a complete absence
of references to case studies from fisheries.
Béné attributes this lack of references not to
the low number of fishing studies portraying
poverty but to the nature of scientific
production and the way the literature
proposes to explain the cause(s) and origin(s)
of poverty in small-scale fisheries.
Generally, there seem to be two contrasting
interpretations of the relationship between
poverty and fisheries. The first claims, “They
are poor because they are fishermen”. Within
this intellectual tradition, there are two lines
of reasoning. One has its origins in H. S.
Gordon’s classic paper on open-access
fisheries (The Economic Theory of a
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery,
Journal of Political Economy 62, 1954), an
idea that was powerfully reinterpreted in
Hardin’s seminal article, describing the
tragedy of the commons (The Tragedy of
the Commons, Science 162, 1968).
Figure: A Framework to Identify the Occurrence and
Types of Poverty (Béné 2004)
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Here the open-access nature leads to more
and more people entering the fisheries,
resulting in overfished resources, an
elimination of the resource rent and,
ultimately, in the impoverishment of the fishers
and their communities. This intellectual
tradition is a solid one, with a large number
of contributions from both scientists and
donor organizations. There is no doubt that
overexploitation is a major cause of
impoverishment, but not necessarily the major
cause.
Exogenous origin
While poverty, in this tradition, is explained
as an endogenous effect, the exogenous
origin of poverty is explained by showing the
low alternative cost of labour in the fisheries.
Writing on the particular problems of small-
scale fisheries, T. Panayotou pointed to the
fact that most fishers (in Asia) have a low
alternative cost of labour, and with easy
access and difficult exit they are ‘trapped’
in the fisheries (Management Concepts for
Small-scale Fisheries: Economic and
Social Aspects, FAO Fisheries Technical
Paper 228, 1982).
In other words, the situation outside the
fisheries is most important. However, several
writers combine the two explanations without
making the necessary distinction, thus
confusing the analytical understanding of
what causes poverty in the fisheries.
The other major idea—”They are fishermen
because they are poor”— indicates that
fisheries is an employer of last resort, where
those falling out of the agricultural system
can manage to eke out a living by fishing.
Common-property resources are, therefore,
extremely valuable for poor people, and any
attempt to close the participation may result
in increased poverty. The coastal fisheries
in Mozambique may be a good case in point,
where large numbers of people have
migrated from the countryside to the coast,
because of the civil war and the problematic
agricultural situation. They have taken up
subsistence fishing, partly in competition with
existing fishers. Limiting access for them
would often be a life-and-death matter.
Both solutions (limiting access and providing
alternative employment) have been utilized
by a variety of donor-assisted fisheries
projects, with mixed success. The latter
approach opens the way for a diametrically
different policy than the former. If the
fisheries is seen as an essential employer of
last resort, within a much larger system of
livelihood creation (based on various
resources and various occupations), it is hard
to stick to the idea of sector development. It
is even harder to limit access in the classic
way done in Western, developed fisheries.
On the other hand, unlimited access can cause
severe damage to a developing fishery. So
what should we do? If we limit access to
‘traditional fishers’, ‘original fishers’ or
‘existing fishers’, we run the risk of cutting
off an important source of livelihoods for poor
coastal populations, while, if we keep the
commons open, the resources will sooner or
later be fished down.
Some try to escape the dilemma, by pointing
to the fact that open access does not
necessarily have to produce the tragedy.
According to one study (Management, Co-
management or No Management? Major
Dilemmas in Southern African Freshwater
Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper
426/1, FAO, 2004), classical management
approaches applied to the inland lake fisheries
in southern Africa have been misplaced, being
led by patchy or simply wrong information
regarding fishing effort (catching capacity).
The main argument is that the catching
capacity of the inland lake fisheries has been
extremely variable, fluctuating not only with
the amount of fish available (following natural
variations), but also following macroeconomic
variations, thereby creating increasing or
decreasing opportunities in other occupations.
During severe droughts, many people are
naturally attracted to the fisheries, while when
the situation is more normal, they will return
to former occupations. Capacity moves up
If the fisheries is
seen as an
essential employer
of last resort,
within a much
larger system of
livelihood creation
(based on various
resources and
various
occupations), it is
hard to stick to the
idea of sector
development
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and down as a result of numerical flexibility,
while few fishers have invested in more
efficient gear or vessels. Most fishers in the
southern African inland fisheries are not
specialist fishers. They have fishing as one
of several possibilities in a livelihood
repertoire. Even if the total effort has
increased in all inland lakes’ fisheries, this
increase is not always considered serious
enough to warrant limiting access. Limiting
access under these conditions would only
aggravate the situation for the poor. In some
cases, no management can actually be better
than the existing regime!
Greater mobility
This is, no doubt, an important result, having
profound consequences for management of
the fisheries in these lakes, but it is difficult
to generalize and extend these findings to
other artisanal fisheries, for example, in the
marine sector, for several reasons.
First, because of greater mobility in marine
fisheries, it is much more difficult to maintain
the idea of slow growth. Vessels from
neighbouring countries as well as distant-
water fleets will easily operate in fisheries
that seem promising and profitable. This is
even more so since most developing countries
do not have an efficient system of monitoring
and control.
Second, it seems that technological
improvements are much more easily spread
in the marine fisheries. This is partly because
marine fishing, especially in several Asian
countries, is extremely dynamic, with access
to varied sources of capital and with few
obstacles in acquiring more efficient gear.
Third, much of the marine catch is now meant
for a world market, being within reachable
destinations and quality standards, and
market opportunities are much greater than
those for African inland lake fisheries.
Finally, there are good reasons to return to
Panayotou’s argument about easy access and
difficult exit or Daniel Pauly’s concept of
‘Malthusian overfishing’ (On the Sex of Fish
and the Gender of Scientists: Essays in
Fisheries Science, Chapmann and Hall,
1994). While this may not be the case for
inland fisheries in southern Africa, it is
definitely the case in a number of Asian
fishing nations. Effort is being increased both
vertically (improved technology) and
horizontally (numerically).
In sum, these factors would indicate that we
cannot be too optimistic regarding the
catching capacity in the marine fisheries.
Even if stock assessments are scarce, we
know enough to say that the fishing pressure
on near-shore resources in a number of large
fishing nations in the Third World, especially
in Asia, is not sustainable in biological terms.
Still, we should maintain the institutional
perspective, turning “the research away from
the issue of natural resources limitations per
se, toward social, cultural and political
elements which shape the relationships
between poor people and these natural
resources and between poor and less poor
people” (Béné, 2003).
There is no clear-cut solution to this dilemma,
but perhaps we should start discussing more
in the direction of policy reform, that is, on
the need for reallocation. While fisheries
economists are eager to make a distinction
between management and allocation, I
believe that there is a clear connection.
Effective management
Without a better, more legitimate allocation,
it will prove impossible to introduce (and
maintain) an effective management system.
Again, I find it useful to return to a scheme
developed by Béné (The Challenge of
Managing Small-scale Fisheries with
Reference to Poverty Alleviation. In
Neiland, A. and C. Béné (Eds.): Poverty and
Small-scale Fisheries in West Africa.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
2004).
One route to poverty is via the lack of surplus
generation, caused by lack of efficient gear
or an ecological crisis (a temporary
disappearance of the exploited stocks). But
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even with surplus generation, there may be
poverty, because of what is called an
institutional entitlement failure. As Béné puts
it: “In other words, satisfying the constraints
of ecological and economical viabilities is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to
reduce the level of, or to prevent the
occurrence of, poverty in fishery. A second
necessary condition is the existence of some
sort of (re-)distribution mechanism which will
ensure that the rents generated through
fisheries activities are redistributed (either
directly or indirectly) to the community/
society. If such mechanisms do not exist, the
rent is likely to be appropriated by the most
powerful, and poverty will occur.”
Béné concludes by saying, “Poverty in
fisheries [may be] more related to institutional
factors than to natural ones”. If this is the
case—and I happen to believe Béné’s
analysis is correct also outside west Africa—
more effort and thinking need to be devoted
to institutional reform. The point is simple:
rights-based fisheries management may
secure some type of ownership, be it
individual or collective. But we need to
secure rights for the right people. That can
only be done through institutional reforms,
giving some type of preferential access to
the poor fishers. This can be done in many
ways. Indonesia, for instance, has shown the
beneficial results of prohibiting trawling in the
near-shore fisheries.
In other cases, fishing rights have to be
reallocated. Needless to add, this will be
difficult. Even in developed countries, it is
extremely complicated to carry out
redistributional reforms. But this institutional
requirement has to be set on the agenda, and
one start could be made by donor
organizations operating in fisheries
contributing to the buying out of more
powerful interests. While confiscation was
the key to many previous land reforms, the
principle of a ‘willing buyer’ and a ‘willing
seller’ is more appropriate at present. To
phrase it differently: starting a new fisheries
policy by confiscating the rights of the most
powerful will quite often be detrimental. I
am not saying that direct reallocation of rights
and quotas can be done in all developing
countries’ fisheries, but we certainly need to
start the process of considering such reforms.
If not, we will repeat the case of the South
African fisheries reform, where a large part
of the bona fide fishers were excluded from
participating precisely because the reforms
mainly catered to the more powerful interests.
Institutional reform and the need for
reallocation should figure prominently in policy
and a future conference on rights-based
fisheries should perhaps be called ‘Fishing
Rights to the Right People’. Even if one size
does not fit all, reallocation will certainly fit
most poor fishers.  
The point is
simple: rights-
based fisheries
management may
secure some type
of ownership, be it
individual or
collective. But we
need to secure
rights for the right
people
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The litmus test
Svein Jentoft
Unless it can be demonstrated that a property-rights regime will increase the
welfare of those most in need, we all have legitimate reasons to remain sceptical
Recently property rights have beenheralded as the solution to the‘fisheries problem’ (that is,
overfishing)—by economists at a conference
in Australia (see article by Derek Johnson,
“Who’s sharing the fish?”, SAMUDRA Report
No. 43, March 2006) and by leading
institutions such as the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
(see piece by Ichiro Nomura, “No one-size-
fits-all approach”, SAMUDRA Report No. 44,
July 2006). That comes as no surprise. It is
old news. The puzzle worth pondering
however, is this:  If property rights are such
a blessing to fisheries as alleged, why are
they so often received with animosity within
the fishing population? Let me suggest the
following possibilities:
The reason could be that people do not get
the message; it is either incomprehensible or
they are not yet ready for it. They may not
see the problem for which property rights are
held to be the solution. Thus, what is needed
is more effective communication to make
people understand the significance of the
message and feel better about it. Maybe it is
not property rights per se that people find so
problematic, but the particular kind of
property rights that is promulgated. To
proclaim that property rights “are absolutely
necessary and fundamental to the
sustainability of the world’s fisheries
resources” (Nomura) does not say much
unless one is willing to specify what type of
property rights one is talking about: private
property, common property, community
property, State property, corporate property,
etc.— which all come in various forms and
have different implications. Therefore, if the
argument had been more nuanced and people
were offered a set of alternative property-
rights solutions that they could relate to, they
might be more supportive.
But perhaps the problem lies elsewhere.
People may both understand the message and
see its merits, and yet oppose it because they
see it as threatening to their livelihoods and
ways of life. For people living under an open-
access regime, the property-rights concept
is often perceived as an alien and
inappropriate concept: “How can somebody
acquire privileged ownership of a resource
that was free for all to share?” If that is the
case, a more cautious presentation that does
not ignore people’s unease might do the job.
Still another explanation for people’s defiance
may be that property rights do not offer any
solution to what people perceive as their most
important and urgent problems: “Whatever
the problem property rights are supposed to
solve, my problem is another one.” If you,
for instance, struggle to feed your family on
a daily basis, a property-rights regime might
not figure high on your priority list. I can think
of yet another reason, which is perhaps the
most likely one, why many fishing people
show resistance to the property-rights
systems favoured by economists: They have
already suffered their consequences. They,
in contrast to academics, fisheries managers
and others who believe so strongly in property
rights, know how it feels to lose access to
the resource.
Standard definition
But in order to understand what the problem
is really all about, we need to dig even deeper
This piece is by
Svein Jentoft
(Svein.Jentoft@
nfh.uit.no) of the
Norwegian College
of Fishery Science,
University of
Tromsø, Norway.
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 46, March 2007
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and ask what property rights are in the first
place. Here is a standard definition: The
essential thing about a property right is not
the relationship it establishes between a
person who is the owner and the item that is
owned but the relationship it forms between
people: the haves and the have-nots. Thus,
property rights are a social relationship, and
any change in property rights is intervening
into existing social relations by differentiating
categories of people. As someone benefits
from acquiring a property right, others
necessarily lose, because the owner is in a
rightful position to exclude others from
enjoying the stream of benefits from the thing
that is owned. Thus, property rights are
inherently inequitable, and this problem does
go away if you simply ignore it—as Derek
Johnson found was happening at the
Sharing the Fish 2006 Conference.
Neither can the equity issue be postponed
until after property rights are introduced, as
it will typically pop up long before you try to
implement them, because people can
anticipate their social and economic impacts.
It is not for nothing that social scientists have
long been concerned with the empowering
and disempowering effects of property rights.
The famous French anarchist and
philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
captured the quintessence of this problem in
his 1840 treatise What is Property? Or, an
Inquiry into the Principle of Right and
Government through his oft-quoted
statement, “Property is theft!”  Fishing rights
are often opposed by similar language. That
is perhaps going too far since property rights
can mean many things, and also serve good
purposes. As Bjørn Hersoug argues in his
commentary on both Johnson and Nomura
(“Opening the tragedy”, SAMUDRA Report
No. 45, November 2006), we, therefore, need
to ask if fishing rights are used to empower
the right people. Consequently, one should
not be dogmatic about property rights, as they
come with potentials as well as risks. Property
rights can lead to more inequity but they can
also be employed for correcting inequities,
as they can be used as a mechanism to
protect those in need of protection, that is,
the marginalized and impoverished among
fishers. This is unfortunately not what those
who most eagerly sponsor property rights such
as individual transferable quotas (ITQs), have
in mind.
I suggest, therefore, that before we embrace
any particularly property-rights regime, it
should be litmus-tested against the “difference
principle’ established by John Rawls–
perhaps the most important philosopher of the
20th century—in his 1971 work, Theory of
Justice: “Social and economic inequalities
should be arranged so that they are to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged
persons.”
Specific situation
Thus, unless it can be demonstrated—not
only in theory but also in practice, and not
only on average but for the specific situations
in which fishing people find themselves—that
a particular property-rights regime will
increase the welfare of those most in need,
we all have legitimate reasons to remain
sceptical, whatever the economists and FAO
might say.  
Maybe it is not
property rights per
se that people find
so problematic,
but the particular
kind of property
rights that is
promulgated
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Fulfilled, healthy, secure?
John Kearney
Conventional fisheries management has been dominated by
the enclosing-the-commons model, even as small-scale fishers demand social
justice and ecological sustainability through recognition of their fishing rights
A debate has emerged in the last threeissues of SAMUDRA Report (Nos. 43-45) about rights-based fisheries and
the allocation of fish resources. The debate
was triggered by Derek Johnson in his review
article on the Sharing the Fish Conference
2006 in Australia, in which he describes how
the discussions on rights-based fishing were
dominated by presenters from the rich,
“temperate-minority” countries. Debate at
the conference thus tended to focus on the
options preferred by policymakers and
economists in these countries; namely,
market-based access rights and allocation
mechanisms, such as individual transferable
quotas (ITQs). Conference participants had
little to say about the applicability of these or
alternative rights schemes to the tropical-
majority countries.
Ichiro Nomura, Assistant Director General
of Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
highlights in the next issue of SAMUDRA
Report that fishing rights and rights-based
schemes are “absolutely necessary and
fundamental” to the sustainability of all the
world’s fisheries. However, the configuration
of these rights needs to be tailored to the
specific social setting of the countries in
question. He proposes that it may be an
opportune time to organize an international
conference on the allocation of rights in the
small-scale fisheries that dominate the
tropical and developing countries.
Finally, in the last issue of SAMUDRA Report,
Bjørn Hersoug picks up the thread by
connecting the debate over rights-based
fishing to the existence of widespread
poverty in fishing communities throughout the
developing world. He concludes that poverty
may be more related to institutional failures
than ecological or economic ones, and thus
institutional reform is a prerequisite for the
establishment of right-based fisheries in order
to ensure preferential access to individual or
collective rights for poor fishers. For
Hersoug, a conference on rights-based
fishing should perhaps be entitled, “Fishing
Rights to the Right People.”
In response to this timely debate within the
pages of SAMUDRA Report, I wish to examine
more closely what is meant by fishing rights
and rights-based fishing. When economists
and government officials talk about fishing
rights at conferences and in publications and
policy documents, are they talking about the
same fishing rights that small-scale fishers
have been demanding for the last few
decades? I say, no. Like many progressive
ideas promoted in the recent past by small-
scale fishing organizations around the world
—ideas like community-based management,
ecological fisheries management, and
integrated management—the notion of
fishing rights has been seized by the academic
and bureaucratic sectors, filtered through
their market-based frameworks, and
promoted as something quite different from
the original intent. In other words, the notion
of fishing rights has been co-opted to mean
not the guarantee of rights but rather the
granting of privilege. In most cases, rights-
based management consists of the granting
of fishing privileges to certain groups within
fishing communities as a means of ‘enclosing
the commons’. Based on common-property
theory, the objective is not to guarantee a
fishing people the right to fish, but to exclude
as many as necessary to ensure that those
This article is by John
Kearney, an independ-
ent researcher who
has worked with
small-scale fishers
and fishing
communities for the
past 28 years. This
article first appeared
in SAMUDRA Report
No. 46, March 2007
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remaining can capture the wealth produced
by the sea for themselves.
If rights-based fishing then has nothing to do
with rights, what is the alternative view of
rights? In my view, the notion of rights is about
a fundamental respect for the human being,
and addresses the many conditions necessary
for fulfilled, healthy and secure living. If we
are going to talk about fishing rights within
this understanding of rights, there are a
number of dimensions in the lives of fishers
that must be considered.
The first is to state that the current distortion
in the distribution of the world’s resources
makes it close to impossible to guarantee this
fundamental respect and provide the
necessary conditions for every human to
have fulfilled, healthy and secure lives. As
we increasingly realize the limits on the
availability of resources on this planet, it is
clear that the guarantee of rights involves
not only poverty reduction but also, and just
as importantly, wealth reduction on the part
of the minority who control the vast bulk of
those resources. It is only in this two-pronged
approach that there can be the ability to ensure
fishing rights since so many fishers are among
the world’s poorest inhabitants. If the
meaning of this view is not immediately
evident, let me illustrate by saying that the
demand for such products as luxury
aquaculture seafood, industrial chemicals and
tourism beaches on the part of the wealthy
has led to serious degradation of coastal
habitats and the viability of fishing livelihoods.
Among the many other dimensions of fishing
rights, I would list the following as some of
the most important:
1.The right to fish for food
Fishers provide food for their families,
communities, regions and country. In Asia
and Africa especially, large numbers of
people depend on fish protein for their basic
nutritional requirements. Local, regional and
national food security should be the number
one priority of sustainable fisheries
management. All fisheries development
should be built on this foundation, not only in
developing countries but also in the developed
countries where there is an increasing
recognition that the most healthy and nutritious
food comes from local sources.
2.The right to fish for a livelihood
For many coastal communities, fish, as a
renewable resource, has the potential to be
an unending means of deriving a livelihood.
Coastal communities have depended on this
resource for generations, and they should be
permitted to continue to find their livelihoods
thus for generations to come.
3. The right to healthy households,
communities and cultures
Fishing provides not only an income stream
to fishing households but is also an activity
around which many dimensions of life are
organized, and from which meaning is derived
by men, women and youth. The way fishing
activities are managed and the benefits
distributed are crucial in fostering healthy
social relations in communities and in nurturing
the culture that binds them together.
4. The right to live and work in a healthy
ecosystem that will support future
generations of fishers
All of the above rights depend on taking care
of the environment in which it takes place,
living within the limits of what the ecosystem
can produce, and without upsetting
irreversibly the functioning of that system.
5. The right to participate in the
decisions affecting fishing
The protection of fishing rights and their
optimal implementation for the benefit of
fishing communities requires that everyone
in these communities have a voice in
decisionmaking. This means placing a high
value on the knowledge of fishing people
about fishing and the environment, promoting
a bottom-up and community-driven decision-
making process, and implementing national
policies that protect fishing rights.
The development of fisheries and the design
and implementation of management plans
As we increasingly
realize the limits
on the availability
of resources on
this planet, it is
clear that the
guarantee of
rights involves not
only poverty
reduction but also,
and just as
importantly,
wealth reduction
on the part of the
minority who
control the vast
bulk of those
resources
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based on the above-listed rights would look
very different from a rights-based fishery as
advocated by those who wish to enclose the
fishery commons. A rights-based fishery
stresses one value: economic efficiency. On
the other hand, a fishery based on a guarantee
of the fundamental rights of fishing people
recognizes their equal status and dignity as
members of global society, and their equal
right to a fulfilled, healthy and secure life.
A rights-based fishery would allow one factor
to determine the future of fisheries
development: a privilege granted to a few to
promote the sale of fish as a commodity to
the highest bidders on international markets.
In contrast, a fishery based on the
fundamental rights of fishing people would
result in a fishery where communities shape
a future based on providing their basic human
requirements for food, livelihood, communal
living and a vibrant culture. It is a fishery
where fishing people could begin to realize
their dreams to steward the resources of the
sea, make friends with them—as some of
them would say—own boats and gear, obtain
a fair price for their fish, and offer a brighter
future to their children.
It is also important to point out that the five
fishing rights listed above can all be found in
a more generalized form in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. All too often,
the denial of human rights is understood
narrowly as the violation of civil liberties,
without adequate recognition of the rights to
food, livelihood, communal living and culture.
Finally, I wish to conclude by making
reference to Derek Johnson who started this
debate in SAMUDRA Report No. 43. In another
article that he wrote last year (“Category,
Narrative and Value in the Governance of
Small-scale Fisheries”, Marine Policy 30,
2006), he argues that the perceived
importance of small-scale fisheries may not
only lie in the sustainability of their scale of
operations but also in the values of social
justice and ecological sustainability that
small-scale fishers have come to represent
in response to the dominant modern
narratives of change. He goes on to state
that this view does not always correspond to
reality, given those situations where small-
scale fisheries have been overly exploitative
and ecologically destructive.
The fact that the fisheries of the last 50 years
have been dominated by the drive to kill fish
and that many are responsible for this mining
of the sea, is not at issue. The theme of this
article is that fisheries management for the
past 30 years has been dominated by the
enclosing-the-commons model, at the same
time that small-scale fishers have been
demanding social justice and ecological
sustainability through recognition of their
fishing rights. I would argue that the dominant
model of fisheries management has
contributed to—or, at least, not stopped— the
collapse of fish stocks and ecological
degradation around the world. It has resulted
in greater inequities in the distribution of
fisheries benefits, and now has co-opted the
notion of fishing rights in support of itself. It
is time to recover the true and full meaning
of fishing rights, to listen to small-scale fishers,
and allow them the opportunity to exercise
their fishing rights for a socially just and
ecologically sustainable fishery.  
...a fishery based
on the fundamental
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The possibility that the Food andAgriculture Organization of the UnitedNations (FAO) would sponsor an
international conference on the allocation of
fishing rights focused exclusively on the
interests of small-scale harvesters and
traditional fishing communities is heartening.
Such an event is long overdue and, if it were
to provide an opportunity to hear and
document those authentic voices that have
been resisting and offering alternatives to the
private appropriation of public fisheries
resources, it would be a good thing. It might
even begin to re-establish some sense of
balance and objectivity in the debate about
the merits of different rights schemes by
identifying those that work to support
sustainable development in traditional fishing
communities and those that undermine it.
If the objectives of such a conference were
to include discussions about how the
allocation of rights could “re-establish and
formalize traditional fishing rights and thus,
protect the rights of fishermen”, as Ichiro
Nomura of FAO suggests (see pg.82), it
would also challenge the central orthodoxy
of modern fisheries management; that in their
natural state, fisheries develop in the absence
of rights and play out the “tragedy of the
commons”.
In “Opening the Tragedy?” (SAMDURA
Report No. 45), Bjørn Hersoug correctly
identifies Scott Gordon’s The Economic
Theory of a Common-property Resource:
The Fishery and Garrett Hardin’s The
Tragedy of the Commons, as the core
intellectual foundations that underpin the
theories of modern fisheries management.
But the Hardin contribution to this foundation
is seriously flawed when it comes to
understanding fishing communities and how
they manage fisheries resources held in
common. While Gordon recognized that
fishermen come together to establish rules to
regulate fishing activity, Hardin did not. This
is a very significant difference.
Gordon’s treatise recognized that the so-called
common-property problem was, in fact, an
open-access situation. Even the most
primitive of societies, he noted, generally
recognized the risks of overexploitation
caused by unregulated access, and moved to
regulate resource use for “orderly exploitation
and conservation of the resource”. Societies
that failed to do so, he posited, simply would
not survive. Gordon recognized that humans
live in societies that impose norms to inhibit
socially destructive individual behaviour.
In Hardin’s construct, community or societal
regulation is non-existent, and society is but
the aggregation of selfish individuals, each
seeking their own individual short-term
advantage.
Since Gordon understood social control as an
essential trait of human society, he did not
prescribe the form it should take to avoid
resource depletion. (Like Nomura, he appears
to have been of the “one-size-does-not-fit-
all” school.) On the other hand, the absence
of community in Hardin’s flawed analysis led
him to prescribe only two options to prevent
resource depletion: paternalistic State
management or privatization of the common
property.
Private rights tragedy
Marc Allain
This article draws from the Canadian experience to show how flawed economic
theory works to undermine sustainable development in fishing communities
This article is by
Marc Allain
( m a r c a l l a i n @
sjma.net), former
policy adviser to the
Canadian Council of
Professional Fish
Harvesters, and now
a Geneva-based
fisheries consultant
This article first
appeared in
SAMUDRA Report
No. 46, March 2007
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In Canada, unfortunately, Hardin, not Gordon,
has been used to understand the problems
and make prescriptions for sustainable
fisheries management. In fact, it could be
argued that Canada’s modern fisheries
management has followed Hardin to the
letter: first, through a short-lived and failed
experience with paternalistic State
management; and, in the face of failure, the
subsequent dogged pursuit, in many of the
country’s fisheries, of Hardin’s alternative —
the privatization and concentration of the
common property in individual and primarily
corporate hands, through market
mechanisms.
The first phase–the one of paternalistic State
control–started with the extension of
Canada’s fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical
miles in 1977, and saw the uncontrolled
growth of harvesting capacity, much of it
encouraged by the government’s desire to
industrialize the fishery. By the mid- to late-
1980s, overcapacity, overfishing and sharp
conflicts between fleet sectors over resource
access defined many of Canada’s fisheries.
In Atlantic Canada, much of this conflict was
between the traditional small-scale sector,
known as the inshore fishery, and the highly
capitalized corporate offshore and individually
owned midshore sectors.
The second phase of Canada’s modern
fisheries management, dealing with this
overcapacity through the allocation of
property rights through individual transferable
quota (ITQ) schemes, began in the late 1980s,
and has been the State’s preferred, almost
exclusive, option ever since.
Descriptions of the Canadian State-
sponsored private-property schemes can be
found in the proceedings of both the
FishRights99 and the Sharing the Fish
2006 conferences.  They provide textbook
examples of the efficiency of property rights
and market-based mechanisms in putting a
stop to the dissipation of resource rents in
individual fisheries thereby generating rents
and subsequently allowing the State to
recuperate some of these through negotiated
agreements with quota holders, an
increasingly important objective of Canada’s
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
as it attempts to generate external revenues
to compensate for more than a decade of
continued budget cuts.
Critics in the small-scale fishery do not
challenge the efficiency of classic ITQ
systems in dealing with the macroeconomic
problems of oversubscribed fisheries. The
efficiency of the market is readily
acknowledged. It is the externalized costs to
fishing communities of the ITQ approach that
is in question.
Small minority
From the small-scale/community-fishery
perspective, ITQ systems give rights and
benefits (including significant economic
windfalls) to a small minority of individuals
in fishing communities, who are encouraged
to dispose of these rights in pursuit of their
economic self-interest, irrespective of the
impact on the community. Under this system,
the benefits of the right go to the individual,
while the long-term costs, in terms of
employment opportunities, resource access
and wider distribution of resource rents, get
transferred to the communities and future
generations.
In late 2004, the environmental non-
governmental organization (NGO), Ecotrust
Canada, published a major study on the
impacts of resource privatization in Canada’s
Pacific fishery, documenting, for the first time,
its costs from the perspective of community
and the small-scale fishery.
According to the study, the capital costs of
vessels and equipment in the Pacific fishery
shrunk dramatically from Can$777 mn in the
pre-privatization period (the late 1980s) to
Can$286 mn in 2003, as fishing rights
concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and
individual quotas eliminated overcapitalization
in the race for fish. But the research also
found that this decrease was offset by the
soaring capital costs of quota and licences,
which are now estimated at Can$1.8 bn.
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According to the report, “In the past, the
problem was too many fishermen chasing too
few fish, but today it has become too much
money chasing too few fish.
Overcapitalization in licence and quota has
become the problem, especially in terms of
social equity.”
The costs of licences and quotas are now so
high, Ecotrust Canada says, that a fisherman
needs to be a millionaire to enter most British
Columbia (BC) fisheries, putting ownership
of licences and quota out of the reach of most
rural families, aboriginal people and younger
fishermen.
The study goes on to document how market-
led mechanisms undermined the interests of
traditional fishing communities by stripping
them of fishing licences and quota. With
virtually no restrictions on who could buy
fishing rights, rural ownership of both quota
and licences declined precipitously.
Traditional fishing communities—particularly
aboriginal communities, which have been hit
especially hard—lost 45 per cent of all major
licences. The big winners were urban
investors—both corporate and individual—
who had better access to the capital needed
to purchase the quotas and fishing licences
that increased rapidly in value as more buyers
entered the market.
Limited ability
Rural residents, hobbled by lower incomes,
reduced economic opportunities and lower
property values that limited their borrowing
ability, simply could not match the prices
urban dwellers and corporations were willing
to pay for licences and quotas that were put
up for sale by harvesters in their
communities.
Another notable consequence of this transfer
of fishing rights from rural to urban hands
has been the siphoning off of resource rents
from working fishermen to ‘slipper skippers’,
absentee resource-rights owners, who do not
fish but lease the rights they own back to
working fishermen. In separate research, the
Canadian Council of Professional Fish
Harvesters (CCPH) has documented how in
some BC fisheries, like herring, up to 70 per
cent of the landed value in some years is paid
to rights holders. Since the rights are leased
at prices set prior to the fishing season, this
has led to fishermen fishing an entire season
at a loss. The practice of leasing is now so
widespread that even those captains who own
licences and quotas deduct the going market
rate for leases from the calculation of crew
shares, thereby significantly reducing returns
to crew members. According to CCPH, the
costs of leasing are also endangering the lives
of fishermen as captains cut back on crew
levels to reduce costs and also venture out in
unsafe conditions because of the need to fish
quota they have paid for, before the season
ends.
The DFO is now in the process of introducing
ITQs for the Pacific salmon fishery, following
the recommendations of Professor Peter
Pearse, a consultant to the department who
was also one of the keynote speakers at the
Sharing the Fish conference. This will bring
the last major Pacific fishery under a property-
rights scheme. There is nothing to suggest
that safeguards will be established to protect
coastal-community interests as that process
is launched.
With property rights now firmly established
in Canada’s Pacific fishery and the costs of
acquiring these rights beyond the reach of
most residents of coastal communities, the
only way to restore these rights to the
communities that originally had them is by
entering the rights market. This is what
Ecotrust Canada now proposes to do. It hopes
to establish a capital fund to acquire fishing
licences in the open market, and then lease
them to young, new entrants to the fishery
from coastal communities at affordable rates.
The irony here is that an NGO is having to
raise significant amounts of capital to
purchase rights in order to restore them to a
new generation of rural residents whose
predecessors acquired them for nominal costs
but were allowed—even encouraged—by
government policy, to sell them off to the
highest bidder.
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In Atlantic Canada, there has been
generalized resistance to market-driven
privatization by the inshore fishery, generally
understood as comprising boats under 45 ft
length overall (LOA). There, inshore
fishermen’s organizations have developed
alternative rights-based schemes to control
and regulate access to the fishery. These
alternatives tend to be value-driven, and are
generally concerned with the equitable
distribution of resource rents because of the
impacts of inequitable distribution on coastal
communities. They are also very process-
oriented, seeking to build consensus through
bottom-up, democratic decisionmaking that
builds from the community level towards
larger territorial units (region, province, inter-
provincial). They have also tended to be
ecocentric, seeking to provide small-scale
harvesters with rights to the full range of
harvestable species adjacent to their
communities, using low-impact, fixed-gear
techniques, as opposed to limiting these rights
to specialist, single-species fleets using
higher-impact mobile gear. Throughout the
last 30 years of modern fisheries
management, this community-/small-scale
approach has been in constant tension and
conflict with a corporate view of rights
schemes that concentrates access and seeks
primarily to maximize the generation of
resource rents.
Modernization process
There are numerous examples of how the
small-scale sector in Atlantic Canada has
been successful in devising value-based rules
to allocate rights and restrict access to the
fishery. Very early on in the modernization
process, as the State imposed limited entry
to control access to fisheries resources, it
made a significant concession to the small-
scale sector by prohibiting corporations from
holding licences for species fished from
vessels of less than 65 ft LOA. This became
known as the ‘fleet separation policy’ as it
prohibited fish processors from ‘owning’
inshore fishing licences, thereby ‘separating’
processing from harvesting. Individuals who
obtained fishing licences in the under-65 ft
fleets also had to fish these licences
themselves. They could not (and still can not)
lease the licence or hire others to fish for
them. This became known as the owner-
operator policy.
Individuals were also prohibited from holding
more than one licence for the same species
but a multispecies-licence portfolio approach
was encouraged for the small-scale sector,
allowing only those who held certain key
licences to obtain licences for other species
as these became available either through
harvester retirement or the development of
new fisheries. The use of value-based criteria
such as ‘dependency’ (level of income
derived from fishing) and ‘attachment’
(length of time in the fishery) were also used
first in the Gulf region of the Maritime
provinces (New Brunswick, Prince Edward
Island and Nova Scotia) under the ‘bona fide
policy’ and, subsequently, in Newfoundland,
under the fish harvester professionalization
programme, to restrict access to full-time
fishermen. In Newfoundland, this led to the
denial of access to approximately 15,000 part-
time licence holders, cutting the numbers in
the small-scale sector in half, a process that
generated surprisingly little opposition, largely
because of the extensive community-level
consultations on the measures.
Nowhere has the contrast been sharper
between the value-driven approach for the
equitable distribution of fishery rents and the
rents concentration model than in the
Atlantic’s Area 12 snow-crab fishery.
Until the 1980s, snow crab was a marginal
fishery in Atlantic Canada. The collapse of
the Alaskan king crab fishery and the
Japanese appetite for seafood conspired to
increase international demand for this product
and turn it into one of Canada’s most lucrative
fisheries. Under limited entry, access rights
to Area 12, the most bountiful of the Atlantic’s
different crab-fishing areas, have been
restricted to 130 licence holders, since the
1970s. (They include seven native-owned
licences that were transferred to aboriginal
communities following a Canadian Supreme
Court ruling recognizing their treaty rights to
Throughout the
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the fishery.)  This fishery is generally
recognized as being well-managed. The
owner-operator licence holders in this
midshore fleet (vessels under 65 ft LOA)
moved to individual quota management with
strict limits on transferability in the late 1980s,
eliminating the race for fish and many
wasteful practices. The licence holders fund
and manage dockside monitoring, and
contribute significantly to funding the
government-based scientific stock
assessment through co-management
agreements. In many ways, the midshore
Area 12 crab fishery is a model fishery
except in one crucial area: the equitable
distribution of resource rents.
The generation and concentration of rents,
however, is the fishery’s hallmark. According
to costs and earnings estimates for 2002, this
fishery generated gross earnings per vessel
of more than Can$750,000, and average net
returns of Can$363,000 for what amounts to
a five-to-eight-week fishery. (The net return
is the amount generated above the break-
even point of Can$400,000 per vessel. The
break-even point includes salary of
Can$50,000 for the captain, and wages of
Can$29,400 for each of the crew, and a
return on capital invested of 11 per cent.)
Despite fluctuations in crab prices and total
allowable catch (TAC), this pattern of very
high profitability has been consistent for the
last 15 years. It also contrasts sharply with
the very low returns to both labour and capital
for the 1,230 inshore-fishery licence holders
in some of the same communities along the
eastern shore of the province of New
Brunswick (NB). These small-scale,
multispecies fishermen, who derive most of
their income from lobster but also fish other
species in a season that lasts six months,
generate net incomes per vessel between
Can$3,500 and Can$5,600, after paying
themselves wages between Can$10,350 and
Can$14,000.
Easily accessible
NB inshore fishermen were excluded from
the snow-crab fishery until 1995, despite the
fact that the resource was both plentiful and
easily accessible to them using their existing
vessels. In communities where unemployment
is very high and where job opportunities
outside the fishery very limited, this exclusion
was a source of resentment, social conflict
and general instability in the fishery.
After extensive political lobbying, the Minister
of Fisheries reallocated a small percentage
of the snow-crab fishery quota to NB inshore
fishermen for the first time in 1995. Under
the leadership of their organization, the
Maritime Fishermen’s Union (MFU), the
licence holders chose to exercise this right in
a highly creative and democratic way, with a
strong emphasis on equitable distribution of
benefits.
Given that the allocation was not large enough
to make a significant impact on each
individual enterprise—had it been divided
equally—the licence holders chose to hold and
manage the quota collectively, through the
MFU, and distribute its benefits in the
following way:
z Approximately 60 per cent of the quota
was divided into 11,000-lb individual
quotas, which were distributed by lottery
to partnership groups of four or more
fishermen (that is, a partnership of four
would receive 44,000 lb) who were leased
crab traps purchased by the MFU. It was
agreed that any fishermen who received
quota through the lottery would not be
eligible in subsequent years for another
chance at receiving quota until all licence
holders had received a 11,000-lb share.
z The remaining quota was fished by charter,
and the proceeds were used to:
z finance an extended healthcare plan for
all 1,230 licence holders and their families
z support a fish-harvester professionali-
zation programme, finance scallop- and
lobster-enhancement projects, and for
scientific research on herring stocks.
Except for the years it was excluded from
the crab fishery (1998, 1999 and 2000), the
MFU continued to manage its allocation of
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snow-crab quota according to the same
formula.
Fleet rationalization
However, the long-term decline of lobster
landings in eastern NB and the deteriorating
returns to the inshore fleet forced the MFU,
in 2004, to significantly change its strategy
and to begin using the crab resource for fleet
rationalization purposes. It chose an
approach, however, that was a radical
departure from traditional practices. Instead
of using market mechanisms or centrally
managed licence buyback and retirement
schemes, it has instead turned the crab
resource over to fishing communities and
empowered them to make the decisions on
how best to use it to bring harvesting capacity
in their communities in line with resource
availability and fleet economic viability. The
approach, if it is successful, will ensure that
revenues from the inshore crab allocation are
spent in the best interests of coastal
communities by allowing these very same
communities, through democratic, grass-
roots processes, to make these decisions
themselves.
Under the new approach, which was adopted
in 2005 after extensive community
consultations, the MFU continues to receive
an allocation of snow crab on behalf of all
inshore licence holders in eastern NB. From
the proceeds of the crab allocation, it also
continues to fund a health insurance plan,
which is available to all licence holders and
their families. But the MFU no longer conducts
a central lottery for the distribution of
individual crab quotas. Instead, it distributes
the crab quota on a pro-rata basis to 12
Communities of Interests (COI), territorial
units made up of groups of inshore fishing
licence holders who share a certain affinity/
territory (see map). The COIs decide how
many vessels will harvest their respective
quotas and how much they will pay to have
fishermen in their communities fish the crab
according to harvesting plans determined and
approved by all licence holders in public
meetings.
The other significant change is that a
mandatory minimum of 50 per cent of net
revenues - after paying administration and
health-plan costs - must be used for licence-
retirement schemes in the communities.
However, it is up to the COIs to decide how
best to remove excess capacity in the fishery
in their communities, according to the funds
available to them.
In addition, monies from the crab sales are
also set aside in each COI for economic
diversification and development funds to
finance sustainable-development projects in
the communities, again decided upon by the
fishermen according to criteria common to
all COI. For example, several COIs have
already identified the purchase of lobster
larvae for seeding in their communities from
a project that was initiated by the MFU several
years ago.
The COI approach to the allocation of fishing
rights is a radical departure from the market-
driven, individual-property-rights process
experienced elsewhere in Canada. Instead
of allocating fishing rights to individuals, who
are then free to use them in the pursuit of
their self-interest, irrespective of the impact
on the community, it creates a situation
whereby community interests are placed
front and centre. In the words of the MFU,
under the COI approach, fishermen have to
organize themselves and make decisions
collectively on the use of the fishing rights
“to tackle both the problems of the fishery
and the economic development challenges
faced by their communities.” The approach
is designed to work in the long-term interests
of fishing communities and to make
fishermen accountable for the decisions that
they make on the use of their rights. The
programme is very new and has created all
kinds of challenges for the MFU. It remains
to be seen how successful it will be. But from
the community perspective, it can do no worse
than the alternative processes that have
already proven to strip communities of access
to fishery resources.
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The Canadian experience with the allocation
of tradable, individual property rights as a
means for dealing with fisheries
overcapacity shows that these schemes can
be highly successful in concentrating the
benefits of the fishery in the hands of
individual rights holders. These schemes,
however, have worked to undermine
sustainable development in traditional, rural
fishing communities by depriving them of
access to fisheries resources. In the best
interest of their communities, the small-scale
fish harvesters in Canada have consistently
sought to devise rights-based systems for
fisheries management that distribute the
benefits of fisheries access equitably and
avoid concentration.
If there is to be an international conference
on rights-based systems focused on the
interests of the small-scale fishery and
traditional fishing communities, then
representatives of the Canadian small-scale
fishery would surely want to participate. They
would not come forth proselytizing for ITQs,
however, nor representing a ‘temperate-
world minority’ view. Rather, I suspect, they
would come to share, listen and learn as part
of a universal majority of women and men
who fish for a living, care passionately about
their small communities, and want them to
continue providing decent livelihoods for their
children’s children’s children.  
...fishermen have
to organize
themselves and
make decisions
collectively on the
use of the fishing
rights “to tackle
both the problems
of the fishery and
the economic
development
challenges faced
by their
communities”
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As the world's fisheries continue to come under scrutiny for their potential
to be depleted of resources due to various pressures, including overfishing,
modern fisheries management has focused on allocation of fishing rights as
one prescription for sustainable fisheries management. Solutions based on
such a perspective have often pivoted around the gamut of property rights,
and how to control the social arrangements that govern the ownership, use
and disposal of factors of production and goods and services in the fisheries
sector.
Rights-based management in fisheries, as this dossier shows, can take several
forms, including licensing, and individual and community fishing quotas.
How property-rights regimes address the issue of allocation of ownership
will determine their effectiveness in equitably spreading welfare throughout
the fishing/coastal community. Only by recognizing fishing rights that are
socially sensitive and address the issues of labour, gender and human rights,
can fishing communities, especially small-scale, traditional ones, be assured
of social justice in the face of moves towards ecological and resource
sustainability.
These are some of the issues discussed in this dossier, which is a collection
of articles from SAMUDRA Report, the triannual publication of the
International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF).
ICSF (www.icsf.net) is an international NGO working on issues that concern
fishworkers the world over. It is in status with the Economic and Social
Council of the UN and is on ILO's Special List of Non-Governmental
International Organizations. It also has Liaison Status with FAO. Registered
in Geneva, ICSF has offices in Chennai, India, and Brussels, Belgium. As a
global network of community organizers, teachers, technicians, researchers
and scientists, ICSF's activities encompass monitoring and research, exchange
and training, campaigns and action, as well as communications.
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